The Compact is a Contract with a Conscience

Dr. G. Rauf Roashan

Continuing on the tradition of the Bonn Agreement of 2001, The Tokyo Conference of January 21-22 of 2002, and the Berlin Conference of March 21-April 1 of 2004, the London Conference of January 31-February 1, 2006 put Afghanistan on the limelight once again and gave the world audiences a chance to reevaluate the events, past and present, and decide on a future for this South Central Asian country. This is not because the world has time or patience to go out of its way to help and extend charity to a nation that had fallen, on their guard, pray to, first expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, and later to regional politics, extremism, terrorism, lawlessness, illicit trafficking in narcotics and was considered an overall threat to regional and world security and interests.

For the first time after the toppling of the reactionary Taleban regime in Afghanistan and establishment of a democratic government there, the Afghan administration came up with a blueprint for the country’s economic and social rehabilitation presentable to a world audience. The plan was overdue by at least two years after the election of Afghanistan’s first ever president through a general elections and formation of his cabinet. The lack of a clear document detailing developmental objectives for the country and focusing on vital issues plus a myriad of other factors like donor reluctance to invest through an inexperienced government machinery as well as haphazard programs and projects presented by a variety of non-governmental organizations, the NGOs, had led to a state of disarray in the disbursement and expenditure of billions of dollars of aid money for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country. This had led to the frustration both on the part of the donors and the Afghan population over the slow progress of the reconstruction and the continuation of poverty and misery of the masses.

It was therefore apparent that the world needed the reassurance that the nation building, reconstruction and success in war on terror needed established goals based on a time frame. The Compact therefore, was a necessity. It provides for that reassurance and specifically addresses questions about judicial reform, rural irrigation and tougher enforcement of drug policies. The compact further addresses goals for expanding present efforts for the establishing of a 70,000 strong army by the end of 2010, 62,000 officers for the national and border police force, improvement of roads, airports, access to safe drinking water and a goal of providing electricity to 65 percent of urban and 25 percent of rural households as well as making basic health services available to 90 percent of the population.

The Afghan government had estimated that for accomplishing of these and other measurable goals it needed $ 20 billion for the next five years. Thus the compact was presented to the London Conference that was hosted by the United Nations, Britain and the Afghan government. Some of these goals were found realistic enough by the representatives of more than 60 nations that participated in the conference to prompt the following pledges in aid:

The United States the largest contributor offered $ 4 billion while the British government came up with a pledge of $ 885 million. The World Bank pledged $ 1.2 billion. Other major donor countries offered the following amounts:

  • Germany $ 480 million
  • Japan $ 450 million
  • EU $ 268 million
  • Spain $ 182 million
  • India $ 181 million
  • Holland $ 179 million
  • Saudi Arabia $ 153 million
  • Pakistan $ 150 million
  • Norway $ 144 million

    • The total of pledges agreed upon by the Conference amount to $ 10.5 billion. Of this amount 20 percent is old commitments and about 8.0 billion new offers. The pledges made therefore make less than fifty percent of what the Afghan government had estimated as its needs for the next five years.

    Experience has shown that there is a difference between pledges and actual assistance that is delivered. Nevertheless, London Conference was considered a success by many sources in that it reaffirmed that countries of the world have become acutely aware of the fact that helping Afghanistan means helping world peace and security and ensuring the success of what is known as the Western style democracy in the third world countries and thus guaranteeing human rights and the principles of peaceful coexistence. This is happening also because of the realization that doling out aid money to Afghanistan is not charity, but investment for attaining a desirable peaceful world. The world invests in Afghanistan because of the dangers emanating from illicit drug production and trafficking, the need to curb insecurity caused by terrorism and its supporter the Al-Qaeda, the need to fight corruption and prevent human rights abuses, and the need to see democracy flourish and because this is no time to walk away from an evolving democratic process that has begun in Afghanistan. Success in Afghanistan is closely tied to the success of education, human rights including women’s rights, the success of war on terror and success over anarchy, warlordism, tyranny and chaos.

    The Afghan President reassuring the London Conference said: “On behalf of the Afghan people, I pledge today that we will be a dependable asset to the security of the region and of the world.” “ A stable, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan is not a blessing for the Afghans alone; it is for all of us,” he said.

    Now that the Compact has been sold to the Conference, it is time also to see how much of the aid reaches its destination namely programs and projects to help achieve the Compact goals. Another essential question is the channeling of the aid through the government. Past practice has shown that up to 78 percent of aid was channeled through the NGO system while the government received only about 22 percent for the projects directly under its control. This balance needs to be considerably improved in favor of the government-controlled programs if tangible results at par with the Compact goals are to be achieved.

    On the other hand, the burden of working for the achievement of the goals presented to the London Conference rests on the shoulder of the government. The government needs to establish a coordinating agency or even an independent commission to oversee project implementation for the achievement of the five-year goals set at the Compact. Past experience has shown that government coordination mechanism is weak and needs a thorough overhaul. As five years is only a short period in the life of a country emerging from the ashes of war, Afghanistan would need to go back to other world conferences and then and there she is obligated to provide proof that she worked diligently to achieve the goals it had set for herself for the five years and that she has a record of success to support her request for further aid. The government also has to establish a mechanism through which the process of monetary accountability is assured and the aid money is solely directed to the planned projects. Health and education are not only public needs, but are rights of the citizenry and must be provided according to the objectives of the Compact. Provision of the basic health services, for example, to 90 percent of the population seems to be an overstatement of the objectives, but a goal towards accomplishment of which serious efforts can be launched.

    In the meantime, in order to achieve any goal, the government needs cooperation by the people and their representatives. The people’s priority seems to be the need for improvement of security, creation of jobs, enhancement of economic conditions, improvement of agriculture, mine clearing, irrigation, small and large industries and betterment of the lot of the citizens including health, education, housing, access to safe water and electricity. Improvement of the infrastructure is another dire need. All of the above show that while the Compact assured the world that Afghanistan has decided on a path to development, there is also the need to convince the Afghan nation that tangible results for the betterment of their lot will be achieved sooner rather than later.

    Therefore in reality, the Compact seems to be a contract and a document with a conscience aiming at achieving all that is good for peace and prosperity of the Afghan nation and of the region and the world. 02/04/06

     

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