IAS: The meeting had an emergency nature as it was convened under pressure by the United Nations and the United States, both of which wanted a solution to be expeditiously decided upon by a group of Afghan personalities. Do you think, representation in the meeting reflected all sectors of the Afghan society? Could one call it a truly representative gathering? 

Ms. Wali: Given the emergency nature of the meeting I thought the UN did a remarkable job. However, were it not for the emergency nature, I think there could have been an equitable representation with regards to ethnicity and gender.

IAS: One of the political strategies in meetings and conferences is that individuals or groups try to participate in them while they benefit from a position of strength. Under the conditions, the Northern Alliance carried the most weight. Do you think still some semblance of balance could be maintained? 

Ms. Wali:  We were told the Northern Alliance representation was larger in part because it had to reflect the various factions and its leadership. This was a matter of concern to the Rome group which was voiced to the UN.

IAS: It was widely speculated and even clearly mentioned by Mr. Seerat, prior to the meeting that one of the objectives of the Loya Jirga and the preceding meeting to it namely the Bonn meeting was to decide on agreeing to the Former King Mohammad Zahir Shah to head the Interim Authority. His Majesty, however, decided to be represented by a delegation only and apparently did not want the job at this juncture. How was this decision by the former King taken by the meeting? 

Ms. Wali: There was much discussion on this issue. His Majesty's delegates had to repeatedly remind the other participants that His Majesty had no intention of restoring the monarchy and that he has no intention of returning to Afghanistan as a monarch. His only wish is to serve his country to bring peace and democracy through the Loya Jirga process.

IAS: The meeting in general and Lakhdar Brahimi in particular worked hard and into the wee hours of the morning to usher a conclusion that was expected of the meeting. Repeatedly the media mentioned that the UN and the international community used the possible aid into reconstruction of Afghanistan as motivation for the conclusion. Was this really the case? The meeting also gave rise to apparent disparity between the political stands of the younger leadership of the Northern Alliance versus the leader of the Jamiat Islami Party, namely Professor Rabbani. Was this obvious to the members and was it considered a positive change? 

Ms. Wali: It was reported that one of the " pull" factors that influenced various participants to reach an agreement was the promise of reconstruction monies. What was evident in the discourses, however, was the constant reminder from all representative bodies and Mr. Brahimi that the world was watching and witnessing this momentous event. "This was a golden opportunity" accorded to Afghanistan and "the eyes of the world was upon us" were frequent remarks coming from Mr. Brahimi [and] echoed by all delegates.

IAS: For the first time in many years a few women participated in a meeting that was entrusted with deciding on the fate of the country. In your own mind, was that a welcome move or an insufficient measure to represent women's interests? 

Ms. Wali: It was a welcome move to include women in the initial discussion. Holding a parallel civil society meeting held in Bon was also a welcome move. However, gender ratios were obviously not balanced. It is my hope that it will be rectified in the future.

IAS: A relatively less known younger leader who was away in Afghanistan was chosen by the meeting to head the interim authority. Evidently he was favored by the United States and that issue as you may agree or disagree carries weight with the United Nations. Heading an interim authority is one of the most difficult jobs and responsibilities anyone could have. The task is much greater than heading transitional governments or even regular government apparatuses. The time period of six months also seems to be extremely short for accomplishing all the meeting wants from the interim administration. Were these questions discussed by the meeting and how could the meeting's decision be justified? 

Ms. Wali: I have full confidence in the abilities of Mr. Karzai. It was the Northern Alliance that proposed that a Pushtun should head the Interim Authority. The timeframe of six months is short and the task daunting. There were no oppositions to Mr. Karzai's Chairmanship.

IAS: One report during the meeting suggested that Haji Qadeer left the meeting in protest over the under-representation of the Pashtuns in it. Would you kindly expound on this sensitive issue of ethnical representation and whether the meeting worked on bringing about a balance. 

Ms. Wali: I heard the same report. However, Haji Qadeer did return to resume his role as a delegate.

IAS: 17 of the 29 cabinet positions were assigned to the Northern Alliance. Among these are the most important portfolios of Women's Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Interior. Does this not give more power to the Alliance and somewhat limit the decisions to favor that Alliance. Let me give one example. The Ministry of Defense of the Interim Authority has agreed to finance programs of the newly revived Afghan TV. It shows the TV needs money and that the Defense Ministry has enough funds. But most importantly, the Defense Ministry has agreed to do this only if the TV runs programs showing activities of the Northern Alliance during the past few years. Would you consider this as an unnecessary edge provided for one of the factions only because their share in the government is a lion's share? 

Ms. Wali: The Northern Alliance were appropriated with more cabinet positions. Perhaps this was a recognition that the Northern Alliance was the main military resistance in the war against terrorism.

IAS: During the meeting representatives of Dostum's party were first banned and later admitted into the conference. Did the meeting have reasons for these actions and whether these reasons were discussed in the plenary. 

Ms. Wali: I do not know the particulars of this issue. I was not aware that anyone was expressly banned from the meeting.

IAS: Some lobbying is part of any such conference. Were their national and international lobbyists and what were they lobbying? 

Ms. Wali: The meeting of the international lobbyists were separate from the "Afghans only" discussions. The way in which the discussions were held was that the delegates met in a separate part of the building. There were no international observers present during the "Afghans only" negotiations. The protocol of the meeting was that we would meet separately in our respective delegations and would then convene in a joint session with the UN (Brahimi and his aides). The urgency of reaching an agreement and the pressure from all sides gave some delegates an urgent sense to compromise.

IAS: What was the role of international observers? Could you please elaborate on some of the important roles that were played by some of these observers. 

Ms. Wali: The role of the international community representatives were to support the UN efforts.