Tradition Versus Ideology in Afghanistan
Juma Khan Sufi
WEEKEND POST by Frontier Post, Pakistan
DECEMBER 16, 1999
Loya Jirga-time-honoured tradition
Parallels between left and right ideologies
Introduction
There is hardly any country in the world which is so much attached to traditions as Afghanistan has been. There are social, historical, geographical and political reasons for it. Though a mix of Tajik, Uzbek, Hazaras, Turkmen, Baluch, Nooristanis and others with a predominant Pashtoon population, Afghans have evolved, to a greater extent, common culture, psychology, ethos, and customs over the course of joint existence in a state. Common traditions of jirgas and governance bound them together.
Though ethnically the name Afghans are used for Pashtoons, yet all the residents of the country call themselves Afghans. Politically and socially they are mingled in one historic entity 'Afghans.' Traditions persisted and still are dominant factors in determining the individual and social life of Afghans. The non-Pashtoon Afghans also resort to community shura (jirgas) when they deliberate upon matters of common interest. Though on the crossroad of civilisations and inter-mingled with different cultures and peoples in history, thousands years old traditions and beliefs can still be found there. The advent of Islam moulded all those traditions and imparted them a new colouring. Thus Islam also became an important part of the people's traditions. As regards to day to day matters of managing their social and political life, they have resorted to the ancient tradition of holding jirgas. Tradition of jirga, which was later on sanctified and augmented by Islamic practice of shura existed thousands years back among Arian tribes in ancient Ariana, the present-day Afghanistan, in the shape of Sabha which is the prototype of modern local jirga, and Simithy, the prototype of modern national jirga. In Sabha the people usually decided matters of common interests like distribution of grazing grounds, animals and water resources through consensus and Smithy used to be the gathering of selected people of authority, wisdom and wealth dealing with most important matters. Both jointly used to elect the King. In Smithy the king also used to participate. Kushan Empire also sustained this tradition for spreading their religion, Buddhism. And the Ghaznavide dynasty was also founded on the same principles as Nasiruddin Subagtagin was elected through a jirga.
Loya Jirga-time-honoured tradition
Despite the fact that traditions of jirgas are as old as the civilisation of Afghanistan is, yet its practice to turn it into regular national phenomenon on a grand scale was owned by the more modern rulers and inhabitants of Afghanistan. Following the rise of Mirwais Khan Hotak as leader of Afghans, the jirgas became a national and regular feature for deciding matters of common concern.
There are two types of Loya Jirgas: One called by the people themselves at the time of national crisis to deliberate and decide upon matters of war and peace, election of Amir or King, and restoration of national sovereignty and national independence. Secondly, when the circumstances and rules of the game compel the ruler or leader to consult people with regard to urgent and important matters, like enactment of fundamental law, ratification and endorsement of treaties reached with outside powers and defence of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Mirwais Khan Hotak's three Jirgas held in the beginning of 18th century helped the people of Afghanistan to liberate western part of Afghanistan from the ruthless Saffavid ruler, Gurgin, in the year 1707.
Loya Jirga participated by influential elders and leaders of Abdali and Ghilzai tribes, as well as representatives of other ethnic groups, especially Uzbeks, was held at Sher-i-Surkh near Kandahar City in 1747 had chosen Ahmad Khan, later Ahmed Shah Abdali, as king new and modern Afghanistan. As we see the very state of modern Afghanistan owes its existence to this time-tested tradition. From then onward, Loya Jirga became regular feature in the history of the country.
When the First World War was started and the intelligentsia of the country leading the constitutionalist movement was clamouring for participation on the side of Turks and Germans and against British imperialism for wresting back their complete independence, Amir Habibullah Khan called loya Jirga in 1915 and won the approval of the Jirga for maintaining neutrality in war. King Amanullah Khan convened three more Jirgas in February 1923, in July 1924 and in August 1928.
The Loya Jirga of Nadir Khan was held in September 1930 to approve the rules of business for Millie shura (national council). In July 1941, Zahir Shah convened Loya Jirga to deliberate upon the Afghan position vis-a-vis Second World War. Another Loya Jirga during the Prime Ministership of Sardar Daoud Khan in November 1955, which raised the issue of Pakhtunistan under the conditions that Pakistan had come into being as inheritor of all British rights and obligations in the area. Daoud Khan also called Loya Jirga in February 1977 to legitimise his rule, pass new constitution, elect new president, get approval for launching of his national revolutionary party and ratify some laws and agreements reached with other countries.After April Revolution in 1978 and especially after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in December 1979 the Cold War rivalries entered Afghanistan and, both sides, ruling and opposition forces resorted to this tradition. Since Jirgas held by moderate elements opposed by Mujahideen in 1980 at Peshawar, by Karmal regime in 1985 and by President Najib in 1987 where held under the shadow of foreign powers, therefore, their influence on the course of events was limited. The same was the fate of Shura-e-Al-o-Aqd, held in Herat in 1992 to legitimise and prolong the rule of Burhanuddin Rabbani. One can easily draw the inference that traditions are the binding and cementing force inside Afghanistan. The sustenance of the state and regulation of social and political life therein, are based upon traditions.
Ideology
Ideology is something that is external, alien, foreign and super-imposed upon the traditions loving Afghan society. Whether left or right, progressive or reactionary, revolutionary or retrogressive, both variants are in contravention to Afghan ethos and social consciousness. Afghans pay allegiance to Islam as an inseparable part of their social traditions. It does play vital role in their social life as sacred part of their collective behaviour. But whenever there is a clash between Islam and traditions, they abide by the latter. However, Islam has merged into their traditions in such a way that distinction is sometimes difficult to make.
Afghan character
Afghan character has evolved under the confines of geographic and historical compulsions alluded to earlier. Some say that radicalism is an inevitable part of Afghan political process as manifested in the PDPA regime, mujahideen or Taliban rule. They tend to forget one thing-the role of ideology in the hands of Afghans. Since historically cut off from modern world influence, Afghan accepts nothing new. He is ignorant. Very rarely he accepts new ideas, but when he accepts these he sticks dogmatically to them.
Parallels between left and right ideologies
Many parallels and similarities can be found between the left extremism and right fundamentalism in Afghanistan. The leftist swung the pendulum to the extreme left and mujahideen swung it to the extreme right. Taliban, though different from them in many ways, are still continuation of Ikhwans in their basic ideological thrust. However, both of them acted/act along similar lines. If the ruling Khalq considered every white-collared villager and respectable person to be feudal and counter-revolutionary, their right prototype Ikhwans (Ikhwanul Muslimeen- Muslim Brotherhood) or fundamentalist mujahideen considered every student, disregarding his political affiliation, studying in Kabul, as infidel and Kafir worth punishment. One extreme gave birth to another extreme. Both fathered each other. If the left sent Darud Sharif on Lenin in their paper Parcham in the conservative Islamic society in 60's, the Ikhwans sprinkled acid on the bare legs and faces of girl students in Kabul University.
Maulvi Yunus Khalis was the first to translate the book of Sayed Qutab about "Islam and Social Justice" in 1960 in Afghanistan. The books of Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi were used to be translated and printed in Pakistan and sent secretly toAfghanistan by the present Amir of Jama'at-e'Islami during the said decade. Dr Ali Shariati of Iran did not lag behind in indoctrinating some Shiite Mullahs in Shiite fundamentalism. The Pakistani progressives like Afzal Bangash, Ajmal Khattak and others were also publishing the communist books and other literature of and for the PDPA in Pakistan. The organisational principles of both these movements were to a greater extent copies of each other or to be more exact the religious fundamentalists copied the Leninist canons of party building. In order to provide legitimacy to them, both pro-Moscow left and religious fundamentalists resorted to shallow claims. The former talked about the potential support of the 'working people' and the Jihadi organisations clamoured about 'oppressed Ummah.' But in practice both of them did not allow the working people and the Muslim Ummah to express their wishes and aspirations.
Some mechanical unity did take place among all these followers of the same ideology under orders from their masters, which soon gave birth to rivalries. PDPA reunited in 1977, but soon went the old way after assuming power. Reunited after Soviet invasion and apparently carried on as one party, but never merged. Khalq and Parcham remained two distinct entities at loggerhead with each other even within one government. How the seven parties of mujahideen went along with the one another is no secret. Under orders from Ziaul Haq regime, they got united once in three fundamentalist parties' alliance, then seven parties' alliance took place, and afterwards they were ordered to work as one interim government in exile.
To be more correct, the left fared well in this regard than the so-called followers of Islam and proponents of Ummah. The former at least brought the semblance of unity after Soviet intervention; the latter failed even in maintaining this semblance. PDPA did not tolerate dissenting views let alone permitting other organisations to function, when it seized power. The mujahideen rulers who took power after the fall of Najibullah followed in the footsteps of PDPA and banned all the political activities of other parties except that of Mujahideen parties. Both showed their undemocratic and despotic character from the very beginning.
It is an open secret that with the invasion of Soviet Union Afghanistan became a conquered country of Russians and whatever they said or did was followed by the PDPA rulers. But as far as the so-called freedom fighters and Islamic crusaders are concerned, they were also getting orders from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The similarities in the habit of considering other people's property as their own can also be found. However, the mujahideen had been far ahead in this habit. If the PDPA plundered, it was in darkness and under clandestine conditions, the mujahideen shamefacedly and openly looted people's houses, government offices and buildings. Their loot and plunder assumed legendary character. Both created differences of language, ethnicity and region, and whipped up national narrow-mindedness. The PDPA was ideologically committed to translate the erroneous Leninist Nationalities Policy in Afghan conditions and thus shattered the traditional fabric of unity in Afghanistan. Mujahideen went further ahead in fighting on the basis of religious sects, linguistic and ethnic origin. The fighting of Gulbuddin vs Rabbani, Saif versus Shiites, Masood versus Hazaras, Dostum versus Najib, Dostam versus Masood and now Taliban versus all are glaring proofs.
Taliban and their place
Taliban power is also the continuation of mujahideen rule in a different form. The pendulum of Afghan political process swung to the extreme right by fundamentalist mujahideen has not been brought back to its natural course in the middle with assumption of their power. To them also Islam is not simply a basis for individual faith but a system that encompasses all aspects of society, including individual behaviour and the relationship of individual to both society and state. Both Ikhwans and Taliban regard Sharia to be legal code to guide actions of both the state and individual. In the initial stages when Taliban movement was just in embryonic form, the world was ready to provide it with benefit of doubt. Then it was very difficult to label Taliban outright fundamentalists. After seizing Kabul and installing a semblance of government to come to terms to Kabul reality was very difficult for them because of their mainly rural credentials. People expected them to change.
Their harsh behaviour in the city prompted their leader Mullah Mohammad Omar to ask them to be more considerate to Kabul population. Their attitude to city population did undergo a change. But they were, by and large, unable to respond to the cultural needs of the city and thus remained pariah. Prevention of music and dancing is similar to Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia. To Taliban the exposure of human body is also against Islam. Hence the ban on TV sets and cassette players. The compulsion for women to wear compulsory all embracing burqa- though not an Arab or Afghan tradition- and for men to wear beards are examples indicating the strict Taliban interpretation of Islam not found anywhere else. The department for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice and strong emphasis on enforcement of regulations are directly derived from Wahhabism. This Puritanism of Taliban can be found in Wahhabism.The question is how the people of Afghanistan supported them in their bid for absolute power, especially in the areas dominated by Pashtoons. Here comes my basic contention that Taliban were supported because their Islam is deviation from the political Islam of Mujahideen. They are rooted within the Afghan society and, notwithstanding their absolutism, their Islam is drawn from the traditions of Afghan people. They are introvert and inward looking with no concept of pan-Islamism of fundamentalist mujahideen. Their nationalist credentials were beyond any doubt for the people of Afghanistan.
Despite their Afghan-based beliefs and creed, efforts are afoot to convert them into Arab or Pakistani types of religious schools of thought, which are basically fundamentalist in the world outlook. Since they have taken one element out of the Afghan traditions and made it absolute in their ideology, therefore, with each passing day they are increasingly turning to extremism and fundamentalism found in Middle East, Pakistan and Iran. They are increasingly becoming breeding ground for the various types of fundamentalist crusaders in the Islamic world. The same can be said about the inflexible attitude of Taliban regarding female education. The mere opening of their schools will help them winning the support of the Western countries. But they are afraid of the adverse impact it would have on their illiterate followers, who might refuse to fight on their side against the 'enemy'. So if they want to change the course, they cannot do it out of compulsion. Their dilemma is that they are prisoners of their own creation. And they have chosen to follow the present course of action, which is in direct confrontation to the wishes of the modern world.
Conclusion
The trouble in Afghanistan is that the resistance to Soviet invasion was basically resistance to western and socialist influences. West, and for that matter Pakistan, supported the resistance movement in which fundamentalist Islam was the binding force.
Their rigid attitude to the Watan or People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which could have filled the vacuum in the changed circumstance like its counterparts did in the break away Central Asian Republics, created conditions for extremism and fundamentalism in Afghanistan. Now it is not very easy to extricate the country from this web of vicious circle. And without a liberal and forward-looking set-up, the solution to the problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation is a distant possibility.
The only alternative left to the world and the people of Afghanistan is to help let this land to reassert its traditions. The fundamentalist solution of the Afghan problem leads us to nowhere. It would perpetuate the hardships and empty the country permanently from the technocrats and scientific know-how. This situation would be haven for the fundamentalists and religious extremists, for drug barons and arms dealers and acceptable solution to the hawkish elements in Pakistani Establishment who think just in term of 'strategic depth' vis-a-vis India even at the cost of internal security, but would condemn a dynamic nation to permanent strife, backwardness and ignorance. This would not be in the interest of the regional and world peace. The security concerns of the neighbouring countries and the world at large would be very difficult to allay.
The traditions of Loya Jirga and monarchy are as old as Afghanistan is. Under such circumstances the reversion to traditions is the only solution available to the people of the country and world. Zahir Shah who symbolises traditions and the long cherished dream of a peaceful and liberal Afghanistan can deliver goods under the present precarious juncture of history.
Here the role of Pakistan is crucial, for the yesteryears strategic considerations are still dominant in the agenda of some of its powerful quarters. But Pakistan cannot remain out of step from the world developments and its economic, political and diplomatic considerations outweigh the strategic one. So its national interests dictate to come to terms on Afghanistan.