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Chapter 2
Peacekeeping as a collective term covers a diverse range of interventions: from traditional peacekeeping, to peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacebuilding, conflict prevention, humanitarian operations, etc. (Flint in Gordon and Toase, 2001, p.230; British Army, 1998, p.1-1). Other collective terms have now been coined as ‘catch-all’ labels, including peace support operations, multi-dimensional operations and wider peacekeeping (Slim, 1996, p.6). The array of terminology used to describe international interventions aimed at preventing, halting or resolving conflict is illustrative of the evolution in thinking and expansion of mandated tasks that have taken place since early peacekeeping initiatives were first seen in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Fetherston (1994), among others, despite in-depth studies of peacekeeping, fails to pin down a firm definition. She writes,
‘The real difficulty in providing a comprehensive functional definition of peacekeeping is that as peacekeeping takes on more and more functions the definitions get longer, more general and less useful’ (p.128).
Interventions during the Cold War period are now described retrospectively, somewhat romantically perhaps, as ‘traditional’, ‘classic’, ‘relatively straightforward’ or ‘generally benign’ (Wilkinson in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2000, pp.63-64; Pugh, 1998, p.345). In the Cold War landscape, lightly armed UN military observers and peacekeeping forces were generally deployed in the cessation of an inter-state conflict to oversee and assist with the implementation of a peace agreement. Examples include the United Nations Emergency Fund in the Sinai in the mid-1950s and the UN Forces in Cyprus from the mid-1960s onwards (Kühne in Ottunu and Doyle, 2001, p.377). Peacekeeping relied on the consent of the parties involved, with mandates for peacekeeping forces rooted, though not specifically defined, somewhere in between Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter (Slim, 1996, p.6). The number of military forces deployed and the resources required were relatively small in today’s terms, with the requirement to use force generally restricted to self-defence. Peacekeeping in this sense was seen as a deterrent, applied to ‘placate and refrigerate the conflict environment to allow formal negotiations to take place’ (Richmond, 2002, p. 44).
There is growing acceptance, largely unquestioned amongst academics and military and humanitarian practitioners alike, that the proliferation, nature and impact of ‘modern’ conflicts have changed dramatically since the beginning of the 20th Century, and particularly since the end of the Cold War. It is indeed the case that, with the end of superpower conflict, the number of intra-state wars has increased. State power has declined; traditional front lines are no longer clear; warring parties are not easily identified – with ‘traditional’ armies often replaced by militia groups and private security forces; chains of command are harder to track; rules of combat have been abandoned; conflicts last longer; and crucially, the casualties of war are now predominantly civilians who are not only the victims of war but also the targets, with mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing, and other acts of aggression targeting civilians, all too familiar features of ‘modern’ conflict (Kühne, 2001, p.378; Eliason, 1998, p.203; Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.4; Mackinlay in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2000, p.53).
Others question the novelty of ‘modern’ conflicts as described above. Hugo Slim, writing on the civilian idea in war, rejects the notion that the targeting of civilians is necessarily a new phenomenon (Slim, 2003a). He cites examples ranging from medieval conflicts in Europe to the British/US policy of ‘firebombing’ in the Second World War to demonstrate that there never has been any commonly agreed concept of ‘a civilian or civilian immunity’ (ibid., p.490). Violent conflict in Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, etc., he writes, are nothing more than a continuation of a ‘long history of warfare that rejects the civilian idea’ (ibid., pg.492). Similarly, Keane’s (1996) Reflections on Violence takes the reader through a series of chapters on the meaning, causes and effects of violence. In so doing he develops his theory of ‘uncivil society’, which he illustrates with a disturbingly rich series of examples through the ages.
But if wars have not changed - if the rules were never there to be broken in the first place - then what is different? Perhaps it is the appetite for engagement in other people’s wars? The Cold War period was certainly one of engagement, but largely with superpowers taking proxy roles in distant conflicts. The end of the Cold War saw a significant reduction in engagement in proxy wars and the beginning of an increased interest for contributions to peacekeeping operations. This new interventionist spirit now made possible by the ‘freedom’ that accompanied the end of the superpower stand-off and the subsequent ‘neutrality’, whether real or perceived, of the intervening party.
From the mid-1980s with the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping moved into what is now known as its ‘second generation’. With its new freedom and the perceived ‘right to intervene’, often justified on humanitarian grounds, the UN’s agenda for peace and security expanded rapidly. The number of military forces deployed and the budgets required to sustain those operations increased dramatically. Doyle (in Ottunu and Doyle, 1998) describes this acceleration from 1987 to 1994:
‘…the Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized, and increased from one to seven per year the number of economic sanctions it imposed. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than ten thousand to more than seventy thousand. The annual peacekeeping budget accordingly skyrocketed from $230 million to $3.6 billion in the same period…’ (p.3).
Illustrative of the new optimism and appetite for engagement at the end of the Cold War period was the decision by the Security Council in 1992 to commission the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to put forward his recommendations for a stronger and more efficient mechanism within the UN for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The result, later that same year, was An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The document broke new ground in setting out an optimistic and ambitious agenda for a proactive and principled UN. It captured the mood of the period by challenging notions of ‘absolute and exclusive sovereignty’ (ibid., p.9) and declared the UN’s will and right to intervene in state matters as never before.
The transition from ‘first generation’ through to ‘second’ has not been an entirely linear journey. The influence of individual UN Member States has taken the development of peacekeeping operations through a series of ‘phases’ or ‘eras’ (1). The UN may be able to provide guidance and develop policy on good practice in theory, but ultimately it can only work with the resources made available by its Member States and carry out decisions taken by its primary decision-making body, the Security Council. Slim (1996) describes the limitations on UN capability as being a result of its subservience to the domestic politics of its Member State
the original policies of Agenda for Peace are still in place but their implementation is being viewed still more selectively by the main powers in the UN on a case-by-case and “can-do” basis, largely determined by individual national interest’ (p.4)
The US has been particularly influential in steering UN peacekeeping policy. The US strategy of ‘assertive multilateralism’ (DiPrizio, 2002, p.3), optimistically set out in the wake of the Gulf War in January 1991 came to an abrupt end with the death of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 (2). The US administration rapidly withdrew from its multilateral phase and began a period of retrenchment and caution, with US decision-makers determined never again to ‘cross the Mogadishu line’ (ibid., p.102) for fear of risking domestic political capital. An increasingly casualty-averse US administration saw the development and approval of Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), demonstrating a reticence reminiscent of the post-Vietnam era (Weiss, 1995, p.158). Assertive multilateralism turned out to be a ‘fad’ (MacKinnon, 2000, p.3). Even the horrors in Rwanda less than a year later were unable to draw the US out of its ‘new frugality’ (Hill and Malik, 1996, p.156) in relation to peacekeeping. Others followed suit, refusing to contribute the adequate resources or forces necessary to prevent the eventual genocide in Rwanda in 1994.
Not only the number, but also the nature, of peacekeeping interventions has changed dramatically with the dawn of a new generation. Second generations peacekeepers now find themselves in more challenging environments – with a shift from intervening in static (or ‘frozen’) inter-state conflicts to increasing engagement in ongoing (or ‘hot’) civil wars. Within these complex environments the emphasis has shifted from a monitoring or observation role to attempts to actively resolve and settle conflicts (Williams, 1998, p.1).
Military mandates have broadened significantly since the containment strategies of the Cold War period. Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace sketches out for the first time a diverse range of tasks for potential UN engagement in the pursuit of peace and security. They are defined as preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and the ‘critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p.11). Boutros-Ghali urges the international community to take an integrated approach to address not only the symptoms but also the causes of war. In the words of Gordon and Toase (2001), An Agenda for Peace represents ‘the ‘silver bullet’ intended to slay the social, political, and economic forces which generate violence’ (Gordon and Toase, 2001, p.xxvi).
Boutros-Ghali’s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995), written three years later, attempts to illustrate what a comprehensive, multidimensional UN approach to peacekeeping might look like. The bewildering variety of functions for peacekeepers includes:
The supervision of cease-fires, the regroupement and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.6).
Intervention in post-conflict situations has become key for second-generation peacekeepers - the purpose being to prevent conflict re-emerging by (re)building the apparatus and capacity of a society to function without violence, thereby laying the foundations for durable peace. If post-conflict situations do not already exist then peacekeepers must try to create them. And, once there, it is the job of peacekeepers to
work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining…. making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners (Brahimi, 2000, p.2)
Intervention in complex emergencies at various stages within the conflict cycle requires the development of complex interventions (Wilkinson in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2000, p.67). Consideration must be given to ways of resolving rather than just managing conflict, focusing on and seeking to address the root causes of violence (Richmond, 2002, p.171). In the words of Boutros-Ghali this ‘requires integrated action and delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p.10). However, the parties to the conflict are often a complex mix of state and non-state actors – ‘a difficult mix for peacekeepers to handle’ (Kühne, 2001, p.378). Furthermore, many of the key players have no interest in a return to peace.< As Stephen Ryan writes: ‘not all groups will want transformation’ (Ryan in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2000, p.40). ‘Spoilers’ opposed to a peace agreement may seek to derail moves towards stability and security. More than ever, the pursuit of post-conflict peace-building calls for an increasingly multidimensional, multifunctional workforce with the skills to interact with a complex mix of actors and to provide more than just a deterrent military presence.
Despite the chaos of these new working environments, there is a sustained emphasis on the cornerstone principles of peacekeeping operations. Donald (2002), writes that
"Ever since the UN effectively invented armed peacekeeping in 1956, blue helmets have relied on a trinity of principles as their conceptual body armour. The consent of the parties, the neutrality/impartiality of the peacekeepers, and their minimum or non-use of force, were meant to keep them above the conflicts that they were despatched to ameliorate or end" (p.21) (my emphasis).
I will return to these principles again in Chapter 4 when I look at the work of the PRTs in Afghanistan. Using the principles as a framework, I will explore the problems associated with their application in a contemporary setting.
The task of the second-generation peacekeeper as described above is a daunting one. But of course, the military cannot (and should not, as I will argue later) be expected to work alone to resolve conflict and build peace. An effective interface between political, humanitarian and military components is essential in post-Cold War peacekeeping. Peacekeepers must adapt to work alongside a host of different actors also present on the scene. Williams (1998) describes this process of adaptation:
‘Armed forces still played a vital role in these missions, but this time in a strange new world in which they had to cope with both the ever-present – and largely critical – international media and the NGOs that became a feature of conflicts and humanitarian emergencies ‘(p.2).
In order to operate effectively together to fulfil their multidimensional mandate, both military and civilian actors need to take stock and consider the significance of their new working environment. Both sides of the partnership must consider their comparative advantages before deciding who should do what and how. This is no easy task. In general, the civil-military relationship is an uneasy alliance, fraught with political, ideological and technical challenges. These difficulties will be outlined in detail in the next chapter, followed by a look at the institutional arrangements designed to ease working relations between civilian and military actors and promote enhanced co-operation and co-ordination.
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Dennis Jett, building on the work of A.B. Fetherston, categorises those eras as follows:
In an interview with William Shawcross, a US official is quoted as describing the loss of American lives in Somalia as
‘the defining trauma, the consequences of which the US military will live with (and impose on the political leadership) long after the Clinton administration is gone. ‘Mogadishu’ and ‘Somalia’ are not place names now – they are cautionary slogans for disasters to be avoided at all costs.’ (Shawcross, 2000, pg.102).