The Afghanistan Foundation's White Paper or Dark Paper?

 

A Discussion of This and Other Issues.

By

M. Hassan Kakar, formerly professor of history

at Kabul University and the author of: Afghanistan,

The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, University of California Press, 1995.

 The Afghanistan Foundation in Washington D.C. has in July 1999 issued a White Paper (WP) in 44 pages on the situation in Afghanistan entitled: U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Challenges and Solutions. Its authors state that they want to " help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan." For this purpose they have taken upon themselves " to recommend options for US policy makers" and offer suggestions for them to adopt as policies of the U.S. Administration on Afghanistan.

In the following pages I want to evaluate the WP. In particular I want to elucidate the main issues it has raised, and advance, in conclusion, my own suggestion on the subject.

The WP is the outcome of a " three-week mission" to the countries around Afghanistan. The mission has not been to Afghanistan. The WP authors state that the mission met with " senior officials from various parties to the [Afghan] conflict including the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia."

Who these "senior officials " are the WP authors do not say. Whoever they were most probably they have not told the mission the whole story in question, but only that part of the story which they wanted to tell and that too in a way to impress it. If the senior officials were career diplomats they probably have tried to impress the mission even more skilfully. On such occasions what such senior officials and diplomats usually have uppermost in mind is the national interest of their own country. This becomes particularly so when the issues in question also affect their country or when they have a particular agenda of their own about their neighboring land in question. The WP is a reflection of such a situation. It has more than once alluded to the interests of Afghanistan's neighbors in the affairs of Afghanistan, whereas it is silent about Afghanistan's interest in these countries. Hence its limitations, in particular its one-sidedness. It is, of course, not the only account of its kind. All diplomatic accounts are of this brand and history students are particularly familiar with them. The WP drafters have been insensitive to this, and have instead claimed apparently to impress their uncanny readers that the information the mission had gathered is "excellent", a claim which can not be valid for the additional following reasons also.

What is usually understood by "excellent information" is the information which is obtained from the original source or sources in the language or languages of the natives by those who are specialists in the subject or are making efforts to become specialists. Also, to obtain "excellent information" one needs to do field work or at least to hold interviews with informed persons and groups of persons from different walks of life inside their own country in their own language.

The mission has not done so. For this and other reasons the WP suffers from limitations as the following examples show: One, the mission, as already noted, has not been to Afghanistan, that is, to the country about which the WP has offered suggestions. Two, its members do not speak Pashto, the language of the majority of the people of Afghanistan. Three, members of the mission do not follow Afghan affairs regularly. They do so only when the US Administration becomes keen about Afghanistan and the region in which Afghanistan is located. Four, no member of the mission is a specialist on Afghanistan in the true sense of the word. The Foundation itself is new. It has been set up in 1996. Five, the mission has been to the vast region for only three weeks, a period insufficient for obtaining "excellent information." Six, the principal drafter of the WP, Mr. Zalmay Khalilzad, although originally from Afghanistan and even though he still speaks Dari, the second main language in Afghanistan, has spent almost all his adult life outside Afghanistan, that is, in Lebanon and the US. He has left Afghanistan probably in 1974. His long absence makes him a stranger to Afghanistan and its people especially when we bear in mind that the upheavals of the last twenty years have drastically altered Afghanistan politically, socially, economically and even demographically. The Afghanistan Foundation's outside consultants, that is, Mr.Ishaq Nadiri of New York University and. Mr. Quadir Amiryar of the George Washington University, even though their country of birth is also Afghanistan have been away from it for decades. They are likewise not Afghanlogists . None has published a study of any subject on Afghanistan that I know of. Neither do they speak the language of the majority.

All the above shows that the information which the mission has obtained about Afghanistan is not " excellent." In other words the WP is based not on "excellent information" but on non- excellent information. Any paper based on such a brand of information is bound to suffer from shortcomings, whatever the intention of its drafter. The WP is not an exception. So the recommendations it has made, if the US Administration adopts them as its policies, is then likely to bring about an outcome other than what its drafters have apparently intended, namely that it may, inter alias, prolong the present conflict in Afghanistan. Even if the US Administration ignores its suggestions it still may hurt the cause of peace in war-ravaged Afghanistan. For by its expressions intended to satisfy the taste of readers in the West the WP may persuade their unwary among them into thinking that its statements and recommendations are sound.

The WP is a sum of statements, propositions, generalizations, predictions, recommendations and injunctions. The injunctions in the form of " must" and " should" are not for others but for the US Administration as if it were a subordinate office of the Afghanistan Foundation. More important, none of the above statements has been based on facts, evidence, data or statistics. They all are statements and generalizations, not precise or sound but the product of preconceived notions. Hence the subjectivism of the WP. Only well-established authorities of social and political sciences may venture to make such statements. They too would make such statements only after they have obtained reliable data. Little that I know of Afghan history I can state that no one, Afghan or non-Afghan, is such an authority on Afghanistan to make statements of the kind such as the WP drafters have. As noted no one, whether or not an authority on Afghanistan would make such statements unless he or she first obtained reliable facts on the basis of which to formulate recommendations for policy makers. It is then not surprising that for this as well as other reasons the statements that the WP authors have made are unsound.

Take, for example, the generalization "rogue state" by which the WP has characterized present day Afghanistan. To be exact, the WP has not referred to Afghanistan directly as a " rogue state." It has used the term in statements such as "If Afghanistan under the Taliban continues to behave as a rogue state and "...Afghanistan is becoming another rogue state." The WP drafters despite their juggling with words imply that Afghanistan under the Taliban is already a "rogue state" and will become more so unless it is replaced or forced to become a non-rogue state. What the WP drafters have stated in the last clause of this statement is the real purpose of the WP that will be discussed later in this paper. The phrase "rogue state" has a recent pedigree. The dictionary meaning of the word rogue is a dishonest and unprincipled person, a fierce and dangerous animal separated from the herd. By extension the "rogue state" is then meant a state that observes no principle, abides by no law and is separated from other states for its unprincipled and dangerous stand. A rogue state in this sense then is a state which is run by individuals who are not bound by any law or principle but by their own whims and dictates. When the drafters of the WP call Afghanistan under the Taliban a "rogue state" they mean an unprincipled and dangerous state of the above kind.

In this connection another point also crops up for examination. This is the word state in the sense the WP authors have used. They have not defined it. Do they mean by it a government as the words government and state are often interchangeably used? This does not seem to be so because throughout the WP its authors have avoided calling the Islamic Emirate or the Taliban as government as if they were academic and legal authorities. They have called them only as the "Taliban", or "a party to the conflict." By this they mean that the Taliban are only a group of Afghans contending for power just like other groups are. The WP authors as well as like-minded pundits disregard the fact that the Taliban have under their jurisdiction about ninety percent of the country whereas other groups are now history and the one inside the country has been confined to a corner of it. They have also disregarded the fact that the Taliban have mainly by disarming the former bandits maintained peace in their domain and that the people in their domain have assisted them to power against the former rulers and bandits. Seemingly, the WP authors are here faced with a dilemma: On the one hand, they claim that the Taliban are only a group or a party to the conflict but, on the other hand, they do not hesitate to call them a government or a state when it serves their purpose, which is that they want to demonize and condemn the Taliban and also the land under their jurisdiction. Contrary to what they hold they are now willing to give them the status of a state in statements such as: "If Afghanistan under the Taliban continues to behave as a rogue state" and "...Afghanistan is becoming another rogue state." Since the word state generally refers to a territory, a political community, and a political system this "political community" becomes also "rogue" in the scheme of thought of the WP authors. Then all the Afghans under the jurisdiction of the Taliban become "rogue." This is nothing but arrogance and irresponsibility especially on the part of the WP primary author even though he owes his very existence to Afghanistan and its people, that is, to those men and women in that land who have brought him up, have looked after him, have trained him, and have helped him become what he now is. By composing such a paper about the country of his birth he has revealed his true self, which is that he is, to say the least, a very ungrateful and egotistic person indeed. Now the essential question is this : Is Afghanistan under the Taliban a "rogue state" as the WP authors claim , or the claim is only a willful distortion? This is what I want now to discuss.

In this connection I want first to note what leaders of the Islamic Emirate themselves say. They say that they want to implement the Islamic Shari'at as interpreted according to the Hanafi jurisprudence (fiqh) or creed (mazhab), one of the four Sunni schools of law, the other being Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Maliki. Basically they are all the same and the Hanafi school, is , in modern parlance, relatively liberal for being based on the Quran, saying of the Prophet, (hadith) consensus ( ijma') and deduction (qiyas.) (1)

The above saying implies that the leaders of the Islamic Emirate want to purify Islam. They have been vocal about their puritanical mission from the time they began to rule. Since Islam is state and religion, that is , since the Islamic state considers itself responsible for secular as well as religious affairs of the community the Islamic Emirate has taken upon itself the responsibility of running Afghanistan accordingly. The Islamic Shari'at has well-defined laws and injunctions covering all aspects of life including the rights and responsibilities of individuals and of the community toward each other.

The pre-Taliban Muslim rulers of Afghanistan also upheld the Islamic Shari'at, but they had also introduced statutory laws. What differentiates them from drivers of the Islamic Emirate in this respect is this: The leaders of the Islamic Emirate are very strict perhaps too strict in implementing the Shari'at. They have adopted the initial Islamic period as their role model, and have so far adopted no modern statutory laws. Neither have they allowed interpretation of the Shari'at in the light of those modern developments that have transformed some aspects of human relationships whereas the former had . Consequently in Afghanistan now the Shari'at is the only body of laws on the basis of which the country is run and it is supreme. This has put the Islamic Emirate at odds with human rights activists who monitor throughout the world those rights of individuals which have been universally accepted in modern times. The confrontation is then not because the Islamic Emirate is run by the whims of individuals, that is, by no laws, but because it is run very strictly on the basis of Islamic laws. The clash is probably a reflection of the clash of civilizations. Critics might argue as they actually do that some of these laws specially those dealing with secular affairs are anachronistic and that these are implemented roughly by untrained personnel in a society that has undergone huge transformation in the course of fourteen centuries after Afghanistan became an Islamic land. But to allege that the Islamic Emirate under the Taliban is a "rogue state" in the sense stated above, as the drafters of the WP have alleged, is nonsense. It becomes the more so when we want to know what kind of rulers the leaders of the Islamic Emirate are and what kind of life they lead.

In the first place the drivers of the Islamic Emirate observe the Islamic Shari'at in minute detail, applying it on themselves as well as others on an equal basis. They punish violators of their own ranks just as they punish others. In the second place they, as distinct from administrative officials of the Emirate who are as corrupt as officials in other third world countries are, lead a modest life. They are modest in their food, modest in their clothing, modest in their residential homes and modest in their dealing with people. Their overall style of existence is so modest that one can hardly differentiate them from ordinary Afghans. The difference in appearance between them and the ordinary people is the fact that the former, unlike the latter, are driven in modern cars.

As far as I know none of the leaders of the Islamic Emirate has so far misused state power for personal enrichment even though the temptation to do so in the present runaway inflationary situation is great. They are, in fact, among the most principled and most pious rulers modern Afghanistan has ever had. They are perhaps also among the pious and principled rulers the present day world has. It was indeed their piety, their principled behavior coupled with their strong convictions as well as their iron determination that helped them save the tyrannized people of Afghanistan from the clutches of the most cruel tyrants of the Islamic Tanzimat period. These attributes also helped them rise to power, the first instance of its kind in modern Afghanistan where religious functionaries have become rulers. To those who dislike their mode of rule and style of life should be pointed out that this is how they are, and that the leaders of the Islamic Emirate in turn do not like their style of life. As already noted, the difference is probably a reflection of the clash of civilizations. Who can say who is right considering the vast differences that exist between their respective social and political environments in particular the values which they uphold and the moral standards which they apply?

This much, however, can be said with certainty. As noted, the totality of the values which the leaders of the Islamic Emirate uphold prompted them to boldly stand to the powerful tyrants with dangers of every kind to themselves and their families, while those who now demonize them or wish and try to replace them stood as mere spectators. Now to characterize the Islamic Emirate run by such men as a " rogue state" as the the WP drafters have done is not only untrue but also cruel.

Apparently the WP drafters want to punish those whom they dislike. In particular they want to punish the Taliban and their leaders who administer the state on the basis of Islamic laws and themselves lead a pious life in a world where unprincipled and corrupt rulers are not few. The principal drafter of the WP, Mr. Khalilzad, has taken advantage of the anti-Taliban climate for drafting the WP essentially to promote his own career at the expense not only of the Taliban and their leaders but also of the country of his birth. Who can guarantee that he may not do the same to the country of his adoption when and if his career, that is, his personal interest requires it? To careerists self promotion comes first, principled life afterward if at all. At any rate Mr. Khalilzad who existentially and morally owes so much to the people of Afghanistan ought to advance views intended to create good will between them and all those who deal with them. Now that he is in a position to do so he is expected to pay the Afghans what he owes them especially in the present fateful moments of their national life. Only then he would have paid what he owes them. If he can not do that or does not want it he should at least avoid trying to promote himself at their expense.

The WP has also used terms for groups of people erroneously. Take for example the term Taliban and the term Northern Alliance. The WP speaks of the Taliban as "a party to the [Afghan] conflict." It likewise refers to the Northern Alliance as "a party to the conflict." The criterion the WP has adopted for these statements is not the same. It has actually used a double standard. This is in addition to the fact that both terms have undergone changes in their original meanings, and are no longer what they had been.

What is called the Northern Alliance was brought about on October 10, 1996 by Commander Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, head of the Supervisory Council and General 'Abd al-Rasheed Dostum, head of the National and Islamic Movement in opposition to the Taliban. Afterward, Karim Khalili, head of the Islamic Unity Party and others joined it. The actual name of the so-called Northern Alliance was not the Northern alliance, but the United Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan. It was, however, at no time a united front because its members never joined forces together, and because such serious differences existed among them that their fighters had on more than one occasions waged deadly battles against each other's groups of fighters. More to the point, with the exception of Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, who has now been confined to a corner, the others have been driven out of Afghanistan and their groups are no longer organized, and are out of function inside Afghanistan. Out of the eleven provinces in northern Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Mas'ud holds only two provinces - Badakhshan and Takhar - while the others are in the hands of the Taliban. (Ahmad Shah Mas'ud too is more than likely to be driven out in a matter of weeks if his forces are not sustained by foreign arms, ammunitions and money.) That is why the term-Northern Alliance- is dead among Afghans themselves. It is alive only in the writings of some persons and agencies outside Afghanistan. Specifically those who dislike the Taliban or the Islamic Emirate use the term. But the term not only misleads uninformed readers, more seriously it plays into the hands of the enemies of the integrity of Afghanistan. Such persons knowingly or unknowingly apply the term with the meaning that the country be divided between the north and the south along the great massive of the Hindu Kush as the Soviets had actually tried to do. The so-called Northern Alliance is a variation of this splitting scheme. The Soviet Union's successor too, that is, Federal Russia, followed the line and it still does. Actually it was Russia's consul at Mazar, Oleg Nevelyaev who supervised on the spot the creation on October 1996 of the so-called Northern Alliance.

If the WP drafters apply the term Northern Alliance for the so-called the United Front why do not they call the other "party to the conflict" by the name it has chosen for itself, that is, the Islamic Emirate? The Taliban are the fighting force of the Islamic Emirate. True, originally it was called the Taliban Movement, but since 1996 it calls itself the Islamic Emirate. This should be all the more so because the Emirate controls about 90 percent of the country including Kabul, the capital, and has maintained peace and security in its domain as noted. That the WP drafters apply a double standard here is because as noted they dislike the Taliban. But if they dislike the Taliban what about other names representing countries and regimes which they also may dislike. Can they call them by other names? Certainly not. They have ignored this fact and applied a double standard. Throughout the WP they have only negatively focused on the Islamic Emirate which they call the Taliban. But whatever their personal opinion about it the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan exists as a fact, and to call it by another name or equate it with the non-existent Northern Alliance as they have done is to mislead their readers. Perhaps what the WP drafters want is to help the defunct Northern Alliance to resurrection.

The most serious charge that the WP drafters have levelled against the Islamic Emirate is that it has assigned to itself the mission of creating instability in the region as far Saudi Arabia with the exception of course of Iran. To be exact it has not said so in direct and plain words, but the message is unmistakably clear. They have linked the creation of instability in these regions to the Taliban's zeal for radicalization and terrorism by stating that "...the continued radicalization of Afghanistan [under the Taliban] is destabilizing Pakistan." They have, in addition, charged that Afghanistan under the Taliban neutralizes peace efforts in Central Asia as it states : "Afghanistan also destabilizes Central Asia, fostering violence that has hindered the implementation of a peace plan in Tajikistan and led terrorism in Uzbekistan." Moreover, the WP drafters have alleged that Afghanistan under the Taliban helps train terrorists to fight the United States: "Afghanistan is a haven for terrorists and extremists dedicated to fighting the United States and creating instability among such important allies as Saudi Arabia."

First I want to draw the attention of readers to the double standard which the WP drafters have employed once again and to which I have alluded before. Earlier we saw that they considered the Islamic Emirate as the Taliban who are only " a party to the conflict [in Afghanistan]." Now it implies that the Taliban represent the entire country. Why this contradiction in term? It may be that the WP wants to show that the Taliban as rulers of Afghanistan will be, because of this and many other charges that the WP drafters have leveled against them in addition, the most destructive agent to stability, a stability which is the foundation of welfare not only for peoples in the region but for peoples also throughout the world. By thinking so the WP drafters have probably been influenced by two well-known judgmental remarks. One is Motley's denunciation of Philip 11 in these words: "...if there are vices...from which he was exempt, it is because it is not permitted by human nature to attain perfection even in evil." The other is the denunciation of King John by William Stubbs in these words: ".. polluted with every crime that could disgrace a man." (2)

If the WP drafters succeed in convincing their readers of their characterization of the Taliban then they will undoubtedly be condemned as the most evil group of persons in the world and branded as persona non grata by all in particular the United Nations. Already a number of partisan groups and persons here and there in the West have raised high this demonization chorus. Now the WP drafters have joined hands with them with semi-official force.

Luckily, they have no monopoly of knowledge on the Taliban. In fact their knowledge about them is of the stereotype. Besides, they have shown in their WP that they are biased toward them. That is why they have branded them as a destabilizing factor in the region as noted. The question now to be asked is this: What about the rules of the game worthy of man in general and of those in particular who are attached to prestigious think tanks and who are required to think and act as conscientious persons do? This becomes particularly necessary on war and peace issues which affect the lives of millions of people. In such cases it behoves on the WP drafters to responsibly enlighten the public and offer solid suggestions for policy makers. They can do so only when they draw a balanced picture of the topic assigned to them in this case the topic of the Taliban and then make recommendations about them for policy makers. Have they done so in their WP?

That the WP drafters have branded the Taliban as a destabilizing factor in the region is clear from their own writing as noted. What is not clear in the WP is why the Taliban do this and what advantage they have in view in doing so ? The answer according to the WP drafters seems to be that since the Taliban believe in "radical Islam" they want not only to implement it in Afghanistan but to export it to the region as well. They allege that under the Taliban " Afghanistan's leading exports to the areas are drugs, arms, and Islamic radicalism." For this and a host of other allegations in particular the allegation that they have allowed camps in Afghanistan for training "terrorists" the WP drafters have characterized all this "Talibanism" or "Taliban's ideology." Now let me briefly discuss some of these points.
 

"Radical Islam" or "Islamic radicalism ":

What is understood by radical Islam or Islamic radicalism is different from what the WP drafters have stated. Briefly, radical Islam or Islamic radicalism known as Islamism stands for the views of the radical thinkers of Islam such as Sayyed Qutb, Abul Ala Mawdudi and their followers. They all want to radically transform society. This is a revolutionary view of Islam, and in order that this view be implemented state power is required. Hence the significance of state in their view as the means through which to transform society. That is why the followers of the above Islamic thinkers stand for the view that they must have the state as a means to radically transform society on the basis of the Qur'an as expounded by these thinkers. Can it be now true to say that the Taliban or the leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan hold such views and that they have tried to change or want to change the state and society on its basis?

The answer to the above question is an emphatic no as the following shows. The leaders of the Islamic Emirate are mullas and mawlawis of the traditional type with no higher modern university education as Islamists have. Neither are they spiritual or mystic leaders. They have risen from among the ordinary people of the rural areas with known pedigrees but with no connection to the higher echelons of the urban society especially Kabul. They were not a city people except for those who led people in prayer in mosques. They differed from judges and others who were connected to the government. They had not served the bureaucracy or the administration. Neither are they drawn from big landholding families nor from tribal elites. They have raised themselves to their present position solely by their firm convictions and iron determination. They have made themselves rulers of a country where no such group of people has ever reached such a position. They have thus set a precedent. Some among them are graduates of the local madrasas while others are graduates of the madrasas in Pakistan. (3)

The well-known Pakistani journalist, Ahmad Rashid, calls these madrasas Deobandi. By this he implies that since they have been influenced by the Deobandi teaching "...the Taliban are virulently and violently anti-Shiite." Here Ahmad Rashid refers to the treatment of the Shee'i Hazaras by the Taliban who reincorporated their region, the Hazarajat, in 1998 after 18 years of its separation from the rest of the country. This was a radical cessionist Khumeinist Party whose leaders followed Iran not only in religious but also in secular affairs. During all this time, contrary to their professions, they had made themselves unpopular even with their own Shee'i Hazaras to the extent that eight Hazara commanders joined the Taliban in driving them out. Subsequently, Shaykh Akbari, the leader of a faction of the Islamic Unity Party, also joined the Islamic Emirate. By driving the the leaders of the Party the Taliban brought the country closer to the brink of reunification. They also paved the way for the normalization of life in the Hazarajat. Ever since the Afghan Shee'as lead a normal life with no restrictions either on their beliefs or their religious practices just as they did before the civil war period that was marked by the spirit of sectarian toleration about which even Ahmad Rashid speaks in his article, "Rewriting the Rules of the Great Game. Talibanization?"

Still Ahmad Rashid has associated the Taliban or their leaders with the Deobandi madrasa in the anti-Shee'a sense. But the teaching of the Deobandi madrasa had many dimensions one of which was opposition to the Shee'i doctrine, the others being for the regeneration of the Sunni Islam and opposition to the British rule. The seminary had turned into an important center of anti-British activity, and many of its leading thinkers and activists struggled for the independence of a united and undivided India. Of course, its opposition to the Shee'i doctrine was in the Indian context when the Sunni doctrine was threatened, among other things, by that rival doctrine. It was in response , among other things, to this threat that the Deobandi madrasa was set up in 1879 in the Saharunpur district in the Uttar Pradesh province of India just as the madrasa network had been set up originally in Afghanistan about one thousand years ago by Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna in response to the Shee'i doctrine. In modern Afghanistan neither the Shee'i doctrine nor the Shee'as have posed a threat either to the Sunni doctrine or to the Sunni people. Hence the peaceful coexistence among the two sects. The Afghan Shee'as have, in consequence, lived in an atmosphere of no violence for more than a century. Let me briefly explain why this was so.

In modern Afghanistan not only leaders of the Sunni and Shee'i sects but also common men and women of both sects have co-existed peacefully particularly after 1893 when the Shee'i Hazarajat was brought under the direct control of the central government. True, during the conflict the Shee'i Hazaras were harshly treated. But with the dissipation of the conflict atmosphere they lived as others did. This is mainly because Afghans are a people known in the region for their toleration. Intermarriages and mixing have been an accepted way of life among the Sunnis and Shee'as. The Shee'as were and still are free in the performance of their religious practises. When they performed their special Muharrum ceremonies even Sunni official dignitaries including members of the royal family joined them as observers. The modus vivendi was likewise real in the bureaucracy where the Shee'as participated on an equal basis with the rest. They held ministerial posts in the government. The Shee'i Qizilbashes even served the bureaucracy out of all proportion to their number. From 1747 to 1880 they had dominated it. An exception to this modus vivendi in normal times has been the commotion that had happened in the reign of Shah Mahmud Sadozay in Kabul in 1802. The commotion happened because that monarch had leaned heavily toward the Shee'i Qizilbashes. The peaceful coexistence of the two communities had been disturbed sharply in times of disturbances caused by foreign armed aggression and foreign sectarian instigation. In such times almost all foreign mass media men and women have concentrated much on sectarian and ethnic discords, not knowing that in Afghanistan sectarian violence has never been as sharp as in old India or Iran. Against such a background it does not stand to reason that the Taliban or their leaders could become " virulently and violently anti Shee'as" even if they want to be so, when, in fact, they are not.

For Ahmad Rashid brought up in the sectarian - conscious atmosphere of Pakistan where especially in Karachi sectarian violence is endemic this is difficult to comprehend. This sectarianist journalist looks at events in terms of Sunni and Shee'a encounter, holding history as if it was a struggle between the two sects. This may be the reason that he has opted to follow the anti-Taliban line of his Iranian co-religionists. Hence his alarmist propaganda of " Talibanization " and the spread of view to the effect that Afghanistan under the Taliban has turned into a safe haven for anti-Shee'a Sunni extremists from all over the Muslim world. In his anti-Taliban rhetoric he utters such alarmist words as "...the dangerous behavior of Afghanistan's new leaders." Either he willfully ignores the fact or does not know that leaders of the Islamic Emirate were, before they took over, religious functionaries, who also performed a variety of social services in their communities. Living in the midst of Afghans they do not act under the influence of the Deobandi anti-Shee'i teaching.

In Afghanistan even the Mujaddidis, that is, the descendants of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhind who had initiated the anti-Shee'i movement in India, do not utter anti-Shee'a rhetoric. Their present-day leaders have sided on some political issues with the Afghan Shee'as. Ahmad Rashid also holds the view that the Taliban do not follow the Deobandis in every respect. In his own words: "The Deobandis sought to harmonize classical Islamic texts with current realities, an aim the Taliban has ignored." The fact is, as noted, the Taliban and their leaders can not disregard the realities in Afghanistan. As rural people themselves they have close ties with the rural people who are the genuine embodiment of Afghan culture , a culture which is, as noted, more tolerant and free of sectarian violence than those either of Iran or Pakistan. This is beside their professions to the effect that as strict Muslims they do not differentiate between their Muslim compatriots. It is in line with this culture that the Taliban and their leaders have upheld the Islamic Shari'at, and ,conversely, have disparaged ethnic considerations. It is also in line with this culture that they have taken upon themselves to reunite the country, an effort which Ahmad Rashid and other like-minded pundits interpret subjectively.

That the Taliban are conservative and puritanical Sunni is true. And this for the additional reasons that atheism and materialism had made inroad in Afghan society, and that the communists rose to power in the country for the first time in its history. This means that the Taliban are concerned mainly with the conservation of the traditional Islam in particular with its five pillars. That is why also they have set up only a small-scale government of the early Islamic period type concerned mainly with the preservation of the Islamic Shari'a and the maintenance of public morality and public order and security in a reunited land. They have left other affairs including economic affairs to individuals. This means that no official restrictions are allowed to hamper the free operation of the market forces.

All this is because in words and deeds they resort to the fundamentals of Islam as was practised in the earliest period of Islam, the period where Shee'ism had not appeared as an organized force. Their notion of Islam then may be termed "neo -fundamentalism" as some have, because " Islam is expressed by them not as an ideology [or Talibanism as the WP drafter hold ], but the mere and absolute application of the Shari'at." (4) True, they are strict perhaps too strict in implementing the Shari'at, but that is not "Islamic radicalism" or " radical Islam" as the WP drafters allege.

The WP drafters have confused this neo-fundamentalism not only with "Islamic radicalism" but also with what they call "Talibanism", a term by which they mean "an extreme, backward and oppressive version of radical Islam." Apparently they have invented this ambiguous term to associate it with the term communism, fascism and the like in order to demonize the Taliban and to prepare the intellectual ground for the US Administration and others to act against them. Seemingly they do not care whether or not their invented term corresponds with objective reality. It does not, and this for two reasons: The Taliban and their leaders have added nothing new to Shari'a or Islam as a whole to call them by such a new term. More important, the WP authors have overlooked the inconsistency in their view which is: How can the upholders of "an extreme, backward and oppressive version of radical Islam" find a favorable response among the non-backward Muslims of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Central Asia ?

It is a matter of common sense that it is unlikely for a backward concept especially when it comes, as the WP drafters allege, from the "oppressors of women, and ethnic minorities" of an undeveloped and war-devastated country to impress the non-backward people of another land. Apparently, the WP drafters do not care about the inconsistency in their writing as long as they feel they can demonize the Taliban. For whatever reason they do not care to mislead their readers.

The WP authors should ask themselves the question why the Taliban and not other Afghan organizations have found sympathizers even in countries outside Afghanistan particular Pakistan? The answer can not be found in the allegation that they are backward, but in the fact that they as well as their leaders sincerely believe in the Shari'at, apply it indiscriminately, lead a pious life and, as noted, have uncompromisingly stood to tyrants of the worst kind in a situation where tyranny, terrorism and violence were practised on a scale unheard of in Afghanistan where nearly everyone and everything was insecure before they took over. Besides, to the people of the country they have brought security out of such an anarchy that reigned supreme throughout the country. And they have ensured the security to such a degree that no other Afghan government had ensured in any other period in the twentieth century. In short they had made safe in their domain not only the lives of men and women, but have likewise ensured and maintained collective security.

Critics forget this and assume as if Afghanistan was as normal a land as were theirs. They likewise overlook the fact that in the absence of security life itself becomes exposed to extinction whereas life with dignity is or ought to be the most sacred thing on earth. National security is thus a fundamentally necessary prerequisite for a civil society as well as the preservation and promotion of life itself.

In this connection here is a note of the obvious. When the United States of America, the sole superpower of the day, time and again makes a big issue of its national security, then for war-ravaged Afghanistan surrounded by some ill-intentioned neighbors it becomes absolutely imperative to make national security the top issue in its list of priorities. It should be the more so because Afghanistan 's ill-intentioned neighbors have threatened its very existence as an independent nation a number of times in this as well as the last century. Even now some are after the partition of their country. Once again Afghan security has become a matter of national survival.

Except for a few ambitious and mercenary warlords the Afghan nation is strongly for national security and wants to lead a normal life in a reunited and independent Afghanistan just as other nations want to live in their own independent countries. For Afghans this is not a new concern. They had always been sensitive about this issue so much so that at critical moments in their national life they have opted to remain free at the cost of material progress, a modern style of life, and even life itself. A recent example of this is the stand which their overwhelming majority took visa vis the Soviet aggressors and their surrogates as a result of which they sacrificed about one and a half million in expelling the aggressors from their fatherland.

This, however, does not mean that they are not for modernism. They have shown the desire for modernism very strongly in the pre-war period. During that period they had, among other things, turned their cities in particular Kabul as safe havens for hippies of the Western world. They, however, long for all this to happen not at the expense of national dignity. The view is strong among them that only in an independent, reintegrated and consolidated Afghanistan can they have national dignity and prosperity. From what I know I can confidently state that the overwhelming number of Afghans share this concern. It is on these as well as the issues of safety of property, safety of life and national security more than anything else that the Taliban have proved their worth. Hence their rise to power

Regrettably, most outsiders particularly the self-promoting ones among them Mr. Khalilzad fail to appreciate the special geographical location of Afghanistan along with the concern of its people for its integrity and independence. They undervalue the values which the people of Afghanistan value much. They overstress those issues which men and women in the West, secure in their peaceful and unexposed countries, value much. They, thus, want the people of basically different cultures and with different concerns to behave the way they want them to behave. They themselves then become the source of tension rather than rapprochement between peoples. They then do a disservice to people.
 

Drugs

According to the WP Afghanistan likewise destabilizes the region by exporting "drugs." Here by "Afghanistan" the WP means Afghanistan under the Taliban. Perhaps also that part of Afghanistan which is under their opponents' control. In any case the WP implies that the Taliban as a government either encourage the illicit drug trade, or condone the trade or at least do not take effective measures to stop or reduce the trade. It likewise implies that the Taliban do not discourage farmers from growing opium poppy, from which the drug is obtained by a manufacturing process. In each of these cases the Taliban, as the WP implies, are engaged in activities which turn them into a destabilizing factor for the region and by extension also the world.

I feel restrained to discuss the above as well as the terrorism issue about which the WP has words in reference to the Taliban. In neither am I a specialist. Neither are the WP drafters. Besides, these are ongoing issues, and the data presented on them are limited, one-sided, and suspicious. That is perhaps because presently they are the subject mainly of intelligence agencies which are concerned understandably with security issues, and which are duty bound to come up in a short span of time with figures, information and statements for authorities for them to take some action on their basis. Journalists as well as persons of special interest do not hesitate to make general statements on their basis. The WP may be considered of this type. The statements they all make about such issues then may not be precise or even correct. That they are generally accusatory in nature and of the stereotype is universally known.

My five-year prison life in Kabul in the 1980s has made me suspicious of generalizations based on the statements apparently made by those who are held under the custody of security forces. For all these reasons objective studies on such issues are almost non-existent. I therefore confine myself mainly to the official positions of the parties concerned with some concluding remarks of my own about them.

Before the Soviet invasion the drug issue was not connected to Afghanistan in any serious way. The invasion and the subsequent long period of war changed this and brought about many offshoots. Among them the drug, lethal weapons, and terrorism issues plagued Afghanistan the most. They likewise affected the region and to some extent also the world.

With the the Soviet invasion the war situation led to an increase in the opium poppy cultivation mainly because the central government was no longer able to curb its cultivation. It lost control over the rural areas. In this situation in some regions small farmers in order to provide the basic necessities of life for their families cultivated opium for ready cash and the cash offered them in advance of the delivery of the opium by money lenders. The existence of mines of the war period in some areas also persuaded farmers to cultivate opium poppy in their much reduced land. The runaway inflation as well as the high unemployment situation compelled the farmers to go on cultivating the opium poppy in still larger quantity in place of the staple diet. At the same time that the drug smugglers made persuasive demands for opium cultivation the unprecedented ease in crossing porous borders facilitated its trade that became in consequence international in nature. This became particularly the case after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.

It is unfortunate that the ease in crossing the porous borders after decades of restrictions partly led to this state of affairs. All this contributed to an unprecedented increase in the opium poppy cultivation, the production of drugs from it and its use as a precious trade commodity albeit illicit commodity by a network of smugglers and collaborators not only in the region, but even beyond it. But as Secretary - General Kufi Annan states: "The value added of drug production for Afghanistan is small compared to the profits that are gained internationally along the drug -traffic chain." ( 5) Barnett Rubin likewise states that " The Afghan peasants receive a mere fraction of the eventual street value of the opium."(6 )

This "mere fraction of the eventual street value of the opium" to the Afghan farmer is because it is processed into highly valuable and much wanted drug by people other than its original cultivators. Since the processing is done by relatively simple machines such machines were set to operate easily wherever they were needed. They had also been set to operate inside Afghanistan. But in 1997 the Taliban authorities destroyed such machines in the presence of workers of international agencies. They officially banned this manufacturing process inside Afghanistan, declaring it un-Islamic. They also from time to time destroyed and still destroy crops of opium poppy. However, one can not rule out the surreptitious existence of such operating machines inside the country. But the bulk of the drug is probably produced in the unadministered frontier regions east of the Durand Line. This means that even though opium poppy is cultivated in large quantity in Afghanistan it is processed into the drug in huge quantity outside it.

The proportionately high number of addicts of the drug in Pakistan and Iran confirm the statement. In Pakistan the number of the addicts, according to Ahmad Rashid, is five million, and in Iran three million, while for Afghanistan he has given no figures. This means that the number of the drug edicts in Afghanistan is negligible. This also means that the drug is available in large quantity in Pakistan as well as Iran but not in Afghanistan. All this means that it can not be true to state as the WP drafters state that "Afghanistan's leading exports to the area are drugs."
 

Arms

As noted the WP drafters also allege that because of its "...leading exports to the area are drugs, arms and Islamic radicalism." Afghanistan under the Taliban "destabilizes Central Asia." The allegation implies that Afghanistan is a source of weapons of its own make. It also implies that Afghanistan had, during the resistance period, obtained abundant weapons so much so that it now has a surplus of them and that it exports the surplus to the region. The assumptions are unfounded. Afghanistan makes no weapons. True, Afghanistan or to be precise the various parties to the conflict obtained huge quantity of weapons from various external sources during the resistance and after, but they spent a large quantity of them in the conflict which has gone on for over twenty years. The conflict is still alive, and weapons are still needed and are still delivered by external sources to the parties involved in the conflict. Indeed a main reason or perhaps the main reason for the prolongation of the conflict is this flow of weapons into Afghanistan.

The drafters of the WP also hold this view and state that "As long as outside powers seek to control events in Afghanistan, the flow of arms and money to [Afghan ] fighters will continue, and Afghanistan will remain unstable." Specifically they state that " Pakistan has armed the Taliban" and that " Without Pakistani aid, the Taliban would not have have been able to score some important initial victories, and to sustain its subsequent drive to take over the rest of the country." But then, as already quoted, they also state that it is Afghanistan under the Taliban which exports arms to the region including Pakistan. The statements are contradictory, and they all can not be true. Seemingly the WP drafters do not mind to be contradictory so along as they feel they can demonize the Taliban and even Afghanistan under their control. It seems they have a mission of demonization to accomplish at the expense of truth and decency.
 

Terrorism

Terrorism in the sense of unlawfully coercing and violating a person or a community or a government for a political purpose is likewise a new phenomenon in Afghanistan. Except for a few instances in the the early part of the twentieth century individual Afghans did not resort to terrorism in the sense described. Some Afghan governments ,of course, resorted to terror-inspiring methods. It was in the 1970s that the radical leftist as well as radical Islamist groups started terrorizing members of each other. Thereafter terrorism became a component of their liquidation program. It was practised on an increasingly wide scale after the communists staged a coup in 1978 and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The radical Islamists terrorized with religious fervor, and the ruling leftists terrorized with revolutionary zeal. While the former were backed in terrorism by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan the latter were supported by the Soviet KGB and their own revolutionary state. During the resistance period the Islamic Tanzimat resorted to terrorism as a matter of practical necessity also. When the Afghan resistance became international in character terrorism also assumed an international character. Those individuals and governments who are now the outspoken critics of terrorism were then silent about it in Afghanistan.

Friendly foreign intelligence agencies even assisted the radical Islamists to terrorize not only the Soviet intruders, but also their opponents. Their opponents were not exclusively leftist atheists of various stripes, but secularist figures as well including nationalists, democrats, community and ethnic elders. They carried on their mission not only in their own land but among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan as well. By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the suppression of Afghan leftists radical Islamists had become more experienced in terrorizing and more international in character. The sophisticated lethal weapons of the friendly Western countries which they obtained through the ISI helped them carry on their mission more frequently and more efficiently. Their employment of professional mercenaries as well as their backing by foreign intelligence services likewise helped them become still more efficient in terrorizing.

During the Islamic Tanzimat and the civil war period terrorism along with kidnapping and the raping of women assumed many forms until the Taliban Movement rose to power and established peace and security in its domain. After the Taliban took over I have not heard of instances of terrorism or kidnapping or raping of women to have taken place in their domain. The Taliban suppressed all these heinous practices. But in the adjacent cities of Quetta and Peshawar leading Afghans still fall victims to terroristic attacks.

Thus radicalism, foreign invasion, abundant weapons, machinations of foreign intelligence agencies and, above all, the prevalence of disturbances and lawlessness in the absence of a national government resulted in terroristic strikes in a country where terrorism as we know it was unknown. It caused the physical elimination of numerous actual and potential leaders who might have helped resolve Afghanistan's political crisis. Most damaging of all it made violence the arbiter for the settlement of human affairs, disrupting the civil fabric of society. Afghans thus suffered from terrorism very much indeed. Afghans who are for the sanctity of human life, peace, civil society, a healthy way of life and progress are and must be strongly opposed to terrorism. The Taliban who have suppressed terrorism have paved the way for the actualization of all the above. By any moral standard this is an accomplishment.

On this subject the WP authors, however, have a standard of their own. They see the Taliban as the confederates of terrorists and Afghanistan as a training academy for them in order for them to destabilize the world. In the view of the WP authors since under the Taliban "Afghanistan is a haven for terrorists and extremists", " Many terrorists in Saudi Arabia and Muslim extremists in the West received training in Afghanistan." A favorite theme with them they have repeated it in statements such as "The Taliban has already hosted training camps for fighters who have spread radicalism to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere." They also hold that Afghanistan already "...has hindered the implementation of a peace plan in Tajikistan and led to terrorism in Uzbekistan." Then as soothsayers they foretell that "It is possible that a Taliban-led Afghanistan could become more active in its support for terrorism and trafficking in narcotics." Then they declare that the "terrorists and extremists" trained in Afghanistan are "...dedicated to fighting the United States and creating instability among such important allies as Saudi Arabia" as well as "destabilizing Pakistan" and "Central Asia."

Although the WP authors have not labelled the Taliban as terrorists directly their statements as quoted above are sufficient to align them with them, that is, with those who are, according to the WP authors dedicated to destroying the world or a part of it. The Taliban in their view become accomplices of terrorists. If the Taliban and their leaders had not suppressed terrorism at home and if they had not opposed it in words and deeds the WP authors would have labelled them terrorists. Still their statements are sufficient to suspect the Taliban as partners in crime against humanity, because they, as the WP authors hold, have provided training camps in Afghanistan for the would be destroyers of the world. As the WP authors have already labelled Afghanistan under the Taliban a " rogue state" they probably want that it be, in addition, labelled a terrorism sponsoring state or even a terrorist state, and be dealt with as such by the world community. For this purpose they have commissioned themselves to providing justification for the world community to punish it for them. Hence their WP.

Now two points need to be discussed on the issue of terrorism as noted here: The existence or otherwise of terrorists camps in Afghanistan, and the dedication of terrorists trained there to fighting the United States and creating instability in the region. Here again I want to remind my readers that I feel restrained in talking about this topic. I am neither a specialist in it, nor do I have reliable data about it other than what is available by sources whose reliability or unreliability can not be verified. I then proceed with caution, and confine myself mainly to official statements about terrorism. As usual, I want to discuss the topic in the context of place and time.

As I have already said Afghan extremists of the left and right resorted to terrorism in the 1970s, but they terrorized only members of each other and not on a big scale. This terrorism too was confined only within the limits of Afghanistan, not beyond it. This terrorism was, then, national in the sense that only the radical Afghans resorted to it inside Afghanistan. The Soviet war on Afghanistan made the terrorism progressively national as well as international. During the civil war following the replacement of the Soviet client regime in Kabul by the Islamic Tanzimat organizations Afghanistan became the training ground for those who wanted to learn the guerilla tactics which the Afghan mujahideen had successfully applied against the Soviet army. They did so to enable them to apply the Afghan tactics against those regimes and governments which they opposed. Such persons who came to Afghanistan from almost all over the world found the land an inspiring and ideal training ground. In 1994 T. Winer reported that ,"...thousands of Islamic radicals, outcasts, visionaries and gunmen from some 40 countries have come to Afghanistan to learn the lessons of jehad,...,to train for armed insurrection, to bring the struggle back home." (7) They came to be known "Afghans."

Except for some journalists others did not take notice of this ill-boding situation. Some neighboring governments and foreign intelligence agencies intentionally or otherwise even prepared the ground for the unfettered arrival of these adventurers into Afghanistan by skillfully embroiling the Islamic Tanzimat in an internecine war. The post Soviet withdrawal disengagement of the Western countries from Afghanistan also also helped the adventurers to enter Afghanistan still more easily. All this in particular the embroilment of the Islamic Tanzimat among themselves was done to see that the huge stockpiles of weapons that they had obtained in the resistance period were spent.

Abdullah Shinwari holds that through a "grand conspiracy against Afghanistan" these foreigners schemed to embroil the Afghans among themselves with a view to exhausting the huge stockpiles of the Scud, Oregon, Luna-1 and Luna -11 missiles, as well as the huge stockpiles of conventional weapons which Afghanistan had acquired, especially during Najib Allah's rule - weapons that not many countries in the region possessed. (8) Shinwari probably did not know that the radical Islamic Tanzimat also had stored underground conventional weapons of various kinds and, in addition, possessed a number of the ground to air Stinger missiles.

The civil war situation, and the inability of the Kabul government to establish control over the whole country made it still easier for foreign radicals to arrive in Afghanistan in droves. This situation made the Afghan problem still more dangerous. As I have noted elsewhere in 1994 "...the legacy of the Soviet war and the Western response to it is not only a ravaged Afghanistan without a functional national government but also a culture of guns, drugs and terrorism that is as poisonous to others as it is to Afghans." (9) The Afghans who had already suffered because of the Soviet war suffered still more.

The Taliban inherited, among things, this situation after they occupied Kandahar in 1994 , Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996 and almost the rest of the country in 1998. The point to make here is this. With the exception of the United Nations Organization which tried halfheartedly and therefore unsuccessfully to help the Afghans to set up a national government for themselves the friendly countries of the resistance period in the West became philosophical about it. They became so apparently because in the post Cold War period they did not need Afghanistan any longer despite the fact that this country had at a huge cost to itself taken an effective part in the collapse of their dreadful enemy, that is, the Soviet Union or their deadly rival and the second most wicked state of the century, the other being the Nazi Reich. By disengaging themselves from Afghanistan the above countries left this war-ruined country without a central government to the mercy of the ill-intentioned governments of the neighboring lands. They thus felt free to intervene in its internal affairs and perpetuate its instability. For their purpose, the short-sighted leaders of these governments revived the old Great Game of the nineteenth century with the difference that the chessboard on which it was played was not the vast expanse of Central Asia, but exclusively Afghanistan with perils of all kinds threatening it as a consequence.

The WP authors have made only one or two passing references to this situation and have instead focused on the Taliban as if they had been the source of all the troubles not only of Afghanistan but also of the region. As if this was not enough on August 20, 1998 the Navy of an ally of the resistance period launched 75 to 80 cruise missiles from the Indian Sea on Khost in Afghanistan. The strike was in retaliation for the simultaneous bombing on August 7, 1998 of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which had killed about 250 natives, and injured another 5,500 including about 20 Americans. Afghanistan was hit because it was suspected that Osama bin Laden had masterminded the bombing and that he and his followers were going to hold meetings in Khost on that day.(10) The missiles strike was not considered to be enough. If the Taliban did not hand over bin Laden to be tried for the bombing for which he had been suspected Afghanistan had to suffer more. Bin Laden was not surrendered, and Afghanistan did suffer more and will continue to suffer probably indefinitely.

On 5 July 1999 the United States Administration imposed unilateral financial and economic sanctions against what was called the Taliban. In August the Administration froze the assets of the Afghan state airline, Aryana, held in the United States banks. To please the United States Administration India followed suit. In September she announced the termination of the airline between Amritsar and Kabul, leaving Aryana with only one destination outside Afghanistan, Dubai. More serious, at the initiative of the U.S. Administration the United Nations Organization stepped in.

On November 14, 1999 its Security Council unanimously imposed sanctions of its own on the " Afghan faction, known as the Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan." The sanctions were the same in nature which the U.S. Administration had imposed. In a resolution 1267 (1999) the Security Council asked the Taliban to "...cease providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organizations." It likewise demanded that "...the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden...to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be turned to such a country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and effectively brought to justice." Since the Taliban for reasons of their own had rejected the demands the Council asked member states of the U.N. Organization to deny "...permission for any aircraft to take off from or land in their territory if it is owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban". The Council also demanded member states of the Organization to freeze"... funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled by the Taliban".

All member states of the U.N. Organization have complied with the demands, and Afghanistan after November 14, 1999 is chafing under the sanctions. For reasons already cited I do not want to discuss this issue in full but only briefly in relation to the WP.

Apparently, the sanctions have originated from the WP. The WP as well as the original sanction have officially come out in the same month, July 1999. It seems more than likely that the first draft of the WP had much earlier been submitted to the relevant authority of the US Administration. Probably also the WP drafters in consultation with the authority have talked over the measures to be taken against the Taliban. Whatever the truth the WP demonization of the Taliban as ahrimans bent upon destroying the world itself is enough for the U.S. Administration and the United Nations to take some kind of actions against them. Hence the sanctions. In this venture the contribution of Mr. Khalilzad as the prime composer of the WP is great. Anxious to promote his career he now probably expects an award for his accomplishment.

The Taliban deny the existence of the terrorists camps in their domain. Early in October, 1999 when Pakistan's former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asked the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to close the terrorists camps in their domain and hand over the terrorists to Pakistan the former assured the latter that they will close down any terrorist training camp "... if pinpointed by Pakistan." The " Taliban den[ied] the existence of any existing camps on their soil." Troubled by the intensification of sectarian violence in Karachi at the time, Nawaz Sharif probably wanted to divert attention from his inability to neutralize it. Karachi has been a disturbed city almost throughout the existence of Pakistan.

The "Afghans" , that is, the non-Afghans who received guerrilla training in Afghanistan in the resistance period and afterward, as already noted, has since the bombing in Africa has become a serious problem for the Taliban even though the problem existed before they rose to power. After the bombing in Africa these "Afghans" have been confused with, and often labelled as, terrorists. The allegation became widely current after the U.S. Administration suspected Osama bin Laden, the much talked about dissident of Saudi Arabia to be the ultimate leader of these "Afghans" or some of them and the actual source of the bombing. The WP authors took the opportunity by declaring that Afghanistan under the Taliban"... hosts terrorists and subversive groups dedicated to waging war against the United States." As soothsayers they predicted that "...a Taliban-led Afghanistan could become even more active in its support for terrorism and trafficking in narcotics." As a counter measure they then recommended "...occasional military strike against terrorists" similar to that that had hit Khost.

So far the U.S. Administration has not heeded the advice. Instead its officials have talked to the Taliban officials a number of times on the subject. The purpose was to bring bin Laden to "justice", that is, to a court of law for trial for his alleged masterminding the bombing in Africa after a court in New York had indicted him. The Taliban have rejected the demands.

In the first place the Taliban officials categorically state that "We are against terrorism everywhere and in any shape." These are the words of Mulla Mohammad Omar who had voiced them on November 12, 1999 after the U.S. and U. N. sites had been the targets of rocket attacks in Islamabad, which he categorized as " a conspiracy to increase tensions between Afghanistan, the U.S. and the U.N." Mulla Mohammad Rabbani, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Islamic Emirate, while on a state visit to Pakistan, stated in Islamabad on February 2, 2000 that terrorism was an act against "...our faith and we reject it", adding that the Taliban would not allow their land to be used for terrorism. When such high dignitaries of the Islamic Emirate express opposition to terrorism in such unequivocal words it means that terrorists as well as terrorist training camps are not to be found in their domain. In an interview with al-Hayat Newspaper on December 10, 1999 the Islamic Emirate's Foreign Minister Wakeel Ahmad Muttawakil had said :" We have no terrorist groups [in Afghanistan]." He, however, disclosed that "May be there are some veteran Pakistani mujahideen but they do not operate independently from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, nor do they have their own offices."

Reportedly in places near the Hadda Farm, and the Gamberi Daug close to Jalalabad, and Reeshkhore, and Shakar Darra near Kabul groups of such "mujahideen" have been quartered. They are, however, Panjabi, Kashmiri, Arab, Malaysian and even American and other Muslim volunteers who have volunteered to fight along with the Taliban in the same manner that international volunteers fought in the Spanish civil war in 1936, and Muslim volunteers fought recently in Bosnia.

Now the points to be remembered: The above are non-governmental persons who have volunteered to fight along with the Taliban as private individuals or members of religious associations. This is not something new. Such had become a practise in Afghanistan after the Soviet Union invaded it. In other words the employment of foreign volunteers in Afghanistan is a byproduct of the Soviet war after the Afghan problem became international in the absence of a national government and the waging of resistance from a foreign country. Before that in modern Afghanistan foreign volunteers have taken no part in its internal wars. Now the point to stress is this. When such volunteers fought in Afghan resistance they were called "mujahideen", and "freedom fighters" by almost all the people and governments in the non-Soviet camp. Now the WP authors and the pundits like them call them "terrorists." It shows that when the currents are to their taste they praise them and when to their dislike they condemn them. It likewise shows that a detached attitude to careerists has no meaning. They go along with the currents and remain indifferent to the truth. At all times they remain faithful to their own careers as well as their patrons, assuming the role of intellectual surrogates. Thus they use history as a tool by which they want to punish and reward, labelize and eulogize.

In the foregoing I refuted the allegation that Afghanistan under the Taliban hosts terrorists. This means that today no such people in Afghanistan exist who are "dedicated to waging war against the United States" as the WP authors allege. But as long as the bin Laden issue is in the air the question will stay alive, and the WP authors will go on sticking to their allegation no matter whatever the truth. Unfortunately, the bin Laden issue has now assumed many dimensions, and the dimensions have become so much complicated that it seems almost impossible to discuss it, in the present charged atmosphere, in a detached manner, even though so much depends upon the settlement of this issue. I then want to confine myself mainly to the question of why the Taliban refuse to hand over bin Laden at the same time that they want to solve the question through negotiations.
 

The Issue of Osama bin Laden

As already noted , the Taliban refuse to surrender bin Laden. They say that bin Laden has helped Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989 in the resistance against the Soviets not only with money, but also with his own person. The Klashnikov that he carries with him is the one which he has taken in a battlefield from a Russian soldier. The klashnikov to him is now a sacred symbol of his jehad against the Godless Soviets. Besides, he had recruited many Arabs to fight along with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet aggressors with the connivance of the Americans. Reportedly he has spent millions of his dollars for the success of Afghan resistance. He is now, says Mulla Mohammad Omar, our "guest", and it is against "our dignity" as well as against Islam, he adds, to surrender such an esteemed guest to another country especially when that country has failed to submit to the court evidence to the effect that he had been involved in the bombing in Africa. The Taliban had set a special court to try bin Laden in case claimants forwarded evidence of his involvement in the bombing. The Taliban also argue that since there is no extradition treaty between Afghanistan and the United States they are not obliged by law to surrender him. They likewise contend that since the bin Laden issue is an Islamic one it be resolved by the 'ulama (Islamic Sunni Scholars) of three Islamic countries of Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and of other Muslim country.

The Islamic Emirate, meanwhile, expressed willingness for bilateral talks on the issue. On November 14, 1999 Foreign Minister Wakeel Ahmad Muttawakil said that "Our stance with regard to negotiations has all along been crystal clear and we do not have any problem in this regard. If Washington is really interested in finding a solution to the problem they should set a date for talks to explore solutions." Other officials of the Islamic Emirate have reiterated this theme to the present.

To create an atmosphere of trust the Taliban authorities placed restrictions on bin Laden. On August 20, 1998 they convened in Kandahar a special council of the 'ulama who asked the Emirate not to allow bin Laden to engage in activities against another country. On February 12, 1999 Muttawakil said that "...we have cut his telephone. This is a new restriction, and he is not allowed to make any kind of general statement." The Islamic Emirate's ambassador in Pakistan, Sayyed Mohammad Haqqani on December 2, 1999 was still more emphatic and more specific by stating that bin Laden had been deprived of all kinds of communication facilities and that he was unable to carry on attacks against Americans. On February 2, 2000 the number two man of the Islamic Emirate, that is, Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, while on a state visit to Pakistan, reiterated his government's position that the Organization of the Islamic Countries supervise the movements and activities in Afghanistan. On 12 February 1999 the Islamic Emirate announced that it has lost trace of bin Laden. Subsequently it announced that bin Laden on his own free accord wants to quit Afghanistan to a secret destination provided his destination was kept secret.

The U.S. and the Islamic Emirate's officials have since then held meetings in Washington and Islamabad on the issue of bin Laden, but without being able to make any progress. The former wants nothing less than the surrender of bin Laden by the Taliban as the U.N. resolution calls for. The latter, on the other hand, are unwilling to do so for the reasons noted. Why are both sides so inflexible on the issue? The issue is more complicated than it appears.

Even after the bombing in Africa the U.S. Administration considers bin Laden a threat to Americans. On October 27, 1999 U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that "...we consider bin Laden and his activities a threat to Americans." To neutralize the " threat" she expressed willingness to treat the Islamic Emirate "...with any sense of regularity" if its leaders "...expelled [ bin Laden ] to a country where he can be brought to justice." By a sense of "regularity " she probably meant the establishment of diplomatic relations with Afghanistan under the Taliban. It was probably this "threat" which prompted the U.S. Administration to ask the U. N. Security Council to impose sanctions on Afghanistan. Now how can one man, that is, bin Laden and his " activities" become a " threat to Americans", that is, the citizens of the only superpower of the time, the U.S. Administration does not elaborate. Private individuals have elaborated this foremost among whom is Yossef Bodansky, a specialist of security issues.

In his book entitled: Bin Laden, The Man Who Declared War on America, Yossef Bodansky describes bin Laden's objective and the method he employs in achieving it. Bodansky bases his account on a bin Laden's interview which he had given to Robert Fisk of the British newspaper, Independent, in early July 1996 shortly after he arrived from the Sudan to the Ningrahar province in Afghanistan. The stated objective of bin Laden according to Bodansky is "...to overthrow the House of al-Saud and establish an Islamist state in its place" in which the Shari'at will the be supreme law of the land. Again in Bodansky's words "Bin Laden is convinced that the U.S. presence in the Muslim world, particularly in his home country of Saudi Arabia, prevents the establishment of real Islamic governments and the realization of the Islamic revivalism to which he and other Islamists aspire." According to him bin Laden holds that the House of al-Saud has allowed the United States "... to Westernize Saudi Arabia and drain the economy." Saudi Arabia has, thus, been turned into "an American colony." (11)

Bin Laden's objective by itself can not constitute a threat if it was to be achieved by democratic methods. Bodansky, however, holds that bin Laden does not believe in lawful means. In his view bin Laden believes that "...the United States must be terrorized into withdrawing from the Muslim world. " This, in his view, is necessary because "... frontal assault is out of the question." For this purpose the millionaire bin Laden and his associates are said to have built the Islamic Front as an operational entity to which many other organizations in a number of Muslim countries with similar objectives have been affiliated. Bin Laden thus according to Bodansky is "...a principal player in a tangled and sinister web of terrorism-sponsoring states, intelligence chieftains, and master terrorists." (12) Hence bin Laden as an assumed source of threat not only to the United States but the non-Muslim world also. Hence also the inflexible position of the U.S. Administration on the bin Laden issue in its meetings with the Taliban officials, as noted.

In the present age of nation-states the rhetoric of bin Laden about "...the establishment of real Islamic governments ....in the Muslim world" does not count. It is like talking about the establishment of Christian governments in the Christian world. In the present age of nation-states it is idle to talk about the establishment of such governments either in the Christian or Muslim world. The age of governments based on a religion has long passed. Besides, for the type of a government demanded not the voice of one individual however socially significant he may be but of the decisive majority counts. As a socially significant individual bin Laden's rhetoric may count about the kind of government he wants for the country of his birth - Saudi Arabia - even though its ruling house has officially deprived him of its citizenship. Wittingly or unwittingly he too holds on to this universally accepted principle of our age when he states that " The solution of this crisis is the withdrawal [from Saudi Arabia ] of American troops." (13 ) Recently (January 20, 2000) he has even been more eloquent on this issue when Shari'at, the official weekly of the Islamic Emirate has thus spoken on his behalf: " If the United States withdraws its forces from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden will stop opposing it, give up hostility and offer his hand in friendship."

Bin Laden here shows that he is first and foremost a patriot or even a nationalist, and afterward an Islamic universalist unlike Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani in the nineteenth century who was first an Islamic universalist, and afterward a nationalist. Let me note here in passing that both initiated their opposition to the super powers of their times when they lived amidst the Afghans. Anyway it becomes then natural for the former to dissociate himself from the Islamic Front (if it really exists ) in return for the withdrawal of the American troops from Saudi Arabia and become a friend of the United States.

Bin Laden became a dissident following the Gulf war ( after which the American troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia ) and became an outspoken critic of the United States, while before that he had cooperated with it in the Afghan resistance. His dissidence made him popular with the like-minded people of Saudi Arabia. His disinterested financial assistance and personal participation in the Afghan resistance as well as his speaking of Pashto, the national language of Afghanistan, have made him popular with Afghans. This popular person was raised over night to the status of an Islamic hero after the United States navy with cruise missiles hit the Afghan city of Khost where it thought that he and his senior associates had assembled. People worship heroes specially in times of distress. They do not surrender them to enemies in particular to those who adhere to different religions. All this has made it also out of the question for the Islamic Emirate to surrender bin Laden. To do so may even become politically a suicide for it Hence the stalemate between the Islamic Emirate and the U.S. over the bin Laden Issue.

The stalemate , however, will ruin the people of Afghanistan if it continued indefinitely. The continuation of the sanctions coupled with the international diplomatic sanction will further isolate them in a world where the the electronic revolution and the new post-Cold War global economy are bringing nations increasingly closer together. The combined sanctions will further isolate them and impoverish them. They who now number over 22 million men and women have already been impoverished by a series of wars and conflicts over the past twenty two years. Even before that they were among the poorest peoples in the world. Under the sanctions the Afghans will not be able in any meaningful way to reconstruct the war- ruined country.

So the sanctions will deprive these men and women and their children not only of a hopeful future but even of the basic necessities of life. They may even threaten them as a nation. Such will be the lot of those people whose overwhelming number stood steadfast to the Soviet aggression and the tyranny of its client government for which the non-Soviet world praised them much. By all moral standards that I know of it will be maximum injustice to let these same men and women suffer such a punishment for the sake of one man, a man who has only been suspected of involvement in the bombing in Africa.

If the United Nations, the United States and the Islamic Emirate can not find an honorable solution to the problem one wonders whether they will be able to solve through negotiations the much more complicated international issues of peace and war. On such issues gunboat diplomacy and even intransigence should never be an option but only after all the possible channels of negotiated settlement have been exhausted. On the basis of this view there is still a chance for the bin Laden issue to be resolved through negotiations even though the gap between the positions of both sides on the issue seems unbridgeable. Since the issue is bound to worsen the lives of the already war stricken people of Afghanistan it becomes incumbent upon both sides to make earnest efforts to settle it through an honorable compromise. As I will suggest soon Bin Laden can also cut this Gordian Knot. Those who, like Rawan Farhadi, proclaim that the sanctions will not hurt the Afghan people but only the Taliban are wrong. They are playing politics at the expense of over 22 million of men, women and their children. Since both the sides have always expressed sentiments of good will toward each other as well as toward their respective compatriots the cutting of this Gordian Knot should not be impossible if they really mean what they are professing.
 

Recommendations of the WP Authors

Instead the WP authors in the name of " Forging Peace in Afghanistan" advise the United States to do in Afghanistan with the cooperation of its neighbors what is actually the right of Afghans, namely the institution of a government.

For the above purpose the WP authors recommend the United States Administration to adopt one of the following three options:

Option One: To continue its present limited involvement, "...restricting its own involvement to moral suasion, small amount of humanitarian aid, and occasional military strikes against terrorists." But in their view this option has the disadvantage of " Risks to U.S. security ", " The spread of extremism", "Continuing the human rights and humanitarian problems in Afghanistan", and finally " Dangers down the road." Predicting that "A lack of U.S. involvement today creates the impression that the United States will tolerate criminal behavior, perhaps leading the Taliban to increase it" they go for the second option.

Option Two:To increase engagement of the Taliban as the ruling power of Afghanistan. In this option they speak essentially of realistic measures which, if adopted, may forge peace and bring stability to Afghanistan for which they claim they work. I will specify the measures later, but since the WP authors are anti-Taliban they reject the option, presaging that "An engagement policy is not likely to work given the Taliban's intransigence." They continue their prediction that "...if they consolidated power, they might actually increase meddling abroad, as have other revolutionary regimes in the past." They then go for the third option, and recommend the adoption of a dangerous variety of it.

Option Three: In this option the WP authors advise the U.S.Administration to "Weaken and Transform the Taliban." In their view the Taliban should be weakened to a degree that no alternative is left for them except transformation. This should be done, they propose, through military stalemate and support for an alternative. In their own words: "...the United States and its allies must weaken the Taliban through military stalemate" and "... should also consider working with the former king and other leaders in exile.... to bring Afghanistan's communities together."

To ensure the military deadlock, they propose "...Washington could pressure Pakistan and others to end support for the Taliban." Specifically this means that Pakistan and " others", that is, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate who, in their view, give weapons and money to the Taliban should be pressed to end their support. On this point their own words are more emphatic : " Washington must press regional powers to cut their support for the Taliban and help weaken and transform it." Notice their words of command as if they were the bosses of the U.S. Administration. In regional powers they include Russia as well as is clear from this phrase of theirs: "...Iran, Russian and other regional states." Still for a variety of reasons the WP authors think this approach will not work. They then recommend a policy, which they call " Transform then Engage."

Here the WP authors are caught in a dilemma, nay, contradiction: At the same time that they hold that " Engagement is not feasible at this time", they issue an instruction to the effect that "Washington should set the conditions for engagement, making it clear that it will work with the Taliban if it moderates its behavior on a range of issues." In that case they suggest Washington should "Announce a new direction in foreign policy, making it clear to both regional allies and potential adversaries that Washington is actively opposed to the Taliban's hegemony as long as it refuses to act as a responsible power." They also instruct Washington to "Explore ways to assist foes of the Taliban in their struggle", and "Examine how to work with moderate forces inside the Taliban."

Since, in the view of the WP authors, "transforming the Taliban" through "a credible, Afghan-generated alternative" requires a long time they express doubt about its success. Hence their proclamation that " If the Taliban cannot be transformed, it must be replaced." In essence, they want the Taliban be replaced though apparently they also want the transformation policy be pursued. Since this policy is to be pursued through weakening of the Taliban and since it includes such measures as the surrender of Osama bin Laden, and the inclusion of rebel warlords in what the WP authors call "a more representative government" before the country has been fully reunited it has no prospect of success. The WP authors know this. That is why they stress on measures that will "weaken" and "undermine" the Taliban. Here they seem confused.

For the Taliban to be weakened, undermined, and replaced the WP authors have instructed the US Administration to take a number of measures. The immediate aim of all these measures is "to support alternatives to the Taliban." Specifically they suggest that "Alternative leaders should be identified, and fracture points within the [Taliban] movement noted" The U.S. Administration should do this, they recommend, by supporting the former king and engaging "various Afghan groups, both among the northern opposition forces and among disaffected Taliban elements" as well as by "...helping new anti-Taliban forces that have more support outside their immediate communities." Essential in their view is also "identifying viable third forces, both in Afghanistan and outside it." They then order that "Washington should not neglect important figures in exile."

All the above means that Washington should groom as alternatives to the Taliban such a figure as the former king, Mohammad Zahir, and heads of the opposing groups - Burhan al-Deen Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, Abd al-Rasheed Dostum, Abd al-Malik Pahlawan, Karim Khalili and others as well as succoring disaffected leaders within the Taliban ranks and uncommitted influential figures in exile.

The WP authors also advise Washington to seek the cooperation of regional powers, in particular Iran and Pakistan as well as the world community regarding its new "more proactive policy" to be adopted toward Afghanistan. Here they have rightly stated that "As long as outside powers seek to control [influence?] events in Afghanistan, the flow of arms and money to fighters will continue, and Afghanistan will remain unstable." But instead of advising Washington to discourage these powers from doing so they urge it to seek their cooperation by "Reconciling the interests of the regional powers seeking hegemony in Afghanistan." They consider this a "necessary precondition for long-term stability." They do not mind that such an approach will be detrimental to Afghanistan.

They also do not mind to adopt a partisan position visa vis Iran and Pakistan . While they have kept silence on Iran for aiding its Afghan surrogates with weapons and money they have issued an order that "Washington should explicitly condemn Pakistan's excessive support for the Taliban." They have also advised Washington to broaden the "6+2" dialogue by inviting some European powers to take part in it. But in their view, "The "6+2" process should go beyond vague pledges of cooperation: it should also press the Taliban to moderate and, if necessary, support alternative leaders."

For the implementation of this "more proactive policy" the WP authors urge the U.S.Administration to obtain additional fund because "This money", they hold, "can provide support for anti-Taliban forces and provide inducements for cooperation." The WP authors likewise issue an order to the effect that "As part of the effort to weaken and transform the Taliban, Washington should begin a detailed intelligence effort, aimed at learning about divisions within the Taliban, its sources of support, and other relevant information."
 

An Appraisal

It is now time to examine the recommendations of the WP authors as outlined above and offer my own view about the kind of approach that may help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

By the enunciation of the"more proactive policy" the WP authors have ordered the US Administration to do in Afghanistan that which is the right of its own people, that is, the Afghans. The specific recommendations of the WP authors in such words as " If the Taliban cannot be transformed , it must be replaced", and that "alternatives to the Taliban" be supported, and " a third force" be built up mean that the US Administration should do in Afghanistan that which its own founding fathers have forbidden. To paraphrase the US constitution on this point: It is the inalienable right of a people of a country to institute a government of their choice for themselves.

The "more proactive policy" of the WP authors also runs contrary to the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, a principle which has been the foundation stone of nation-states for about a century. The policy, thus, runs not only contrary to the principles on which the US constitution is based, it also runs contrary to the right of the Afghan people. In short, it negates the sovereignty of a people of an independent country who have done nothing against the USA to justify such an interference.

Is the "more proactive policy" commensurate with pundits of a think tank of a great democracy to recommend interference in the internal affairs of another country? Does it not infringe on the rule of law, and expect the US Administration to resort to machinations and intrigues in order to carry the policy out? Would not such a behavior be below the dignity of the US Administration ? Would not the policy adversely affect its efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law throughout the world? If ever the policy became a national issue would not the law abiding people of the United States condemn it as well as its authors? Finally, have these pundits thought about the consequences of such an intervention? Perhaps the principal drafter of the policy and specialist on security issues, Mr. Khalilzad, would enlighten us on these questions.

Suppose the US Administration tried to go along with the "more proactive policy" as enunciated by the WP authors. Would it bring about the intended result, that is, the replacement of the Taliban by "alternatives" ? The following explanation shows that it would not, and, further, would harm not only Afghanistan but also the USA.

For this the US Administration has to help a third force or an alternative or alternatives to power. As the hard ground political reality in Afghanistan indicates that there is no alternative to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the US Administration in order to implement the "more proactive policy" has to create one. Signs indicate that Mr. Khalilzad has been given the green light to help build up such an alternative under the leadership of the former King, Mohammad Zahir. For this purpose he has actively participated in the meetings which the former king had last year summoned in Rome attended by a number of Afghans in exile.

Much ink has been spent on whether the former king would become an alternative. It would be a miracle if he succeeded in this or even built up one. There are reasons for saying so. Here I want only to note the light comment of an observer who had reasoned that since it took the former king 10 years to assemble 70 Afghans for the preparation of his proposed Emergency Loya Jirga in Rome it would take him about 70 years to summon 500 Afghans for the actual meeting to be held inside Afghanistan. There is a sense in this comment. When the former king was 27 years younger in 1973 he resigned the monarchy without firing a shot. Now at age 87 it is more unlikely for him to fight to make himself the head of the country under the entirely altered conditions even if he has the active support of the US in this regard.

It is also being argued that the former king would serve as a figurehead while others would run the show. This scenario too seems unlikely. No one either from his own extended family or his dynasty has shown the ability to do so. For the former king during the forty years of his rule has not personally made any effort to groom members either of his own family or of his dynasty for political leadership. This may explain why none took part in the national resistance, and all preferred the comforts of life in the West. It is now no wonder that the saying of "out of sight out of might" applies to all of them. They have all been played out.

Of course the US Administration can install the former king by force in Kabul, as the Soviet Union had installed Babrak Karmal, but it is a truism that the US does not will to follow the example of the Soviet Union. It is perceivable that it may try to create and support one as an alternative to the Taliban. This may be the reason that Mr. Khalilzad is trying to build up his third force by allying the royalists with the so-called Northern Alliance. This, in effect, means an alliance between the royalists with Ahmad Shah Mas'ud and his supporters. Here Mr. Khalilzad's efforts come closer to the efforts of Iran in forging an anti-Taliban alliance of its own backed by Russia. Such efforts are even more unlikely to work.

In the first place, it will be sheer optimism to expect Mr. Khalilzad to help build up a third force. He even can not persuade all members of the royal family to make an alliance with Ahmad Shah Mas'ud. In the second place, for various reasons there is a want of trust between the royalists and the Mas'ud faction. The latter is still under the influence of Iran and Russia, while Iran, for reasons of its own, is opposed to the restoration of the former king under whatever name. That is why Ahmad Shah Mas'ud has on March 30, 2000 entered, with the connivance of Iran, Uzbekistan and Russia, into a second alliance with two former warlords - 'Abd al-Rasheed Dostum and 'Abd al-Malik Pahlawan, both of whom the Taliban have driven out of Afghanistan.

The hard facts are that these warlords and others of their kind have discredited themselves with Afghans principally because in the pursuit of power they have contributed to various degrees to the destruction of the country and the death of thousands of innocent people. They have also been and still are under the influence of foreign powers as noted. And they do not trust each other. What bind them together is their opposition to the Taliban whom they regard as Pakistan's surrogates as well as radical fundamentalists. As persons, 'Abd al-Malik Pahlawan and 'Abd al-Rasheed Dostum have made themselves notorious for the crimes they have committed: The former has caused the slaughter of about 3,000 prisoners in 1997, and the latter first as a known communist militia commander and subsequently as a warlord has personally slaughtered innocent people, while his militia employed as storm troopers before its dissolution by the Taliban used to loot, to destroy, to rape and to murder on such a big scale that made it known as gilam jam (carpet gatherers, total looters.) Dostum and Malik are known as criminals in Afghanistan.

Ahmad Shah Mas'ud despite his name and fame could not rule even the city of Kabul in its entirety for the most part of his being in power there from 1992 to 1996. He is the only warlord still creeping here and there in a corner in Afghanistan. In words and deeds he has shown that he is fit to destroy and unfit to construct. He has undone the many agreements that he had made with Afghan warlords but not those he had made with agents of the Soviet Union and Russia. Burhan al-Deen Rabbani for his repeated failures has gone into oblivion. Unable to live in the country he claims he rules he roams in the lands of his patrons. Karim Khalili, who has been born in Iran is likewise no body except in the eyes of his Iranian mentors.

Under the circumstances it would require Herculean efforts, vast amount of money, inexhaustible amount of patience, various kinds of schemes and years of waiting to build up a third force as an alternative to the Taliban. Suppose now or years later an alternative was found who can guarantee that it will be able to replace the Taliban? Those who believe it will are well advised to keep the following calculation in mind.

When earlier I said that there is no alternative to the Islamic Emirate I meant that, even though it and the people face immense existential problems, the Emirate has a functioning administration system . True, the administration system is unmodern but as Nasim Zehra describes in her three articles based on her observations in Kabul in March 2000, the system is organic, well suited to the conditions of the war - ruined country where the overwhelming number of people have become more inwardlooking and tradition-bound while most of the outwardlooking and educated bureaucratic city-bound Afghans have been forced to live abroad.

The steering role is played by drivers of the Islamic Emirate and its fighting force, the Taliban, with Mulla Mohammad 'Omar as their supreme leader. Assisted by councils (shuras) he rules on the basis of the Islamic laws through his companions of the resistance period and others like them who are heads of the administrative offices whether military or civil. He is unquestionably obeyed by all, and the writs passed by the councils and approved by him are enforced. True, the system is monopolistic run essentially by inexperienced mullas and mawlawis of the traditional type but they also show a high degree of common sense in tackling practical problems.

The system is, thus, not hopelessly rigid as some hold, though the changes which its drivers introduce are gradual and small. In its defence they argue that since the country is in a state of war and the danger to its integrity is round the corner major structural changes are impossible. To meet the challenges they perform public affairs as highly motivated, purposeful, dauntless and dedicated persons in a selfless manner, arguing that given the conditions of the country only in such a way they can safeguard its integrity from the schemes of ill-intentioned neighbors and serve their tyrannized compatriots. This indeed is their mission for which they are willing to undergo hardships and accept sacrifices. Their organized opponents in no way can compete with them. The Taliban and their leaders have no alternative.

People like Mr. Khalilzad may still go on with their efforts to help build up a third force as an alternative. Suppose it was built up it may be used either as a pressure group or a group to replace the Taliban. The former alternative may mean a negotiated package that may also include the bin Laden issue, a scenario which as things stand seems unlikely. The latter alternative then may mean a sustained military confrontation. This scenario is likely to drag on for years with no end in sight. As the about 60,000 fighting Taliban are in their early twenties, and most of their leaders are between 30 and 40 years of age they are dynamic and motivated enough, as noted, to go on with the military challenge for years to come. Since only they are well entrenched in the country except for a corner of it, and since they have a functioning organic state system supported by the people they can go on, despite the hardship of life, with their mission no matter what the international pressure, which they consider as unjust and unacceptable.

This sustained war situation is bound to have far reaching consequences for Afghanistan and the region. Chief among them will be more and more suffering for the people of Afghanistan and an ever increasing dependence of the Central Asian states on Russia. This situation will make it increasingly difficult for them to establish contacts on trade, business and the utilization of their natural resources with countries of South Asia and the West through Afghanistan. Thus deprived of the shortest route to the sea and beyond they are likely to become the permanent appanages of Russia. It is now a kind of fateful period of far reaching consequences for the vast and important region of Central Asia. This is why Russia as well as Iran, for different reasons, are doing their best to prolong the war situation in Afghanistan. Coming as it does from a think tank in the USA the alternative scenario of Mr. Khalilzad is a blessing for them.
 

A Suggestion

If the intention is the destruction of the Afghan state any suggestion no matter how realistic and practicable for a way out of the present impasse on the Afghan problem would be an exercise in futility. The intention would enforce the view that even those whose duty it is to solve the issues of peace and war by the judicious employment of reason, law and justice can become superciliously partisan. We then see that a coalition of a kind is in the making for the intimidation, coercion, submission and even replacement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. If not so how was possible for the fifteen-member Security Council of the United Nations to agree on a lengthy condemnatory resolution on the Taliban in the course of only 15 minutes on April 10, 2000 ? Such a short time can only be enough for its members to go through the text of the resolution and sign it, not enough to discuss its contents. It probably had already been made for it outside its chambers. This condemnatory resolution is only one in a series of condemnations and impracticable demands. This naturally prompted Afghanistan's Foreign Minister, Ahmad Mutawakel, to say that "... the United Nations Security Council was acting as a tool in the hands of big powers."

Still more irresponsible and more arrogant is the remark made by the Council's Canadian chairman, Mr. Lloyd Axworthy who characterized the Taliban as " a criminal gang". By passing such an outrageous judgement not only he misused the podium of the Security Council, he also showed his real self which is morally and intellectually substandard. It is then obvious that he needs more education on moral and civilized behavior.

On the very same day head of the Russian Security Council, Mr. Sergie Ivanov, warned that his country may bombard "terrorist bases" in Afghanistan, an obvious warning for taking revenge in the name of suppressing terrorism. Mr. Ivanov's warning is a proof that Russia is not a disinterested member of the 6 plus 2 formulae devised by the United Nations by which to solve the Afghan problem. To it the formulae is only a smoke screen for its own design. Hence its unworkability.

The warnings and condemnation, as noted, not only can not help solve problems, they can create more problems. Neither can they intimidate the Taliban or the Afghan nation. The Russian Security Council boss more than anybody else knows this.

Beyond all these intimidations, distortions, unjust demands, and dangerous approaches of grooming alternatives to the Taliban there is the approach of engaging the Islamic Emirate. This approach, though unpalatable to many, may be the right one to get Afghanistan and to a certain degree the region out of the present predicament. For this due weight is be given to the Islamic Emirate. It is unrealistic to ignore it and at the same time hope for overcoming the impasse. The Emirate is a reality felt almost throughout Afghanistan. It rules over almost all of it and is obeyed by the people in its domain. Only it can represent and speak for the country. No issue of peace and war affecting the country and its relations with other countries can be tackled without it.

True, all policies, approaches and actions of the Emirate are not in line or fully in line with universally accepted norms and standards. But this can not become an excuse for shunning it. To do so will be to shun the Afghan nation. Besides, in its behavior the Emirate is not alone in the world. There are some countries whose records are not better than those of the Emirate. Yet they are not ostracized internationally.

With the right approach the drivers of the Emirate can become as reasonable as their counterparts in other countries. Not dogmatic revolutionaries in outlook and hopelessly rigid in behavior they have shown that they are amenable to reason and change. But the pace of change is presently slow because of the state of war and because of the dangers that threaten the integrity of the country. The pace is also slow and small because of the sanctions and the ostracism of the Emirate itself. But change there is. It will be a mistake to think that even the cumulative external pressure will force its drivers to cave in. It, however, will have another kind of outcome. It will make them, by necessity, to tilt toward those individuals, groups and countries who oppose secularization and by extension the West. And the more the pressure the more the tilt.

Engagement of the Taliban, on the other hand, not only can expedite the process of change, it even can transform them after the Emirate is recognized as the government of Afghanistan which it really is. There are reasons for this optimism the most important of which is the nature of the Taliban Movement. The Taliban is a loose movement, not a tightly organized hierarchical party with members bound to it by a strict discipline. It is composed of factions which the present war situation and the dangers to the integrity of the country and belief in the Islamic Shari'a have made it cohesive. It still does not mean that it is united, say on the treatment of women or education for girls. The present war situation has raised its radical elements to strategic positions. Their faction is, however, small. It is a truism that war brings to the forefront those who are willing to give sacrifices and defend by physical force what they value most.

With the disappearance of the war situation and the dangers as well as the recognition of the Emirate by the world community the movement will change from what it now is. Among other things, the moderate elements who outnumber the radicals are bound to come to the forefront. Pressure from inside would be exerted not only for the end of the present political monopoly system, but also for the institution of a representative government as well as for raising the standard of living. The country's reconstruction on a big scale and the Emirate's dealings with other countries and probably also with international corporations would influence it to give way to technocrats, in itself a moderating factor. Since the Emirate has no blueprint by which to reorganize the society and since the absence of sanctions and ostracism would ease economic hardship the need for radicalism would have passed. The Taliban would have been transformed.

Mr. Khalilzad and like-minded pundits will characterize this futurism a byproduct of an optimistic fancy. In defence let me explain that in constructing it I have taken into account, among other things, the treatment of women by the Taliban for which they have been condemned right and left.

When the Taliban entered Kabul in September 1996 they, among other things, placed various kinds of restrictions on women: They were veiled after 44 years of being unveiled, they were not allowed to work in offices; girls were barred from going to schools; and women were not even allowed to go out from homes unless legal male relatives accompanied them. Besides, women (as well as men ) were severely punished for adultery. The measures virtually deprived women of their right to education, employment and independent life. They were even restricted in getting health care. In Kabul, where because of the loss on a big scale of male population in armed conflicts a large percentage of women and widows earned their living themselves as nurses, midwives, teachers, physicians and office employees, the restrictions hit them hard indeed even though a portion of their salaries were paid to them.

Activists of human rights groups particularly Amnesty International, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, feminist organizations as well as public figures and government officials in the West joined the crusade in condemning the Taliban for the restrictions. Some called the restrictions "gender apartheid", others labelled the Taliban " oppressors" and "segregationists." Madam Madeiline Albright even called them "despicable." Still others viewed the measures as the imposition of Pashtun tribal codes on the liberated city females. Of course, all condemned the measures as a violation of women's basic rights. More serious, governments even though some of whom had signaled signs of good will toward the Taliban until then withheld recognition of them as government mainly because of the restrictions. They were only called "a rouge state", and treated as such. Nevertheless the Taliban went on with the restrictions as if not a single voice of protest had been raised.

The critics, to my knowledge, did not address the question why the Taliban did not heed the protests, and why did they impose restrictions in the first place? They just condemned and demonized apparently for political reasons. The short answer is that the Taliban cared for the Islamic Shari'a as they know it, for the lives and security of women, and the suppression of the crimes associated with rape, abduction and fatherless unborn.

Before the Taliban entered Kabul women were, among other criminal acts, raped during the entire Islamic Tanzimat period on a scale unheard of in Afghanistan. Women who disappeared after sexual assault in Kabul during this period numbered 30, 000 according to Sharee'a, the official weekly of the Emirate.(14) Even handicapped and mentally deranged women of an institute in Kabul were raped. The list of rapes of individual women by individual armed men and groups is too long to note. Only a few instances are noted here.

The booklet Amnesty International has issued on Afghanistan in 1995 begins thus: " During a rare lull in the bombardment of Kabul in 1994, a woman left her home to find food. Two Mujahideen guards grabbed her and took her to a house, where 22 men raped her for three days. When she was allowed to go home, she found her three children had died of hypothermia." (15) Miss Naheeda threw herself to death from the top floor of a block of apartments in Kabul to save her dignity from the lustful men of a militia who were chasing her in front of her family. In 1995 a man asked President Burhan al-Deen Rabbani to have his wife return to him, because a commander of a checkpoint in Kabul had seized her. The so-called President only wrote on his application thus : "Dear Commander, please hand over the wife of the applicant." An informant tells me that men fought among themselves in Kandahar over the fate of a new-born baby boy because each claimed to be his real biological father.

To prevent such crimes from happening again the Emirate imposed the restrictions and ignored the condemnations. They succeeded in their mission. I have heard of no woman who has either been raped or abducted or murdered either in the city of Kabul or in other areas of their domain. They ensured the security of life for women, and for this they expected them to pay a price. In fact, women in all cultures and always had been more vulnerable than others in times of armed conflicts and lawlessness. Perhaps the Emirate did not find it feasible to leave women unrestrained as before and yet save them from criminals. Who could have guaranteed that even the Taliban themselves who, as Nasim Zehra says "... have virtually no experience of interacting with women, other than their family women", would have behaved as angels if women roamed freely in Kabul?

Leaders of the Emirate had seen that their immediate predecessors could not control their hungry, depraved and lustful young warriors from committing the crimes they were committing after they entered Kabul. By imposing the restrictions on women they wanted to give no chance to ony one to commit the crimes others had committed. They had learned from the failures of their predecessors.

The restrictions are imposed on what Suzanne Goldenberg calls " A tiny but vocal minority" in Kabul. In the countryside women live in the same style as before. That the Emirate is more strict with women in Kabul shows that it is concerned with drying up the ground for rape and the social and ethical problems associated with it. Kabul had been a special place for women even before the period of total anarchy. Ms Goldenberg is the first Western lady to note that to the Taliban Kabul was " the repository of sin" as the Shahr-e-Nao of Tehran had been to the followers of Khumeini. The latter totally bulldozed the Shahr-e-Nao. True, women in Kabul are unemployed, but unemployment is widespread among men also.

The restrictions on women, however, should not be permanent, and eased gradually and ultimately lifted altogether. The time for that has come. A change in that direction seems to have been on the horizon for some time now. I know this from Afghan channels. Here, however, I would like to cite only non-Afghan reporters who have almost all recently visited Kabul .(16.) They all speak of moderation in the attitude of the Taliban toward women, education and other issues in general.

Ms. Suzanne Goldenberg of the Guardian writes that" While officially women are allowed to work only on the women's wards of hospitals, many more women have found employment within the past year. " She goes on to say that " One hospital has quietly started training sessions for women who were in medical schools at the time of the Taliban take-over and some women doctors report that they have been granted dispensation to pursue special training, even though this will bring them into contact with men." She reports also that "In the markets of Kabul, women are far more visible than they were a year ago. "

Barbara Crossette of the New York Times quotes Mr. de Mul, coordinator of United Nations relief program in Afghanistan about finding employment for women in Kandahar. He relates to her in New York the conclusion of a working committee with the Taliban officials including Mulla Mohammad Hassan the governor of the province thus: " The first priority was education, and education for girls and boys. Second , they wanted to have more and better trained traditional birth assistants, midwives. Third, they wanted to have increased possibilities for women to be gainfully employed, especially widows."

With such changes the enforcement of the codes of behavior for women is not feasible. And they are enforced as Ms. Goldenberg says only "sporadically". Nasim Zehra observes that "Significantly, the order that women will not leave their homes alone is no longer operative." She also states that the men from the Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice too keep " ..a low profile presence compared to the past when they would regularly check and beat men with short beards and women without the appropriate burqa and dark colored socks."

Change is visible also in the schooling of girls and boys. The Emirate has opened schools for boys and girls and has in addition permitted home and community -based schools. And an estimated 40,000 boys and girls attend schools set up by private associations or aid agencies in Kabul. Mr. Tasogala Bruner of the Dallas Morning News quotes UNICEF officials that nationwide 300,000 to 350,000 children up to age 12 received schooling in 1999. He quotes a UNICEF official for holding that 1999 was, despite problems, a" positive" year for education in Afghanistan. It is in view of this and other changes that Mr. Jolyan Leslie of the United Nations speaks of "... a transformation going on within the Taliban."

All this have become possible because as Nasim Zehra holds ".. by changing their ways in certain areas they have demonstrated that they are not violently attached to their worldview." However, as she also states"... only those adjustments are made which they believe will not violate the fundamentals of their traditions interwoven with their interpretation of Islam." The thing that can make the difference is the change in the attitude of officials of the Emirate and their willingness to purposefully introduce changes even though the present changes are neither structural nor comprehensive enough.

The change can become structural and comprehensive if the unusually vocal supporters of the women cause in Afghanistan now came out with suggestions and practical ways as to how to expedite the process of change. They would do so if their tears were not those of a crocodile. Mr. Khalilzad and collegues who proclaim their goal is to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan can now play a special role. Then they all would listen to the advice of Mr. Joylan Leslie of to the effect that".. we would do better by stepping off the high ground to meet them in the middle." This "middle ground" is the engagement and recognition of the Emirate as outlined above. In this way an effective way will be found to permanently tackle also the problems of opium poppy and terrorism. These had never been problems when Afghanistan had an internationally recognized central government. Seemingly the bin Laden issue is the hurdle.

On bin Laden the Islamic Emirate has seemingly no choice but to follow the line it has adopted as described earlier. On the other hand the United States Administration and the United Nations Organization insist on his surrender. No side seems to reverse its position. This situation is bound to ruin over twenty two million of such people who have already been ruined as a result of over twenty years of war and destruction. I know of no other nation in history to have suffered for the sake of one person. To let this happen as a matter of policy is wrong by any moral standard that I know of. It may even become counterproductive as many similar instances have become. It is now time someone made a move to save the world from doing injustice, and a nation from another catastrophe.

It is said that bin Lade suffers from kidney and liver diseases. If true, he may be unable to stand a trial. He will then be exempted from standing a trial. The coming months may make this clear. If, on the other hand, he is healthy as the officials of the Emirate claim he is, then he is expected to show the courage to face the reality, and wage another jehad by helping to cut the Gordian Knot. He himself knows best how to do this. One way of doing this will be to announce his willingness to appear before an impartial court such as the International Court of Justice at the Hague, or any other ad hoc court composed of Muslim and non-Muslim judges known for their impeccable personalities, provided his personal safety is guaranteed.

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Notes

1. Fazil Ghani Mujaddidi, In the Islamic Order, privately published, Fremont, California, 1996, 134-153

2. Edward Hallet Carr, What Is History?, Vintage Books, New York, 1961, 99

3. The Taliban or the fighting forces of the Emirate have studied in madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Afghanistan they have studied in madrasas in regions south of the Hindu Kush. In Pakistan they have studied in madrasas in Karachi, Akora Khattak, Faisalabad, Multan, and various parts of the North West Frontier of Pakistan and Baluchistan. The latter have been drawn from Afghan mainly Pashtun refugee families during the resistance and afterward. All have been imparted religious education according to which the dictates of Islamic morality and social peace require that Shari'a is enforced and the Sunna is followed. Those who have studied in the Pakistani madrasas have been taught classes in social sciences and English and Urdu as well. " Facts About the Taliban", by an unknown writer as has appeared in Online Center for Afghan Studies, February 12, 2000. Nasim Zehra, "Journey to Kabul", a series of three articles that were first published in The News Islamabad in early March 2000.

4. Olivier Roy, "Has Islamism A Future in Afghanistan?" in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. William Maley, (ed), New York University Press, New York, 1998, 210

5. Kufi Annan, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, Report to the General Assembly, 21 September, 1999, 14

6. Barnett Rubin, The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan, a paper prepared for the symposium that was held in Sweden on June 21, 1999. Here the text that had appeared in Online Center for Afghan Studies was used. p. 7

7, 8, 9. M. Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982, California University Press, 1995, 299, 277, 299

10, 11, 12, 13. Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden, The Man Who Declared War on America, Forum, An Imprint of Prima Publishing, Rocklin, California, 1999, 231, 283, X, 186, 190, X, 316, 191

14. The Shari'at, the official weekly of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, August 11, 1999, 4

15. Amnesty International, Afghanistan, International responsibility for human rights disaster, 1995, London, 1

16. Consulted were also the articles by the following:

Khaled Ahmed, The Grand Deobandi Consensus,The Friday Times (Pakistan), February 4-10, 2000. Nasim Zehra, Journey to Kabul. Barry Bearak, An Afghan Mosaic of Misery: Hunger, War and Repression, New York Times, February 25, 2000. Tasogola Bruner, Signs of Change Detected in Afghanistan's Taliban, The Dallas Morning News, January, 1. 2000. Barbara Crossette, Gentle Negotiations Said to Soften Taliban's Rules for Women, The New York Times, January 23, 2000. Suzanne Goldenburg , Veiled Threats, The Guardian, December 21, 1999. I am grateful to Imogen Forster for sending me this as well as other clippings.

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