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Chapter 4
This chapter will begin with a description of the lead-up to the deployment of the PRTs. I start by outlining the role of the key contributing nations, notably the US and UK: first as war-makers in the 'fight against terrorism' and now as would-be peace providers. I then move on to describe the key security challenges in Afghanistan and the steps that have been taken so far to address them.
The US military response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon began on 7 October 2001 when a 'war on terror' was declared. President Bush sought to muster a coalition of nations to operate under a US command structure. Many nations made small contributions, with the UK in particular stepping forward with the necessary troops and hardware to take joint military action (O'Ballance, 2002, p.164). Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted, giving the allied nations 'the blessing of a larger community of states' (Weiss, 1999, p.26). The resolution reaffirms that acts of terrorism 'constitute a threat to international peace and security' (UN Security Council, 2001), and in the preamble cites Article 51 of the UN Charter by 'reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations …' (ibid.). Whether SC 1373 (2001) did or did not 'legalise' US-led military action in Afghanistan is open to debate (1). The very process, however, of engaging with the Security Council and making reference to the UN Charter allowed the coalition to appear at least to be acting in accordance with commonly held principles and values.
Humanitarian goals, whilst not the principal basis for action, added weight to coalition arguments for the use of force under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom. Both the US and UK made public statements to emphasise the suffering of the Afghan people under the Taliban regime. Donald Rumsfield spoke of the need to 'stand with those Afghans who are being repressed by a regime that abuses the very people it purports to lead' (Rumsfield, 2001); while Tony Blair reminded the British public that 'our argument is not with the Afghan people. They are victims of the Taliban regime. They live in poverty, repressed viciously, women denied even the most basic human rights and subject to a crude form of theocratic dictatorship that is as cruel as it is arbitrary' (Blair, 2001).
The coalition repeatedly emphasised the careful targeting of military strikes. The Taliban regime and al-Qaida were the enemy and every effort was being made to avoid civilian casualties. Despite this, some 1,000 to 1,300 Afghan civilians are estimated to have died as a direct result of coalition military strikes (Connetta, 2002, p.1). Indirectly, as many as 20,000 more Afghans may have lost their lives (Pilger, 2003a) (2).
A number of high profile 'mistakes' by coalition Forces, including the double bombing of a Red Cross food warehouse (AFP, 2001a), fuelled public concern about the potentially adverse effects of military action and prompted a rare public reproach from the ICRC. More generally, the existing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan prior to 11 September is thought to have been significantly worsened by military strikes. Peter Marsden (2001) describes the scene in dramatic terms:
'The most immediate effect of the military intervention was a humanitarian disaster that developed at great speed, compounding the suffering already created by the drought and the ongoing conflict. Fear of bombardment caused the majority of the population of the cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat to flee, adding to the 1 million people already internally displaced. The World Food Programme faced an almost impossible challenge, seeking to distribute through NGOs within Afghanistan a sufficient quantity of food aid before the winter set in. UNICEF warned that deaths of children under 5 could rise by some 100,000 … ' (p.30).
Widespread calls for a pause in the bombing to allow for the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance followed. Whilst refusing to oblige, both US and UK governments went to great pains to stress their own humanitarian contributions to the Afghan population. For the US this controversially included the airdropping of food rations to remote areas of Afghanistan - provoking further outrage from the humanitarian community (3). Financial contributions to the humanitarian effort in Afghanistan from the two nations also increased dramatically (4).
The sudden collapse of the Taliban and their rapid retreat to their stronghold of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, left the way clear for a new interim government to take power. The Bonn Conference in November 2001 saw the formation of the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA): an unstable coalition led by Hamid Karzai and dominated by the Northern Alliance. The AIA was mandated to rule for a period of 6 months until an emergency loya jirga, or national assembly, could vote for an Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) to take its place. In turn, the ATA, now established, is authorised to rule for an interim period of 18 months until national elections are held in mid-2004 (IISS, 2003, p.278).
Moves to transform Afghanistan's fragmented power structure into a centralised administration have obvious implications for the warlords in Afghanistan who derive considerable benefits from a regionalised power system. Their economic survival is ensured by illegal operations such as the smuggling of goods, the opium trade, transit fees, etc; and the domination of populations by their own large militia armies. They have a great deal to lose by not being represented in a centralised government. Not surprisingly then, many of them fought hard to infiltrate and violate power-sharing procedures, often threatening to disrupt the entire reform process when faced with exclusion. In response, Hamid Karzai, in pursuit of a political transition and fearing that a tough line would see an end to peace in Afghanistan, made a number of significant concessions. As a result, his cabinet is largely dominated by one faction (5) and contains a number of members suspected of serious human rights abuses (Johnson et al, 2003, p.3)
In pursuit of its military goals, the US has armed, financed and further facilitated the re-emergence of these same warlords (Dahrnendorf, 2003, p.336). With an attitude that warlord rule is unfortunate but inevitable (IISS, 2003, pp.274-275), the US continues to pursue a strategy of co-option despite the fact that short-term military gains appear to be in direct contradiction of the longer-term goal of strengthening the rule of central authorities (6). In his statement before the US Government's International Relations Committee, John Sifton of Human Rights Watch said in condemnation of the US government's support for Afghanistan's warlords:
'…there is a need for the US, and all other nations involved in Afghanistan, to cut off support for the warlords themselves. We urge specifically the Department of Defence, the Defence Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency - all of whom are cooperating with local military leaders in Afghanistan - to take better steps to avoid strengthening local military leaders. As is stands, the United States has a split strategy in Afghanistan - supporting Hamid Karzai on the one hand, but cooperating with local warlords to hunt former Taliban on the other' (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.3).
In many ways, a great deal has been achieved in Afghanistan since September 2001. The transitional administration has adopted a national development framework and budget; a constitution is in the process of being drafted; a new national currency, the afghani, has been accepted and is already stable; the IMF estimates that the economy grew by 28% last year; over 2 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan from neighbouring countries, and between 4 to 5 million children, both boys and girls, have returned to school (CARE, 2003a; The Economist, 2003a, pp.41-42; International Rescue Committee, 2003;). After 23 years of war in Afghanistan, whilst there is certainly no cause for complacency, these are significant steps forward worthy of celebration.
However, the security situation remains extremely fragile and is in danger of jeopardising progress made to date. Indeed, security is often quoted as the primary issue that concerns Afghans above all others (Johnson et al, 2003, p.5). Reports from aid workers in Afghanistan paint a worrying picture. Ordinary Afghans are being harassed and intimidated; criminality is growing, with increasing numbers of robberies, thefts and assaults; fighting between ethnic groups and factional leaders continues; warlord rule has strengthened (thanks in part to international interference); and representatives of the interim Afghan Government and aid workers are being targeted by hostile groups (7) (Christian Aid, 2003; International Rescue Committee, 2003; Stapleton, 2003b, p.3). The security situation in the south and southeast of the country is particularly worrying, with UN field work currently suspended in the south following a spate of attacks on aid workers (Burnett, 2003, p.3). According to NGOs, 'the security spiral is downward, and the people of Afghanistan are now speaking of the "days of better security under the Taliban"' (International Rescue Committee, 2003).
The economy of war continues to dominate the national market, threatening to become what Cramer and Goodhand (in Milliken, 2003) refer to as a 'criminalized peace economy' (p.151). Poppy cultivation is spreading to new areas of the country and opium now accounts for perhaps a third of the Afghan economy (The Economist, 2003a, p.43). Smuggling of gems and arms as well as unregulated trade in legitimate goods continue to flourish. Instead of this trade forming a source of revenue for the central government, customs dues are largely charged and withheld by local power-holders (Johnson et al, 2003, p.11).
A recent statement by the ATA revealed that insecurity and widespread lawlessness might force the postponement of elections due to take place in June 2004 (MacAskill, 2003). The UN echoes these fears by stressing the urgent need to dramatically improve security in Afghanistan as it launches its drive to register some 10 million Afghan voters in time for elections next year (AFP, 2003). Time is therefore of the essence in finding a way to improve the security situation if the recovery and reconstruction process is to remain on track.
Within this worrisome context, the coalition continues to wage its 'war on terror' in Afghanistan. Approximately 12,000 US-led coalition combat troops are still engaged in active combat (International Rescue Committee, 2003; The Economist, 2003a, p.41), mainly in southern parts of the country. The emphasis of coalition activities is now shifting from combat to stability operations, but as Donald Rumsfield explains, 'the transition does not mark at end to combat operations… Forces will continue to root out terrorist elements around the country, and the US will continue to support the formation of the Afghan National Army' (Marroni, 2003).
Whilst predominantly combat focused, coalition troops have also been involved in small-scale 'humanitarian' and 'reconstruction' activities. Their perceived encroachment into humanitarian territory prior to the development of the PRT concept caused serious concern. Sightings of US Civil Affairs Officers 'posing' as humanitarian workers in Afghanistan around March 2002 provoked furious condemnation from NGOs. Soldiers were spotted wearing civilian clothes, carrying concealed weapons and driving unmarked vehicles. Soldiers 'cross-dressing' (Slim, 2003b, p.5) in this way may, Hugo Slim warns, 'get quite close to perdify as defined in the Geneva Conventions and so risk being a breach of international humanitarian law' (ibid., p.5). NGO representatives in Afghanistan, outraged by this blatant blurring of civilian-military distinctions, wrote to US Government representatives, requesting that: '…transparency be maintained in any military involvement in civil affairs operations. Soldiers (and intelligence officers) should in no case claim to be in Afghanistan as 'humanitarian workers. In addition, all military personnel involved in conducting civil affairs operations should be in uniform and clearly identifiable as soldiers at all times. The humanitarian community objects in the strongest possible terms to armed soldiers dressing in civilian clothes in order to engage in civil assistance programmes' (The NGO Forum, Kabul, 2002).
ISAF came into operation under a UN Chapter VII mandate in early December 2001 to assist in the maintenance of security in Kabul and the immediate surrounding area. The 30-nation peacekeeping force currently consists of approximately 5,000 soldiers. The UK was the first to take the lead of ISAF, with other nations taking subsequent lead roles at 6-monthly intervals. NATO took command of ISAF In August 2003 and will remain in the lead for an indefinite period (Pitman, 2003).
There have been widespread calls for an expansion of ISAF's mandate beyond the perimeters of the Kabul area (8). Advocates for expansion include the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Kofi Annan, and Annan's special representative to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi. A renewed call from NGOs requests 'the expansion of the ISAF to key locations and major transport routes outside of Kabul and the active support for a comprehensive program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all militia forces outside the control of the central government' (International Rescue Committee, 2003).
Estimates vary dramatically as to the number of the troops that might be needed to realistically impact on the security situation. Some suggest that around 25,000 may be an adequate number (O'Hanlon, 2003, p.36); whilst Brahimi, in a recent appeal to the UN Security Council, talked in perhaps more realistic terms when he requested a further commitment of between 8 to 13,000 soldiers (UN News Service, 2003).
Whilst the US has approved an extension of ISAF's timeframe, it has sporadically opposed an expansion of its geographical coverage beyond Kabul. Publicly, US officials attribute their opposition to Afghanistan's difficult geography and poor infrastructure which, they claim, would make an expanded peacekeeping operation unwieldy and unrealistic (Marten, 2002, p.37). The US also points to the adequacy of other security-orientated initiatives currently underway, including their own programme to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the German-led police reform process - designed to develop Afghan capacity to enforce the rule of law. A Department of State report to Congress, however, indicates that US reticence is derived from a reluctance to encounter ISAF troops in areas where Operation Enduring Freedom is still active, with a fear that peacekeeping operations may interfere with efforts to achieve core US warfighting goals (ibid., p.37). Whatever the reasons, US opposition and refusal to contribute troops, have been held largely responsible for keeping ISAF on its tight leash within the Kabul area.
In answer to the call for increased security, but in line with its opposition to a geographic expansion of ISAF, the US has worked to develop an alternative: the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The key objective of PRTs is to create what is referred to as an 'ISAF effect' (Marsden, 2003, p.103; Stapleton, 2003a, p.4) - in other words, an expansion of the level of security currently being experienced in Kabul without the heavy footprint of a full, country-wide peacekeeping force. The next chapter will look at the PRTs in detail, examining and analysing their work at a variety of levels.
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