Political reconstruction of Afghanistan 

Although it is extremely important that all Afghans take part in reconstruction of their destroyed economy, one must not forget that an economy based on a shattered political order is most likely to collapse. Political instability leading to a decade of civil war has played an imperative role in destroying Afghanistan’s economy. Thus, before reconstructing the country economically, the Afghans must rebuild a strong political foundation for their country first. They must eliminate foreign influences, and give the phenomenon of “nationality” precedence to the delusions of ethnicity and language. This in turn will help insure Afghanistan’s economic growth, security, and stability.  
 

While making an attempt to reconstruct the political fabric of Afghanistan, the main question needs to be addressed. What are the factors contributing to the disintegration of Afghan politics? To explore possible answers, many blame its ethnic and linguistic diversity for the devastated political state of Afghanistan. The Afghan society has always been ethnically and linguistically diverse. Yet, Afghans have lived in a relatively harmonious and peaceful atmosphere. Although hostilities are not unheard of, and rivalries had existed among different tribes and political factions, people of separate descents coexisted successfully by making pacts and alliances among themselves throughout their history. Generally speaking, tribal leaders resolved their issues over conflicting interests peacefully through loya jirga (grand assembly) conventions. Therefore, while it is not ethnicity and language that have caused political instability in Afghanistan, it is the “politicization” and “polarization” of ethnic and linguist groups by foreign powers and ideological influences that have resulted in political breakdown of Afghanistan’s highly diverse society.  
 

However, the intention is not to blame foreign ideological influences only for the miseries of Afghans. Retracting back to the end of King Amanullah’s power to the present, most Afghan political leaders are mainly to be held responsible for the unfortunate political and economic conditions of Afghanistan. Their failure to lead their people on national level is mainly due to their lack of a vision for the national unity of their country, as well as their inability to offer a path - a systematic approach toward the goal of national unity to the Afghans. Meanwhile, the ambiguity in their plans and objectives for the future of the country was and still continues to be exacerbated by foreign interests.  

During the Afghan Soviet war, the resistance movement though divided on ethno-political lines was capable of continuing a war against the communists and eventually succeeding to extradite the Red Army from Afghanistan. This was possible mainly because the various factions did have a goal in common – the defeat of Soviet Communism. The existence of such common goal contributed to the survival of their struggle, and their eventual success against the Red Army. Nevertheless, with the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan, that common goal no longer existed among the warring factions. The Afghans were left with neither a strategic and feasible plan for, nor a clear vision of a stable government by the leading authorities. As a result, in a country where the phenomenon of allegiance to ethnicity takes precedence to nationalist ideals, the lack of a national ideological coherence and a common vision for its future, easily led to a decade of war and socio-economic destruction.  
 

However, some may argue that after the withdrawal of Soviet army, the Afghan political elite did have a goal in mind – to substitute the communist government with an Islamic one, and restore a new social order based on Islamic law. The problem with this argument is that the idea of establishment of an “Islamic government” and its definition was never communicated to the public clearly. The goal of the resistance movement was not clarified and defined as to what it was meant for the people to be ruled by an Islamic government. In addition, none of the political leaders had offered a national plan acceptable to the majority of contenders for power on how to reach that goal. Though solutions were offered, and some measures were taken on how to divide power among the warring factions, it was too late for a political resolution to prevent the civil war from occurrence; the civil war had already began. Therefore, neither a vision was presented on national level by those leading the resistance movement, nor did a national ideology exist based on which the country could have moved toward a predetermined destination.  
 

Among most Afghans, the feeling of belonging to a tribe or linguistic group has always remained stronger than loyalties to Afghanistan as a nation state. In another words, nationality stands second to ethnicity in order of importance. This loyalty to ethnicity is furthermore strengthened by tribal constituency’s loyalty to their leaders as symbols of authority and power, which essentially summarizes Afghanistan’s basic political organization at local level. Having said that, it is important to note that this sense of commitment to ethnicity by itself did not cause political disintegration and chaos in Afghanistan. What did lead to the disintegration of the Afghan political fabric was that political leadership affected by foreign influences capitalized on this preexisting condition for assuring their hold on power. As a result of their struggle to maintain power at local level, their leadership remained confined to the basis of ethnic and linguistic identities, and did not open its horizons nationwide. 
 

On the national level, leadership and ideological platform based on which the country must have directed its future was and still is missing. Most leaders of Afghan resistance movement had followed foreign belief systems imported to country by their foreign supporters and providers of money and ammunition for war. Their inability or unwillingness to detach themselves foreign interests, caused their constituencies further to rely upon the foreign sources as well. As a result, Afghans severely fragmented on political and ideological basis. This lack of a national ideology, and fragmentation based on outside influences polarized the Afghan society on ethnic and linguistic grounds. Consequently, Afghanistan was/is reduced to a territory comprised of highly politicized and hostile multiethnic groups. Tribalism and ethnocentrism replaced nationalistic sentiments among the warring factions. Even though militant rivals justified their war against other Afghans on nationalist premises, (by making claims that they fought to free their country from the occupation of this or that foreign invader) their problems were/are deeply rooted in their politicized sense of ethnic identity.  

To ensure peace, and to guarantee a long lasting economic prosperity and social progress in Afghanistan, the Afghans must attend to the reconstruction of their national political identity first. They can do this by truly believing that as “Afghans” they are first and far most committed to their nation. Without such belief system, which is vitally imperative for constructing a strong nation, the likelihood of Afghans to succeed in the formidable task of economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, or any other kind of endeavor that entails social development is far from possible.  
 

To exist, the foundation of a nation is based on its belief to itself, which must come from within. It is wishful to think that without a national ideology a nation could exist and continue to survive. The Afghans could only have a country if they could have a nation. Let’s be honest to ourselves while we evaluate our nationalist feelings comparing, and in relations to our ethnic and linguistic sentiments. Looking at our contemporary history of civil war until now, in the true sense of the word, we are not a nation yet. We are ethnic and linguistic groups highly influenced and sharply divided by foreign ideal and interests that own a geographical territory, a physical entity. And because of this, Afghanistan is a state trapped in chaos – but not a nation state. To own an Afghanistan, we must become a nation first. Therefore, we must begin to reconstruct our political identity by believing in the concept of “Afghanhood,” and believing that nationality must take precedence to political loyalties based on ethnicity and language. This will subsequently ensure peace, and the opportunity to reconstruct our economy in the future. With a foundation as such, we can be certain that the history in Afghanistan will never have another chance to repeat itself. So, let us reconstruct our political identity - our foundation first. 
 

Born in Kabul in 1967, Wali A. Shaaker is a young Afghan poet, artist, free lance and short story writer for various Afghan publications.  His published collection of poems is "The evening of Separation."  Mr. Shaker is a former president of the Socity of Afghan Professionals and holds a BA in political economy and in international relations from University of Washington, Seattle, WA.  Send your comments to wshaaker@hotmail.com