In February of 1986 during a speech Mikhail Gorbachev, the head of the
Soviet State described Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound". In
September of 1993 Haji Mahmud Zamin, a village elder, told an American
reporter "What happens when you don't treat a wound? It becomes
infected." Dr. Rubin reminds us of Haji Zamin's words in his second
volume covering and analyzing the Afghan war. The book is titled The
Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State.
Dr. Rubin, who is an expert on Afghan affairs has done a wonderful job
putting together some of the pieces which led to the Geneva Accords,
resulting in the withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from Afghanistan, as well
as the discussions, negotiations and instructions to various warring
groups which has led to the current state of chaos in our homeland. The
work refers up to and including the emergence of the Taliban and their
capture of Char Asyab.
One of the interesting aspects of the book is the use of game theory
models to put the various stages of the negotiations leading to the Geneva
accords in perspective. Cooperative (C) and defecting (D) strategies are
defined for each side in the conflict. The players in this game, which
were to decide the faith of the Afghan nation, are the Soviet government
and its Kabul puppets on one side and the United States and Pakistan on
the other side. The irony of the absence of an Afghan side in this game is
quiet telling of the misery of our nation, at the mercy of the outsiders.
In the context of the Geneva agenda, the Soviet-Kabul strategies are
defined as withdrawing the Soviet troops (W) or keeping the troops (K),
while the US-Pakistani strategies are defined as ending aid to the
Mujahidin (E), or continuing to arm them (A). Dr. Rubin then combines
these strategies to define four outcomes, War (KA), Geneva (WE), American
Capitulation (KE), and Soviet Capitulation (WA). After making certain
logical assumptions such as each side preferring its opponent's
capitulation to its own, the author then sets up the game by listing the
four preference orderings along with their payoffs for each side. Although
the author explains some of the short comings of the chosen model, he none
the less successfully uses this model to analyze the bargaining tactics of
the two sides, including the various signals and threats intended for the
opposite side. Although I was skeptical of the same relative weights given
to each outcome, and thus oversimplifying the real nature of the
negotiations, this approach was made extremely clear by Dr. Rubin's
precise writing and the many examples he provides.
One of intriguing points in the book is the admission of Yuri Andropov
to Perez de Cuellar, the United Nation Secretary General in 1982 that the
Soviet invasion was a mistake. The UN had taken this admission to suggest
a possible intent to withdraw the Soviet troops. "Cordovez [UN Under
Secretary General and later UN's special envoy to Afghanistan] believed
that if Pakistan sent some kind of "positive signal" the Soviets
would be ready to offer a fixed timetable for withdrawal". Some
signals were apparently exchanged as Dr. Rubin suggests that the 1983
cease-fire between the Soviets and the forces of Ahmad Shah Masoud in
Panjsher was such a signal from the Soviets. After the April round of
negotiations "Cordovez announced that the agreement was 95 percent
completed." In May of 1983 Andropov was incapacitated due to a severe
stroke, leading some to conclude that an opportunity was lost.
One of the main points in the book is the author's conclusion that the
Soviets under Gorbachev finally left Afghanistan not because of the
increased military pressure but due to Gorbachev's agenda to enhance the
Soviet image and more importantly to warm up relations with the United
States. "The perpetuation of a military stalemate had indeed played a
role in Soviet decision making, but Gorbachev had already shaped the major
components of his decicsion before any Stingers enterd Afghanistan."
Infact it is pointed out that in certain stages Pakistan may have been
trying to delay the process as early 1988, "Zia still proposed that
the Geneva round be postponed pending formation of an interim
government". Under intense pressure Pakistan finally agree and on
April 14, 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed by the foreign ministers of
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and the USSR.
Dr. Rubin also covers the issue of "positive symmetry" as the
eventual "negative symmetry" in the backdrop of an evolving
world, where one superpower was clearly headed to its demise. Also covered
in the book are events resulting in the takeover of Kabul by the various
shifting and fluid alliances that had formed after the relative
disengagement of the two superpowers in the conflict. Shelling of Kabul by
rockets in 1992 and the formation of various councils both of which
occured with monetary compensation to those who took part are some of the
things that have been known among Afghan circles for quite some time and
is very appropriately documented in this work.
Overall Dr. Rubin has again demonstrated his crisp understanding of the
conflict in Afghanistan embedded in a changing and tangled world. He has
done so in clear and concise writing and through the use of various game
models, which despite some of its shortcomings has shed more light on the
conflict and the process by which it has transformed in the last decade.