Moderate Taleban?
Dr. G. Rauf Roashan
Part I
A) The Means Versus the End
Concentrating on the end, many forget the means. Take Talebanism for
example. What it is? How did it come about? What does the movement want?
The world today hears about Taleban (plural for the word Taleb or seeker
of knowledge) and considers them as evil, extremists and supportive
of terrorism. Let us have a look at the means that have brought about
the end namely Taleban.
B) Background Notes
The long and difficult decade of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan imposed
hardships never heard of in recent Afghan history. The Soviets did not
only invade the physique of the country, but they destroyed the cultural
basis and values of the people as well. They violated the long-standing
beliefs of the people, their social codes of conduct and then began
to brainwash the whole society and especially the youths, instilling
in them the communist doctrine. Afghans, dictated by their proud history
of non-submission to foreign dominance, fought fiercely to evict the
invaders as well as their alien ideology from Afghanistan. Helped by
the West and a few Moslem nations, finally they achieved their goal
of getting back their country, now in ruins and their social structure
sequestered and dilapidated. It was believed that the so called Mujahidin
(plural for Mujahid, a term used for warrior or a person who strives
and in Islamic tradition is a person who struggles to protect the Islamic
faith) who succeeded the communist puppets, would reestablish the society
based on justice and religious values of the nation and would lead the
nation to regaining of a peaceful life. That did not happen.
The Mujahidin governments failed drastically in fulfilling this wish.
The new religiously oriented leaders and leadership fell pray to their
own lust for power and thus engaged in fighting among themselves. These
infightings led to the destruction of the country and loss of many innocent
lives. In fact these selfish leaders committed worse crimes against
the Afghans than the Soviet forces of occupation and their puppet regime.
Only in Kabul, more than fifty thousand innocent Kabuli citizens were
killed because of these wars. More than 40 percent of the city was destroyed
because of the rockets fired from either side into it. There was no
security and people did not see Mujahidin to be or act as the saviors
of the nation as they had claimed to be. There was need to do something
about bringing real peace to the country.
The situations on the ground were also favorable for profiteering by
Afghanistan's greedy neighbors. The waters were murky and selfish neighbors
of Afghanistan were ready to fish. The United States had abandoned Afghanistan
as soon as the Soviets had left. Pakistan claimed political hold over
Afghanistan's reclamation of its independence. Pakistan had a variety
of interests in Afghanistan. The leaders who came to power in the country
had lived and operated from Pakistan during the long years of the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan. They had relations of sorts with the Pakistani
intelligence services and Pakistani military and military establishment.
Pakistan expected the leadership to acknowledge loyalty to Pakistan.
On the other hand, Iran too, had many religious and economic interests
in Afghanistan. It had too, housed Mujahidin movements in Iran and wanted
the leaders of those movements to prove their loyalty to Iran. But the
Afghan leadership, which was engaged in infighting for power, also proved
too egoistic to play puppets to foreign interests. Military incursion
into Afghanistan was not an option for either Pakistan or Iran.
C) The Call of the Madrassas
But in Pakistan there were considerable numbers of refugee youths who
had- failing to find regular schooling in their camps, enrolled in religious
schools called Madrassas. In actuality Madrassas train religious technicians
to help the Islamic community perform their religious rights properly.
The curricula of these schools contained only religious subjects. Therefore
the students learn basic literacy, some rudimentary Arabic language
and all about the techniques of performing prayers and religious obligations.
The student body is extremely devoted to Islamic faith and to the teachings
of their mentors, the Mullas, the leaders of the mosques. The students
called Taleban learn age-old texts of religious instructions as to procedures
for worshipping and performing of religious rights such as the five
pillars of Islam. These are 1) proclamation of the basic belief that
God is one and that there is no other god but Him and that Mohammad,
peace be upon him, is his messenger 2) performance of prayers five times
each day 3) fasting for a month each year 4) payment of alms to the
needy and 5) paying of homage to Kaaba, the House of God, in the holy
city of Mecca. Each one of these obligations is defined by rules that
the Taleban learn and prepare to go out and preach to general public.
There is either no or little change in these texts that were written
early on over a thousand years ago.
Part II
A) Emergence of Taleban as a Movement
It was this group of impressionable young refugees and their Pakistani
counterparts that were talked into accepting the fact that there was
need in Afghanistan for saving the sacred religion of Islam. It was
then this group of young people who followed the advice of their teachers
and enrolled in the army that a young ordinary Mulla from Afghanistan
had started to establish. The Mulla and five of his colleagues were
among the freedom fighters who had fought the Soviet invaders. The Mulla
named Mulla Omar Akhundzada had lost one of his eyes in the war against
the Red Army.
His army received major support from Pakistan, a close ally of the
United States during the long years of the Afghan war against the Soviet
Union. Pakistan was hopeful to kill two birds with one arrow. By supporting
Taleban, it would ensure installment of a Pakistani puppet regime in
Afghanistan and would score high with its own expanding extremist religious
parties that had emerged as a formidable challenge even to Pakistan's
military establishment.
Mulla Omar embarked on his adventure into Afghanistan fighting the
weak government of the Mujahidin. He did this in the name of Islam and
for providing of security and peace of mind to the Afghan nation. The
nation that was fed-up with insecurity and failure of the Mujahidin
government welcomed the new movement and accepted it in many instance
without fighting into their districts. Ahmad Shah Masoud, the legendary
Mujahid of the Afghan Soviet war and the strong military man of the
government, weakened by devastating war with Hikmatyar, the prime minister
of the same government, over Kabul, slowly retreated to his Panjshair
gorge and Hikmatyar escaped abandoning his military center in Charasiab
near Kabul leaving a large portion of his weapons behind. Thus the movement
called Taleban took over the government. Mulla Omar decided to stay
in his base in Kandahar while a cabinet led by one of his confidants
Mulla Rabbani took over the central government in Kabul.
B) An Injured Nation Welcomes Taleban
The Afghans thought this was the ultimate solution to their miseries
and therefore they began to rejoice. But pretty soon they found out
that Mulla Omar's regime had many problems. Although many of the Taleban
were basically good Moslems, but the nation found out that these good
Moslems were led astray by an ignorant leadership that was reactionary
and incapable of the skills needed to run the government. They only
knew how to perform prayers and make others do the same, but they were
even ignorant of the Islamic values and the need for Islam to show the
world its human nature and peaceful means for provision of an honest
life for its followers.
C) Taleban Movement Welcomed by the West
Even then Western politicians were of the opinion that probably Taleban
were a better alternative to the failed Mujahideen government. Media
reported many contacts between the United States authorities and Taleban
government and government representatives both inside and outside Afghanistan.
A high ranking delegation of the Taleban was received in the United
States for the purpose of studying the possibility of entering into
a contract with Unocal regarding the extension of a gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan to Pakistan and beyond via the land of the Afghans. That
greatly important economic project for south-central Asia is still on
hold.
D) The Case of Osama's Al-Qaeda and Effects of the 9/11 Terrorist
Attacks
However, Taleban consistently refused to expel Osama the son of Laden,
who had established a base of operation for his Al-Qaeda extremist group
in Afghanistan. Nor did they agree to submit him to an international
authority investigation of his role in terrorist activities in Saudi
Arabia and elsewhere.
It was not until the fateful events of 9/11 in 2001 that the United
States decided to deal with the stubborn Taleban administration militarily.
Taleban soon submitted to the superior air power and war technology
of the United States and abandoned Kabul the base of their government.
Soon afterwards, Kandahar the home of Mulla Omar fell and the Northern
Alliance, a loose coalition of the opposition parties who had now gained
power under the shadow of the American air force entered the cities
of Kabul and Kandahar and tried to uproot the remnants of the administration
of the Taleban. Reportedly, the Alliance in its zeal to grasp power
and against the expressed request of the UN and the US, rushed into
the cities. In doing so, it is also accused of committing atrocities
against the retreating and the captured Taleban militia. Again it was
reported and even documented that the US forces stood witness to some
of these atrocities.
The world at large is witness to what came next. The Afghan events
once again dominated reports by news media and kept all those interested
abreast of the affairs of that country. Soon after the Afghan experience,
the United States engaged Iraq and toppled the dictatorial regime of
Saddam Hussein. Yet, Afghanistan remained one step ahead of Iraq in
the long process of nation building and the US watched the implementation
of programs for the establishment of a democratic system in Afghanistan
with a view to use the experiences here in Iraq as well.
Part III
A) An Illusive Peace
But in Afghanistan true and universal peace did not come about. The
weak central authority, although legitimized by a Bonn meeting and an
Emergency Loya Jirga remained weak. The warlords continued to rule their
fiefdoms with a great deal of autonomy and keeping their armed militias
together with some of their heavy weaponry. The establishment of the
Afghan national army taken up by the joint cooperation of the Afghan
government and its allies the United States and Coalition Forces is
too slow to make any significant difference regarding security in Afghanistan.
Attrition and lack of a reliable strong central authority make it difficult
to arrive at the goal of having a 70,000 strong army to maintain peace
and security in the country.
B) Moderate Taleban?
Under this background recent news consistently speak of resurgence
of Taleban in the country and especially in the southern provinces of
Zabul in south-central part of the country and Paktya in the south.
Furthermore, Taleban have become emboldened in Helmand and Kandahar
provinces as well. Most recently terrorist attacks even in the form
of suicidal bombings in Kabul the capital prove as the strongest warning
as to the renewed activity by the Taleban. Taleban reportedly roam around
freely in the south of the country and in Pakistan especially in the
province of Baluchistan that is neighboring Kandahar. This new threat
should be taken very seriously as it seems that for the first time,
the extremists and the Taleban are resorting to suicidal terrorist activities
that were never heard of in Afghanistan before, not even during the
decade of the Soviet-Afghan war.
Yet politically there seems to be a drive for befriending of what is
labeled as moderate Taleban. A former Taleban minister of foreign affairs,
Maulawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, who had given himself up to the American
forces in Afghanistan, reportedly was released and allowed to go back
home to Kandahar. Although his case remains under the shadow of secrecy
and there have been controversial comments on the issue even by the
transitional government and the US authorities, the fact is that many
believe he is being used as a bridge for communication with the Taleban
leadership now underground. This as already mentioned is not the first
time contacts are initiated with the Taleban. Recent reports exposed
at least 30 times that the United States had approached Taleban asking
them to hand over Osama the son of Laden and 30 times Taleban had refused.
A Taleban so-called diplomat, Mawlawi Hakim Mujahid, who was officially
in the United States and had an office in New York, had many times visited
the State Department for talks and each time the talks were unsuccessful
for both sides. The main reason, then and even later, for this was the
extremist attitude by Taleban. Taleban then and always were extremists
in nature. Their uncompromising stand on many issues, even outside religious
sphere, led to their demise in the hands of the US forces, called forces
of liberation by some and forces of occupation by others.
Now that Taleban are regrouping and together with foreign elements
of extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda have embarked on adopting techniques
of international terrorists such as suicide bombings for the first time
in Afghanistan, something drastic, radical and conclusive should be
done about them. The liberal West, and the weak and young Afghan government,
it seems, are considering befriending moderate Taleban. The US forces
have not hesitated to attack their armed resurgence militarily and drastically
inflicting even civilian casualties among innocent Afghan citizens.
None of the two methods above have worked so far. The reason for this
is the fact that in Talebanism, there is no middle way. You will not
find a half Taleb anywhere in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. You will never
find a Taleb who believes that there is a middle way or another way
to the methods he has learned from extremist instructions of his tutors.
C) Where to go from Here?
During the difficult years of Afghan nation's struggle against the Soviet
invaders and their puppet regime, the Mujahidin slowly found out that
perhaps the power of words and education can counter some of the might
of the enemy's military equipment. An appeal to the people's national
values as well as their historical honors as an independent nation that
had never surrendered to colonial powers served the cause of the fight
for freedom rather well. One lesson to be learned from that experience
is that in times of peace and relative peace education of the masses should
be undertaken as a preemptive strategy to counter the poisonous propaganda
of extremists. On the other hand, a conscious effort should be made in
a planned way that Madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan are regulated
and that their curricula are matched with the requirements of the 21st
century and that they contain science and technology as well as religious
subjects. An effort should also be made to devise credentialing for the
teaching staff of the Madrassas so that qualified educated Islamic authorities
are involved in devising of the credentialing methodology. This would
eliminate possibility of using religious students for political purposes.
The militant Taleban should be dealt with militarily and those who would
prefer peace to war should be reeducated as citizens of a peaceful Islamic
society.
Furthermore, the transitional government and later the elected government
of Afghanistan should try its best to assign top priority to maintaining
of security in the country. The government should prove to the nation
that it is at least as effective as the Taleban in guaranteeing security
of the Afghan citizens and protecting their honor and property. Presently
President Karzai has to meet this great challenge. Yet excepting delivering
of a number of beautiful speeches he has failed to demonstrate by action
that he at least has a plan.
The United States forces should resolutely plan to erase the perception
that they are forces of occupation. One of the arguments by the extremists
and the Taleban elements is that the US is in Afghanistan not as true
helpers of the country, but as foreign forces to dictate the will of
their nation on the Afghan government and people. The provincial development
team notion used by the US in engaging its military in civil reconstruction
work cannot by itself change the above perception. Nowhere can peaceful
civilians trust helpers who carry guns, but dig foundations or who living
by the shadow of their weapons build schools. There is an urgent need
for the US policy makers to reconsider the role of the US military in
Afghanistan.
Conclusions:
Talebs and Talebanism should not be taken lightly. Islamic societies
certainly need religious technicians and Talebs should be trained and
educated to serve the needs of the society. But the education and training
of the students of Islamic educational institutions should be regulated.
Educated and enlightened Islamic scholars should devise their teaching
curricula and should make sure that these contain science and technology
as well. History and civics should be added as important subjects. Regular
inspection of the teaching methods and staff should be undertaken as
a regular responsibility of the education authorities of the two countries
involved.
There is also a need for understanding of the fact that presently dealing
with the so-called moderate Taleban is no more than a wishful thinking
as there are no moderate Taleban.. Moderation should be infused in the
lifelong learning of the Taleban from their Madrassas well into their
practices as Mullas. That would take time, but would provide a radical
approach to giving them a chance to understand the requirements of the
21st Century. They need to realize that there is no weapon more powerful
than the weapon of knowledge. They need to realize that as technicians
of a fast growing religion in the world, they need to be able to compete
in a demanding new world. They need to know that they need peace, security
and knowledge of the world and its most recent technology to survive
and to succeed. But perhaps also and more important is the issue of
a reconsideration of the role of the US military in Afghanistan. The
sooner the perception of the US forces in Afghanistan as forces of occupation
is erased by sound policy and by transferring of some of the US responsibilities
to the UN system, the better it would be for alienating further the
black reaction and wiping out the chances of its return to Afghan life.
2/9/04