The Right to Choose in Afghanistan
     
 

The Right to Choose in Afghanistan

Omar Zakhilwal

 

I am a member of the Loya Jirga’s silent majority – or rather, silenced majority – who came to Kabul expecting to shape our nation’s future but instead find ourselves being dragged back into the past.

 

We came from all parts of the country to claim our freedom and democracy, but instead are being met with systematic threats and intimidation aimed at undermining our free choice.  We came strengthened by international declarations on human rights, but instead are facing international complicity in the denial of our rights.  We came to represent the diverse interests of the entire Afghan nation, 1,500 delegates for 25 million people, but instead are being pressured to support the narrow agenda of warlords and their foreign sponsors.  We came to inaugurate an inclusive and professional transitional government, but instead are being compelled to rubberstamp the Bonn Agreement’s unjust power-sharing arrangements.

 

The fundamental question we face is this: will the new government be dominated by the same warlords and factional politics responsible for two decades of violence and impunity, or can we break with this legacy and begin to establish a system of law and professional governance?

 

The Afghan people have spoken clearly on this issue.  I recently participated in a UN-commissioned assessment mission by the Center for Economic and Social Rights, a human rights group based in New York.  Our report documents widespread agreement among all Afghans, from urban professionals to landless farmers, that there should be no role for warlords in the country’s future, and that international aid will be wasted unless the underlying conditions of peace and security are first established.

 

The same consensus holds in the Loya Jirga.  I estimate that at least 80% of delegates favor excluding all warlords from the government.  The 200 women delegates are especially outspoken on this issue.  In a spontaneous display of democracy, they publicly rebuked two powerful symbols of Afghanistan’s violent past – Burhannudin Rabbani, former President of the Mujahideen government from, and Gen. Mohammed Fahim, former intelligence chief during this period and currently Defense Minister in the interim government. 

 

But due to behind-the-scenes pressure, our voices are being silenced and the warlords empowered.  Let me give some concrete examples.

 

When the Loya Jirga opened, support for former King Zahir Shah was extremely strong.  Rather than address the issue democratically, almost two days of the six-day Loya Jirga were wasted while a parade of high-level officials from the interim government, the United Nations, and the United States visited Zahir Shah and eventually “persuaded” him to publicly renounce his political ambitions.

 

When the Loya Jirga recommenced, the delegates were surprised to see Afghanistan’s thirty provincial governors, none of whom were elected to serve in the grand assembly.  It soon became apparent that their purpose was to serve as arm-twisters for the interim government, which is dominated by warlords from the Northern Alliance.  “You are all with me. You will do as I tell you to do. If you dare not to follow me we all go back to our province after this [Loya Jirga], don’t we?”, is a direct quote from a governor to the delegates of his province.

 

These men controlled less than 10% of the country before the fall of the Taliban, and therefore have little direct influence over most Loya Jirga members, especially those from rural areas in the South, East and West.  The governors, on the other hand, are able to leverage their local military and financial power to pressure delegates from their provinces to support handpicked candidates allied to the Northern Alliance.  Their persuasive abilities are enhanced by scores of Interior Ministry agents who are circulating throughout the Loya Jirga compound and openly intimidating outspoken delegates.

 

Equally discouraging is the role played by the involved international organizations and the expectations set forth by them. An adviser to UN chief Lakhdar Brahimi told me in no uncertain terms that the Loya Jirga was not aimed to bring about fundamental political changes like ridding the government of warlords.  Meanwhile, Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Envoy on Afghanistan, has caused some disappointment in the Loya Jirga through pressure tactics aimed at undercutting popular support for Zahir Shah.

 

The Loya Jirga is being treated as a ratification tool for backroom political deals.  As one example, the media has reported on the “voluntary” decision of Interior Minister Yunus Qanooni to drop his candidacy.  But it is not being reported that he will assume an equally powerful post in the new government, or that his intended replacement is himself a member of Qanuni’s Northern Alliance faction (as is Fahim and Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah).

 

On the first day of the Loya Jirga, we were filled with hope and enthusiasm.  Most of us stayed up past midnight in spirited debates about the country’s future.  By the third day, a palpable demoralization has set in.  Our time is being wasted on trivial procedural matters.  We feel manipulated and harassed.  Our historic responsibility to the Afghan nation is becoming a charade.

 

We are in Kabul because we believe that participation and democracy are more than words on paper.  We are not asking for much, after all.  Simply the right to determine our own government and future in accordance with the human rights ideals so loudly trumpeted by the international community.  The same rights as all other people.

 
 

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