Afghanistan: Return, Repatriation, Reconstruction

By Louis Dupree

February 1989, Page 3

In 1980, when I first began to write about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I discussed the patterns which began with the leftist coup on April 27-28, 1978, using seven R's: revolution, rhetoric, repression, reforms, revolts, refugees, and Russians. I added three more R's in 1986, the year of the Stingers: revenge, retribution, and Reagan. Now, I hope we can conclude with: return, repatriation, and reconstruction.

Afghan culture sprang into action (or inaction) as dust from the 1978 coup settled over the streets of Kabul and the bodies and disabled tanks were buried or towed away.

People Can't Farm and Fight

The leaders of the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) were pleased that the countryside remained quiet during the first few months after the coup. They did not understand the seasonal aspects of tribal warfare. People cannot farm and fight at the same time. And, from spring to fall, Afghan farmers and herdsmen find themselves engaged in maximum economic activities.

The regional revolts began right on schedule. The Nuristani went out first, to be ultimately followed by groups in all 29 provinces. In the traditional cultures of the Central Asian-Iranian plateau, first revolts are not necessarily designed to overthrow, but to express disapproval of the actions of the central government. In the same tradition, the DRA should have responded with just enough force to stop the revolts and then call a Loya Jirgah (Great National Assembly) to consider the grievances of the people.

However, the DRA, with all its new military hardware from the Soviets, overreacted and bombed the regions which revolted, thereby creating a badal (blood feud) between the government and the people, so that when spring 1979 blossomed, many of the mujahedin stayed in the field to fight, while others returned to their villages to farm. This was a new cultural signal to the DRA: "We are now out to overthrow you." And, in all probability, the mujahedin would have succeeded if the Soviets had not intervened in December 1979, their first direct military aggression against a non-aligned, independent country since World War II.

The war became regional in orientation. Tribes and ethnic groups came together whenever DRA and/or Soviet troops intruded into their locality. The vertical segmentary kin-tribal structures which are found all over rural Afghanistan (with varying degrees of local intensity) band together whenever threatened by an outside horizontal force, even though neighbors may be blood enemies. Local enmities are set aside to fight outsiders. Also, the ideal male personality type in Afghan society is (again, with varying degrees of intensity) the warrior-poet, a man who is brave in battle and articulates well at the village council.

Role of Islam Central to Jihad

The role of Islam in Afghanistan cannot be overemphasized. Islam is the umbrella under which all Afghan mujahedin can fight the jihad (struggle, not holy war). However, the terms "moderate" and "fundamentalist" are used to describe the various political parties in Peshawar. Only a few "conservative" (a better term) Afghans want to go back to an idealized golden age of Islam, which never existed except in the minds of a few romantics. Virtually all leaders want to use Islam as a weapon to move Afghanistan into the 21st century-Islam's 16th century.

Although the symbolic manifestations of the new political resurgence (and it's political as well as religious) in the Islamic world may jar some Western ethnocentric sensitivities, it must be remembered that these symbols are meaningful within their cultural contexts.

The pre-war rural power elites in Afghanistan consisted of collective leaderships, not a single village chief. Westerners usually seek out the leader in a power situation, but in Afghanistan, the leader seldom exists. Naturally, from time to time, one rish-i-safid (Persian) or spin gerey (Pashto, both refer to "white beards") in a village jirgah (often called mailis or "council" in north Afghanistan) can become dominant, but this is not the ideal or usually the reality.

The village council consists of the heads of lineages (or some such kinunit) and each is a specialist: water rights, marital problems, property rights, the war chief (who leads in the feuds), and one individual who is the "go between" with the nearest government offices. Often, outsiders identify this individual as the malik (a khan, beg, boyar-different names in different regions). The go-between, however, would never make a spot decision on an important issue, but would refer the matter to the village council for a collective consensus.

The war accelerated a process which had already begun in the 1960s, after a fair system of conscription was introduced. Jalbis (draftees) served for two years in either the army, air force, police, gendarmes, or labor corps, and then most returned to their home villages. Like veterans everywhere, they frequently banded together to compare their common experiences which had occurred outside the normal village cultural patterns. These informal rural groups were evolving into local de facto (if not de jure) power groups before the war. Seldom did they openly challenge the traditional "white beards," but made their collective input felt in the decision-making processes.

Many of these younger men (now more mature) have become commanders and sub-commanders because of their previous military experience-and their charisma. Some are also members of families represented in the traditional village councils or local religious leaders. No matter what their prior role and status, however, the military commanders will definitely become a part of the post-war de jure power elite.

In May 1985, the seven major political parties in Peshawar were forced into a shotgun marriage by Pakistan and other interested parties, such as the US and Saudi Arabia, as well as by many inside Afghan commanders who insisted that if they could organize cooperative military operations inside Afghanistan, the least the parties could do would be to present a common front to the outside world.

Although shaky, the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedin (IUAM) has held together. Actually, the parties have performed two valuable functions since the Soviet invasion: they have been a major face to the outside world and they have been the main conduit of supplies to the resistance.

However, of the seven leaders, only Yunis Khalis of the Hezbi Islami has a traditional, territorial base of power. This is among the Khugiana Pushtun of the Surkhab region near Jalalabad, and even his base is being challenged by other local leaders. The rest, supported by such major outside backers as the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, have followers, and followers have the habit of following anyone with the goodies.

This does not mean that the six will have no roles to perform in the post-withdrawal period, but they will probably have to accommodate themselves to the commanders and the traditional leadership inside, rather than vice-versa.

One major fault with the IUAM as it is constituted is that it includes none of the Shi'ite groups, which probably make up 15 to 20 percent of Afghanistan's population. Other minority groups such as the Aimaq, Nuristani, and Baluch also lack adequate representation.

A subtle linguistic change has occurred since the Soviet intervention. During the first few years of the war, the regional leaders would speak of "driving the Soviet and puppet troops from our valley" or "our region." Now many leaders speak of "driving the Soviet invaders out of Afghanistan," a recognition that all the nation is involved in the military action. But, regional ethnolinguistic ties are still the strongest emotions, except among some of the urbanized Western-educated, Western-oriented, and Western reacting minority.

Possible Political Scenarios

A number of possible political scenarios must be considered when one looks ahead to post-withdrawal Afghanistan. I shall only consider a few seriously, but most can be rejected immediately, even though they have their partisan supporters among both Afghans and their sympathizers.

The Republic Survives. Under General Secretary Najibullah, the republic survives and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) dominates. Not likely. In fact, virtually impossible, Oven the destructive and failed pacification efforts, with so much blood shed.

A Coalition Government. Najibullah succeeds in forming a coalition government with the PDPA represented, even if not dominant. Major splits still exist in the PDPA, however. Parcham ("The Banner") now controls most government posts, but Khalq ("The Masses") remains strong in the military. Also, Parcham is split into two camps: one is pro-Najibullah and the other supports his predecessor, Babrak Kamal.

The "War Lord" Gambit. The fear of some observers is that if postwar refugee repatriation supplies and reconstruction materials are controlled by local commanders, they will become virtual regional "war lords," such as existed in China during the 1930s. Given the patterns of collective leaderships mentioned earlier, this is an improbable scenario.

Najibullah Overthrown: Soviets Return. This is certainly a possibility, but given what most Soviet specialists think, I believe this scenario improbable.

Afghan Army General or Generals or Other Ranks Seize Kabul, Overthrow Najib and Invite Soviets Back. Many regular army officers remain loyal to Khalq, so such a scenario is possible. It is improbable, however, that those who participated in such a coup would invite the Soviets to return.

Afghan Army General(s) Invite the IUAN and/or the Main Commanders to Kabul. This is more plausible than the preceding scenario, but also of remote possibility.

Afghan Army General(s) Invite Former King Mohammad Zahir to Return and Form a Government The possible role of the former king, now residing in Italy as an exile-in-waiting, has been discussed and is being discussed by the Soviets, Americans, Pakistanis, Afghan refugees, and almost anyone who has any interest in the Afghan situation. In general, non-Pushtun groups do not favor the return of the Mohammadzai Durrani ex-monarch in any capacity.

No matter what one feels about Zahir Shah, his personality, and accomplishments, he can possibly-just possibly-perform one valuable function over a 24 to 48 hour period. When Afghanistan settles down to a peace, however shaky, the former king could fly into Kabul in a private capacity. He could appear on Kabul TV and announce that, in the interest of national unity and in keeping with Afghan culture and history, he proposes to call a national assembly to consider what form an Afghan government should take. He would leave the selection of delegates to the regional power elites, or, alternatively, he could call elections. Having done this, Zahir Shah would then return to Italy.

Evolution of an Islamic Federated Republic. Such a republic would be based on provincial autonomy or semi-autonomy. Afghanistan is now going through a genuine revolution, and revolutions (to paraphrase Chairman Mao) are not tea parties. When a revolutionary movement overthrows a government, at the center the result is a bloody transitional period.

When the political dust has settled and the bodies are buried, Afghanistan's Islamic Federated Republic will be based on Islamic principles but probably not dominated by conservative religious leaders. The regional mujahedin commanders and the traditional power elite will come together in Kabul to decide the political future. Outside interference from any source will backfire, and the Afghans will solve their problems in their own way collective leadership, with ultimate elections of representatives determined by population density.

The autonomous provinces can number anywhere from 6 to 10, depending on how the leadership defines the ethnolinguistic and ecological zones. Four criteria should be considered in drawing the boundaries, and it may be necessary to re-draw them from time to time. The four are: distribution of major ethnolinguistic groups (not every small group can expect autonomy); river patterns and the flow of hydraulics; lines of communication and commerce between cities, towns, and villages; and natural resources and regional potential for development. The new republic's foreign policy will be non-aligned with loose ties, which means "partly aligned" at any given time, with one superpower or another. A map should be prepared with pertinent overlays comparing the 6 to 10 options.

The evolution of the Islamic Federated Republic of Afghanistan will take time, but time is a natural resource the Afghans have in abundance. They have resisted the Soviets for almost 10 years, and have suffered heavily.

The free world, the Third World, the Muslim world, and even Eastern Europe all owe a debt to the Afghans. They stopped centuries of Russian aggression which began about 600 years ago when the Principality of Muscovy began to branch out and followed its destiny to the Pacific. Now it has no place to go. Instead it can look forward and, inshallah, work to achieve Gorbachev's announced goals of glasnost and perestroika.

I am convinced of two things: the Afghans will decide their own future and outside interference from any source will be rejected. Influences are already in place, but outside interference will not be tolerated. Ask the Soviets.

Louis Dupree is visiting professor of public policy studies in Duke University's Islamic and Arabian development studies program, He and his wife returned in January 1989 from six months in Pakistan on six-month Fullbright program research and teaching grants. He has been researching and writing about the area since 1949.