One of the United States politicians with a keen interest in the affairs
of Afghanistan is a California republican House Representative Dana
Rohrabacher. He has almost consistently been critical of the policies
of the US administration regarding Afghanistan. Over many years he has
acquired some knowledge about the country through contacts with Afghans
and personal field visits. He has met with Afghan politicians, factional
leaders, mainstream and controversial figures, as well as the common
man in Afghanistan. All of these distinguish him from majority of the
US citizens and even the US politicians.
However, one of the dangers of such involvement with the issues of
a distant land by a notable politician in the West is a situation of
"knowing it all" feeling. However, knowing it all about Afghanistan,
for a non-Afghan may not be possible.
One of the most important issues facing Afghanistan today is promulgation
of a new constitution for the country. A draft has already been prepared
and presented to the head of the transitional government. It would be
many months before another committee still to be appointed by the Afghan
president could give the draft a final shape. One of the issues the
constitution has to face up with is distribution of power over Afghanistan's
geopolitical and administrative divisions.
Last Friday, Mr. Rohrabacher paid a visit to Mazar-e-Sharif and met
with controversial politicians-cum-warlords Dostum, head of the Junbish-e-Milie
faction and his rival Atta Mohammad of Jamiat-e-Islami faction. The
very fact that many foreign dignitaries visit Mazar-e-Sharif as if it
were an independent unit in itself may or may not be a questionable
act resulting in overlooking of the authority of the central government
in Afghanistan, but a meeting by a prominent US politician with controversial
Afghan local leaders is. At the end of the meeting Mr. Rohrabacher was
reported criticizing U.S. policy of supporting a central government
in Afghanistan. He even went ahead to call this policy a product of
"too many Ivy League thinkers."
Talking after his visit he described the need for people to be provided
with the ability to elect their local leaders. He further said you couldn't
expect everybody to take his or her orders from Kabul. He opposed a
centralized system for Afghanistan giving example of the failure of
the centralized system in the former Soviet Union and the prospering
of the federal system in the United States.
What Mr. Rohrabacher has not considered in his statement is the fact
that Afghanistan is neither comparable with the former Soviet Union,
nor with the United States. Such comparisons would not work because
of the wide geographical, social and political differences. A centralized
system of government worked in Afghanistan during the 19th and 20th
centuries until foreign intervention destroyed the basis of civil life
in the country. On the other hand, a centrally strong government in
Afghanistan does not mean blocking democratic processes in favor of
local election of executives for provincial administrations. The Afghan
Ivy Leaguers, who would not be influenced by Rohrabacher effect, would
see a system of government for Afghanistan that does meet the requirement
of local autonomy compatible with a central government that is democratic
and representative of all geographic, ethnic and linguistic entities,
based on the principles of true equality and justice. The two ideals
are not mutually exclusive.
It is because of the Rohrabacher effect that the Afghan warlords thrive.
They see in themselves the qualities that have endeared them to some
important US politicians. They find in this strength to continue their
hold on power and keep their factions thriving. Any promise for abandoning
of military strength by them would be a promise only. While Rohrabacher
claimed support for his ideas by Dostum, Atta Mohammad denied agreeing
with Rohrabacher on a federal system for Afghanistan.
For the Rohrabacher effect on Afghan politics you do not need to be
Rohrabacher. Many other dignitaries and ranking officials of the Western
world could exert the Rohrabacher effect. As an example let us have
a look at the military aspects of this political phenomenon. A report
from Kabul stated that Afghan military leaders agreed on the need for
a national army last Sunday. The agreement was reached at the first
national military meeting since the fall of the Taleban. Regional commanders,
government leaders and commanders of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan
attended the meeting. The US local commander Lieutenant-General Dan
McNeill who attended the meeting has been criticized for making the
task of disarming of the factional fighters difficult. He has been employing
regional militias in the US war on terrorism. This empowers the militia
and their leaders, factional leaders or warlords, further making the
central government weaker and ineffective. The transitional government
has been entrusted with the task of building of national army of 70,000
troops. It has only been able to train 3000. On the other hand it has
proclaimed its objective of disarming of the factional fighters estimated
to number 100,000 at this time. Notwithstanding even foreign financial
aid, no effective progress has been achieved in this regard so far.
One of the reasons for this failure could be the "Rohrabacher Effect"
that has, perhaps inadvertently, continued to support continuation of
factional politics. This is yet another example of what could be called
the foreign dignitaries and personalities' effect on Afghan politics.
One thing for sure in all of this is recognition of the right of the
Afghan nation to be empowered to take a decisive role in the determination
of their fate without foreign intervention. It would be essential for
the evolving Afghan constitution not only to recognize this fact, but
also to provide for a mechanism so that the people would be able to
exercise their rights. The constitution must provide for equality and
justice. It should provide for unity of the Afghan nation while preserving
cultural identities of different tribes living inside the country's
geopolitical limits. Rohrabacher Effect should be eliminated and Afghan
well-wishers from outside should better advise their own governments
rather than providing support to individuals and factions inside Afghanistan.
04/20/03