fundamentalism

Maley, William (ed.). Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban.

New York University Press. New York, 1998, Pp. 253.

Reviewed by Jan Mohammad, University of Arizona (1999)

"Fundamentalism reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban" is the most comprehensive book written about the Taliban, a politico-religious force that rules over eighty percent of Afghanistan. The book is edited by William Maley. In addition to an introduction, it contains twelve articles written by both Afghan and non-Afghan scholars who have been involved in Afghan politics/affairs for a considerable period of time. The articles in the book are divided into four parts. The first three parts more or less directly deal with the Taliban whereas the last part maps out the future course of events in Afghanistan. In what follows, we will present a critical review of the introduction and the articles presented in this book.

"Interpreting the Taliban" is the title of the introduction written by William Maley. Under this title, Mr. Maley talks about the post-Najib era and the emergence of the Taliban as a military and politcal power. He also briefly discusses some of the factors that have led to the current chaotic situation in our country. For instance, regarding the current anarchy and the struggle for power in Afghanistan, William Maley digs down in our past history. For him, the current chaos was inevitable since, apart from Ahmad Shah Baba's and Amir Abdul Rahman Khan's periods, the Afghan State has been based on shaky grounds. In this regard he points to Amanullah Khan's downfall at the hands of Habibullah, a well-known thief and docoit. It is worth mentioning here that despite Habibullah's proven past as a thief and bandit, Mr. Maley bestows him the title of Ghazi, a title which is usually given to people who have shown extraordinary bravery in defending their country. It is ironic that on the one hand Mr. Maley is criticizing the Taliban for their medieval and backward policies, but on the other hand he is glorifying the short-lived reign of a thief who stood for nothing else but darkness, ignorance and bakwardness.

Also, regarding opposition to former Afghan governments, Mr. Maley mentions the sabotage committed against the sovereign state of Afghanistan in Panjsher in 1975. Mr. Maley calls the incidence an uprising, but he conveniently ignores the fact that the plot for his so-called uprising in Panjsher was hatched in the corridors of Pakistan's ISI aimed at destabilizing the Afghan State. The incident was nothing more than an aggression by Pakistan against Afghanistan carried out by their trained agents.

Part I The Rise of the Taliban

Part I of the book examines the rise of the Taliban. The first article of this part is authored by Amin Saikal. He looks at Rabbani's government from 1992 until its downfall in 1996 at the hands of the Taliban. In the beginning of his article, Mr. Saikal discusses the problems associated with the legitimacy of the past goernments in general and the Islamic Tanzeems (parties) in particular. Among other problems, he highlights the reliance of the Tanzeems on foreign powers as one of the important obstacles in their path to legitimizing themselves. Mr. Saikal also looks at Rabbani govrnment's failure to continue as a legitimate government of Afghanistan. He lists both external factors, such as Pakistan's interference in our internal matters and internal factors such as nepotism, favoritism, factionalism and the struggle for power among Rabbani's and Mas'ud's camps as the main reasons for Rabbani's downfall. However, among the external factors, Mr. Saikal fails to mentions the role played by Iran. As we know, Iran was actively involved in Afghanistan's affairs prior to Najib's overthrow in April of 1992. The alliance between Mas'ud, Dostum, and Mazari known as the Northern Alliance was the result of direct involvement by the Iranians in our matters.

Anthony Davis, in his article entitled "How the Taliban became a military force", examines the emergence of the Taliban and their military power which has enabled them to sweep the country in a lightening speed. Mr. Davis begins with how and why the Taliban started their attacks in and around Kandahar province. He gives an extensive account of the step by step Taliban victory in Kandahar province, followed by their victories in rest of Afghanistan including the capital Kabul. According to Anthony Davis, Pakistan has had a vital role in Taliban's victories, especially in western and eastern Afghanistan by supplying the Taliban with the logistics of war and necessary military planning and training. He also points out the role played by the former Khalq party's members as military personnel among the Taliban.

For a while, it was rumored that high ranking Khalqis disguised as Mullahs have been leading the Taliban's military and political machine, but no positive proof has been provided so far. It might be true that there are some low ranking Khalqis in Taliban's ranks, but so far no high ranking Khalq member has been identified among the Taliban's leadership.

"Pakistan and the Taliban" is the title of the article written by Ahmad Rashid, Pakistani journalist. In his article, Ahmad Rashid looks at Taliban's connection with the Jami'atul Ulama-e Islam and the transport Mafia, the federal and provincial governments of Pakistan and, last but not least, the ISI. According to Mr. Rashid, the Jami'atul Ulama-e Islam has helped the Taliban significantly in recruiting new fighters from their 'madrasas' and lobbying support for them among the Arab nations. The Taliban have also received large sums of money form the transport Mafia in exchange for allowing them to smuggle goods freely in and out of Afghanistan.

Regarding Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban, Mr. Rashid points out that although, in 1995, Pakistan's government declared its neutrality towards the warring factions in Afghanistan, it has allowed Pakistani recruits to freely cross the Pakistani border into Afghanistan. Pakistan also helped broker peace between Dostum, Hekmatyar and the Taliban, but their attempt was fruitless at the end.

ISI' connection with the Taliban is also extensively discussed by Ahmad Rashid. Among other cooperation between the two, he points to the technical assistance given to the Taliban in order to establish a first telephone connection between Pakistan and Kandahar and some other major projects such as building roads, etc.

Part II The Taliban and the World

In this section, the policies of the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Central Asian Republics towards Afghanistan are discussed.

"The United States and the Taliban" is the title of the article written by Richard Makenzie. According to him, after 1992 when the cold war ended, the US had no effective policy towards Afghanistan. In 1994, when the Taliban appeared on the Afghan political scene, the author argues, the US merely followed Pakistan in their policies towards the malitia force. Among other things, the US hoped that the Taliban would ban narcotics, restore security for construction of an oil pipeline from Central Asia to Pakistan, contain Iran and Russia and finally eliminate terrorist camps operating within Afghanistan. However, Mr. Mackenzie does not explain why the US had no effective policy towards Afghanistan between 1992 and 1994 despite the fact that the US's concerns outlined above did exist before Taliban's emergence too.

In the last part of his article, Mr. Mackenzie claims, now, there is a change in the US policy towards Afghanistan largely because of Taliban's failed policies. He contends that Taliban's inability to restore peace and security in Afghanistan and policies such as barring women from education and employment, human rights abuses, a boom in narcotics in territories controlled by them are the reasons for the shift in the US policy.

In the second article of Part II, Anthony Hyman examines Russia's and the Central Asian Republic's (CAR) position vis-a-vis the Taliban. According to Hyman, Russia and the CAR would like to see the status quo continue in Afghanistan. Apart from Turkmenistan, the rest of the countries are weary of Taliban's control over northern Afghanistan. Mr. Hyman elaborates on Russia's and other CAR's fears over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism northwards beyond Afghanistan's borders if Taliban are to advance as far as Amu River. Also, there is fear of the refugees' influx to these states that could increase trafficking drugs to and via these countries.

Although since this article's publication, the Taliban have been able to bring most of northern Afghanistan including areas bordering CAR under their control, the fears expressed by Russia and other CAR seem to be unfounded.

In the last article of Part II, Saudi Arabia's and Iran's policies towards the Afghan conflict has been examined. The author of the article is Anwar-ul Haq Ahady. He divides the two countries' involvement in Afghanistan into three phases. In the first phase (1980-1988), Saudi Arabia was actively involved in supporting the Afghan Mujahideen against the former Soviet Union while Iran had more or less kept its distance from the Afghan conflict because of its war with Iraq. In phase two (1988-1992), Saudi Arabia's involvement in Afghanistan receded because of the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, Iran, fresh off of Iran Iraq war, increased its involvement in Afghanistan in hopes of finding a foothold for itself in the country. In the third phase (1992-1998), both countries have supported their clients both militarily and financially. Saudi Arabia has been the main financial backers of the Taliban. Referring to Iranians interference in Afghanistan, Ahady points out that Northern Alliance, a coalition between Mas'ud, Dostum, Mazari and Naderi, was a result of their efforts. Ahady, also, elaborates on subsequent but temporary fall out between Iran and Rabbani's gov't.

Part III The Taliban and the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

In the first article of this part, Michael Keating examines the dilemmas facing the humanitarian organizations in helping the Afghans put their lives and country back together. According to Keating, Afghanistan is the last in the world in a number of fields, such as, infant mortality, life expectancy, adult and female literacy, the number of mentally or physically handicapped people, number of people dependent on food support, etc. He points out that while the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan continues, the enthusiasm among the donor countries has been waning. One of the important issues brought up by Keating in his paper is whether the humanitarian assistance has contributed to prolonging the war in Afghanistan. Mr. Keating points to the warring factions ability to wage an expensive war while asking the humanitarian organization to pay the salaries of gov't health workers.

Keating also discusses the problems created by Taliban's extreme policies, especially regarding women, and the distribution of humanitarian aid. He adds that the Taliban's lack of administrative knowledge makes the matters even worse. While criticizing the Taliban's ineptness and destructive policies in this regard, he is also critical of aid groups who at times demonstrate little understanding of the Taliban and their cultural values.

In the second article of Part III, Nancy Dupree examines the situation of women under Taliban's rule. She presents a detailed picture of how the Taliban's edicts have deprived Afghan women, especially, those living in the capital Kabul, from education, receiving proper health care, and employment among other basic rights. She identifies the various factors involved in shaping Taliban's harsh policy towards women. Also, she discusses the constant disagreement between the Taliban and the western relief organizations, which have in many cases either stopped or significantly reduced their educational and other programs due to Taliban's discriminatory policies. According to her, no shift in Taliban's policies is in sight as of yet. She points out that the Taliban have not eased on their restriction on women. In some cases they have gone as far as telling the outside world that the issue of women in Afghanistan is their business and they (the outside world) should stop from interfering in their affairs. As a result, the education sector and programs geared towards helping widows have suffered considerable setbacks.

Part IV Paths to the Future

In the first article of this part, Bernt Glatzer discusses whether Afghanistan is at the brink of ethnic and tribal disintegration. In the beginning of his article he lists the ethnic groups living in Afghanistan. He then provides additional details on the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks and tribalism in Afghanistan. Contrary to many Afghan and non-Afghan scholars who for one reason or another consider the conflict in Afghanistan as one between ethnic and linguistic groups, Glatzer argues that ethnicity has not been the dominant factor in the current civil war. He dismisses as inaccurate the contention that Afghanistan has been ruled by the Pashtuns for 250 years. He argues that Afghanistan had Pashtun rulers, but the Pashtun populace had no share in the power. He contends that the warring factions have used the ethnic card to muster support for themselves among the people. The warlords want to legitimize their struggle for power by raising hues and cries about ethnic injustices, but according to a survey conducted by Glatzer amongst peasants, traders and students from different parts of Afghanistan, most Afghans favor Afghanistan's unity by incorporating all ethnic groups in it. He also blames foreign powers and media for misinterpreting the conflict as one between ethnic groups. This misinterpretation has in turn reinforced the ethnic factor in the current conflict.

In the second article of Part IV, William Maley examines the role of the UN mission in Afghanistan. He recounts the failure of the UN's envoys one after another since 1992, and the reason behind their failures. He argues that after the Soviet troop's withdrawal, the UN envoy, at times, overlooked important players of the Afghan conflict in search for restoring peace in Afghanistan. In this regard, he points to the UN envoy's, Sevon, plan of forming a transitional gov't which would replace Najibullah 's regime without consultation with the Mujahideen commanders who were the center of power inside Afghanistan. Regarding Mastiri's failure, Mr. Maley argues that he failed to seize the opportunity for finding a peaceful solution to the conflict when the Taliban were first dealt military setbacks in and around Kabul in 1995.

Whether any attempt for peace at that particular time would have borne fruits is anybody's guess. Other than the fact that the Taliban were dealt a minor military defeat, there is no other reason to believe a peace intiative would have worked. The Taliban did not show any sign of weakness, or readiness to enter negotiations with their opponents. It is obvious that Mr. Maley will blame anyone but the warring side he favors in this ongoing conflict.

And, finally, Mr. Maley puts forward some suggestions if and when another opportunity for a negotiated settlement arises in the future. Mr. Maley argues that since the state has virtually collapsed in Afghanistan, it would be best to turn Afghanistan into a federal state which will allow the warlords to have their share of the pie. He continues that Kabul could be placed under international administration.

The question whether a federal system will work for Afghanistan is not easy to answer, but there are more problems associated with federalizing Afghanistan than there are with a system based on governance from the center. It is beyond the capacity of this review to discuss this issue here. However, first, the people of Afghanistan must be given the opportunity to decide on this issue. Just because federalizing Afghanistan will allow a few power hungry criminals to stay in power does not justify the devision of Afghanistan into mini-states.

Oliver Roy, in his article, discussed the future of Islamism in Afghanistan. While giving a brief account of the Islamic movement's history in Afghanistan, he claims that the Islamists in Afghanistan have borrowed the ideology from the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e Islami organizations. The Islamists were further influenced by Arab radicals who participated in the Afghan holy war against the Soviet invasion. Roy argues that the Islamists have no future in Afghanistan due to factors such as rurality, ethnicity, and tribalism. Also, he points out to the failure of the Islamists in implementing any of their policies since Najibullah's downfall in 1992.

In the last article of Part IV, M. Nazif Shahrani examines the future of the state and community governance. In the first part of his article, Mr. Shahrani stresses the importance of family and kinship in Afghans society. He argues that that family and kinship are the determining factors in how the Afghan society functions. Mr. Shahrani points out that one of the reasons why Afghanistan is in turmoil is because of ignoring family and kin-based relationships and allowing the central gov't to run the country's affairs. He blames many of Afghanistan's current problems on imposing a central authority over Afghans modeled after British India. Even the Mujahideen's failure which has largely been the result of struggle for power between the warring factions is being blamed on Afghanistan having a central gov't. In the last part of his article, Mr. Shahrani suggests a system similar to federalism for future Afghanistan.

ISI' connection with the Taliban is also extensively discussed by Ahmad Rashid. Among other cooperation between the two, he points to the technical assistance given to the Taliban in order to establish first telephone connection between Pakistan and Kandahar and some other major projects such as building roads, etc.