The Afghan successful repulse of the Soviet aggression became
a Pyrrhic victory of the late twentieth century. It was, however
not in the sense that history repeats itself exactly, as is
commonly held. Of course the essential motor force of history is
always man, but every time he makes history he makes it under
vastly different conditions. Even the man of the third century
BC when Pyrrhus, king of Epirus in Greece, invaded Italy but at
a too great cost, was not like the man of to-day in his outlook
except for his basic drives, to say nothing of the tools with
which he makes history. That is why the consequences of Afghan
victory , more that King Pyrrhus's victory, brought about such
dire consequences that shook even the foundation of the land for
which the Afghans fought. Of all the consequences the one with
international significance proved the most troublesome. It still
is.
When the Afghans began to fight back the aggressive army of
the "Soviet evil empire" nearly the whole non-Soviet
world lauded them with the lofty words their men of mass media,
political, public, and spiritual leaders could find. Even the
top person of the first super power who at the same time was the
top leader of the Western world did not hesitate to define the
Afghans as "freedom fighters." Most media men in the
Western world just like those in the Islamic world printed the
stories of Afghan gallantry in the front pages of their papers,
and called the attention of their readers that there in the
heart of Asia was a little known people who undauntedly stood
steadfast in defence of their fatherland against the aggressive
army of the Soviet super power. Scores of academics,
journalists, human right activists, and even some elected public
figures endangered their lives by making secret trips to the
forbidden war zones deep inside Afghanistan to see whether the
"freedom fighters" deserved the praises with which
they were being lauded. Sceptics were few, and lauders numerous.
The recommendations of these people in part convinced the
decision making bodies of their respective countries that if
ever there was a nation around the "evil empire" who
deserved assistance in curbing its expansionistic designs it was
the nation of these "freedom fighters".
The words were matched with deeds. Indeed a variety of lethal
weapons along with logistical materials, medicine, and funds
were generously made available to the freedom fighters, the
weapons for which they, known for their marksmanship, were
eagerly waiting. Even the newly tested ground to air missiles,
known as Stinger, were handed over to them. They were the first
to receive such a weapon which made the Afghan sky unsafe for
their air power. Until then the Soviets had its safe monopoly.
The weapons along with psychological and diplomatic support of
the peoples and governments of the non-Soviet world further
strengthened the resolve of the freedom fighters in defending
their values against the intruders. The intruders were forced to
retreat, a retreat which in effect was their defeat and their
failure to dominate the land of the freedom fighters militarily.
No other country around the evil empire which it had invaded had
scored such a victory. That was not alone. Shortly afterward the
"evil empire" itself disintegrated and out of its
ashes emerged more than a dozen independent states. The
bipolarised world became history, the Cold War was gone, the
Berlin Wall crumbled, and the United States emerged as the sole
super power of the time with a strong economy in decades.
All the above happened after the Western world and the
Islamic world helped the Afghan freedom fighters to hit more
effectively the Soviet aggressors in the atmosphere of the Cold
War in which the Western world had been engaged in devising
military and other kinds of schemes that required the
expenditure of thousands of billions of dollars. But then
something odd happened. When the "evil empire"
disappeared, the Western world all of a sudden turned its back
on the Afghans. This it did at a time when Afghanistan had been
devastated by the war. In this grand destruction the weapons of
the Western world had also played a part. Every body thought
that if there ever was a country that was entitled to assistance
in its reconstruction efforts it was the land of the freedom
fighters. Every body expected that the Western world and the
United states in particular owed the Afghans a moral
responsibility in helping them reconstruct their ruined country,
or at least to try to keep others from interfering in its
internal affairs. Instead they left them to the mercy of their
ill-intentioned neighbors. These neighbors who should have been
permanently grateful to the Afghans for securing them from the
ever present menace of the evil empire acted as if they were the
new Soviets. History played its most cruel trick on the Afghans.
The "new Soviets" or the ill-intentioned neighbors
thought that the new Afghans who had been intoxicated by their
victory over the army of the Soviet super power and experienced
in the use of a wide range of sophisticated weapons might pose a
danger to them. They had become concerned about the weapons
which the Afghans had come to possess in abundance. Since nearly
all had in the past grudges against the Afghans for various
reasons they thought that the time had now come to dominate
Afghanistan. Whatever the specific designs of each one of them
they were united in pursuing one particular goal which was that
Afghanistan should not have a strong national government with a
strong army. Some even trotted on the road that was intended to
lead to more than one Afghanistan. In pursuing such a policy
they were in fact going on the footsteps of the former Soviet
Union. They then designed means and ways intended to embroil the
Islamic Tanzimat (Islamic Organizations) among themselves in
fighting to weaken themselves and their country. These were the
issues with various offshoots which the Afghans face to the
present day. Let me pursue the main issues with some detail.
The scheme of more than one Afghanistan
The notion of more than one Afghanistan has its origin in the
second British war with Afghanistan when first the British
Government of India and subsequently the Imperial government of
Russia had entertained. Lord Lytton, the British viceroy of
India, had actually turned the notion into a policy when the
British troops had occupied Afghanistan. But the Afghans
frustrated him in his design. ( my new manuscript) At the same
time, the secretary to the Russian governor-general in Tashkand
encouraged the then fugitive Sardar Abd al-Rahman Khan in
Tashkand to set up a new state in northern Afghanistan with
Russian assistance. But when the sardar returned to Afghanistan
he disappointed the Russians. (1) Both super powers of the time
acted with a view to making the Hindu Kush the boundary of their
empires, which meant the partition of Afghanistan. The British
government of India later imposed the Durand Agreement on Ameer
Abd al-Rahman Khan that eventually separated original
Afghanistan from present day Afghanistan. (2). This proved to be
such a serious event that in time it indirectly led to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The British however until their
departure from India assisted Afghan rulers in consolidating
their kingdom or what had remained of it. This was, however not
the same with the Russians, who especially in the Soviet era
even pressured Afghan governments to suppress any one or any
group of people north of the Hindu Kush who, they thought, were
anti-Russians. (3) To please the Soviets the Afghan governments
suppressed many, until on the same issue an encounter took place
between Leonid Brezhnev and President Mohammad Da'ud in the
Kremlin on 12 April 1977. In the words of an observer, "Brezhnev
complained that the number of experts from NATO countries
working in Afghanistan in bilateral ventures, as well as in the
UN and other multilateral aid projects, had considerably
increased. In the past, he said, the Afghan government at least
did not allow experts from NATO countries to be stationed in
northern parts of the country, but this practice was no longer
strictly followed. The Soviet Union, he continued, took a grim
view of these developments and wanted the Afghan government to
get rid of those experts, who were nothing more than spies bent
on promoting the cause of imperialism." In response
President Da'ud became as surprising to the Russians as they had
become to the Afghans. After his initial diplomatic words,
President Da'ud addressed Leonid Brezhnev in these words:.
"... we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run
our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we
employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive prerogative
of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if
necessary, but free in its acts and decisions." (4)
The Brezhnev-led Soviets proved that they were dead serious
in what they had said to President Da'ud after they invaded
Afghanistan in 1979. But the tough resistance the Afghans
offered convinced them that they can not pacify Afghanistan as
they had hoped they would in a matter of months just as they had
pacified Bukhara early in the century and some East European
countries following World War Two. They then took such measures
with respect to northern Afghanistan that were apparently
intended to eventually separate it from the rest of the country.
In other words they made efforts to realize their old dream,
that is, to make northern Afghanistan an appanage of their
empire. In this way, they intended to secure a natural boundary
for their empire as Lord Lytton had tried to secure the same
boundary for the British empire a century earlier. For this
purpose, the measures which the Soviets through their client
Purchami regime took after 1982 were novel. These included the
quartering in Mazar of a sub-government composed of deputy
ministers headed by deputy premier, the authorization of
provincial governors north of the Hindu Kush to exchange
missions directly, that is, without reference to Kabul with the
Soviet Central Asian republics, the extension of electric power
from across the Oxus River to some of these provinces, the
construction over the Oxus River of a new bridge, the
"Friendship Bridge" (pul-e-dosti), the almost free
travel of officials from both sides to northern Afghanistan and
the Soviet Union, and no comparable severe military operations
in northern Afghanistan on the part of the Soviet army. As a
supplementary to these measures the client regime embarked on
the policy of nationalities according to which the Afghan
nationalities, that is, ethnic groups, were declared brothers
and equal to each other. This policy was, in fact, intended to
encourage the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan
to unite against the Pashtuns who, by virtue of being in the
majority and the producer of the ruling dynasties ever since
1747, were the most militant against the usurpers of the
national sovereignty. To give teeth to the policy the client
regime permitted certain minority ethnic groups to organize
militias with its funds and weapons. The regime used some such
militias as storm troopers. The most known of these were the
Uzbek militias of the province of Jouzjan in northern
Afghanistan headed by Abd al Rasheed Dostum, who, by 1992, was
said to have 60, 000 armed men under his command. (5)
Had the Soviet Union not been dissolved on December 25, 1991
the Afghans would have found it more difficult to reunite their
land. The break-up of the Soviet Union did not mean that the
policy of fragmentation was given up. Federal Russia and
following her the government of Iran and to some extent also the
new republic of Uzbekistan followed the policy through their
surrogates, especially Dostum and the Islamic Unity Party headed
by Mazari, a pro-Khumeini party. The Russian agents attached to
its consulate in Mazar became so active that they worked for the
success of Dostum to the detriment of the government in Kabul
led by President Najib Allah, even though the latter had been
the most loyal man of the Kremlin throughout the occupation
period.( 6 ) On March 21, 1992 heads of five minority groups
claiming to represent the ethnic groups to which they belonged
in collusion with some military and civilian personnel of the
pro-Karmal faction of the former People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan set up what was called the Northern Coalition in
Mazar. Azad Khan Uzbek and an official of the intelligence
service of Iran also attended the meeting. The purpose was to
topple the government of President Najib Allah and terminate the
traditional Pashtun rule in Afghanistan. This was the first time
that encouraged by agents of foreign governments some men from
minority ethnic groups made an anti-Pashtun coalition. The blind
forces of hatred were collectively given a vent. In Mazar Dostum,
now calling himself the head of the Islamic and National
Movement made himself pasha by a successful coup. He had now
under him a strong militia with light and heavy weapons of all
kinds, including some air power and the Scud missiles. All the
provinces from Badakhshan to Herat in northern Afghanistan that
were severed from Kabul fell into the hands of Dostum, Commander
Ahmad Shah Mas'ud., and Commander Mohammad Isma'il Khan ( 7)
Afghanistan was in fact but not in name fragmented. On April 14,
the coalition led by Commander Ahmad Shah Masud and Dostum made
a successful coup against President Najib Allah, who took asylum
in the headquarters of the United Nations in Kabul. No one
however dared to set up a government. The setting up of a new
government was considered to be the prerogative of the Islamic
Tanzimat who had waged a relentless opposition throughout the
occupation period against the Soviet invaders. There on April
24, 1992 in the presence of nearly all the heads of the Tanzimat
and the premier of Pakistan, the heads of the intelligence
services of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and the ambassadors of
Iran a formula was designed which made the heads of two non-Pashtun
Tanzimat to lead the new interim government in Kabul.(8)
The Peshawar Accord had a common ground with the Northern
Coalition. In both persons from minority ethnic groups were
raised to high power. In both the Pashtun majority was excluded
from holding high power. In both agents of the ill-intentioned
neighbors including Russia worked for the promotion of their
Afghan surrogates. In both nationalistic and other groups were
excluded. In both the concept of ethnic collectivism was
stressed at the expense of individual qualification. Finally and
most important, both were designed to do away with the existing
standing army which could have been manipulated and used as a
bulwark against the instability which usually crops up during
the uncertain period of transition. The outcome became an
unimaginable disaster that the Afghans experienced during the
period of the even the so-called government in parts of Kabul.
The armed groups of freebooters and thugs of various stripes
also became active. Such things became the order of the day not
only in the city of Kabul where a government led by President
Burhan al-Deen existed by name but also throughout the country
that was fragmented and mastered by self-interested autonomous
governors and commanders. All this happened in the period of
running inflation where in Kabul fathers would present their
children to markets for others to take and feed and keep. The
city of Kabul which had become as a result of years of
modernization schemes the center of a flourishing and
cosmopolitan civilization was almost all destroyed. It still is
in ruin. Approximately 60,000 of its residents were killed in
the fighting. Over one and a half millions of its residents were
forced to flee to the countryside or Pakistan. Any person
throughout the land who could not protect himself, his family or
property was exposed to danger. Afghanistan had become an
inferno more in this period than even in the occupation period
until the Taliban ended the reign of terror.
It was impossible for the Taliban to accomplish what they
have accomplished without the prevalence of the situation as
described. It was unthinkable for the Taliban to score
spectacular victories over the seasoned fighters of the Tanzimat
and the ethnic militias without the active support of the local
population. It was also impossible for the Taliban to rise
without having strong convictions against tyranny (zulm). In no
other period of Afghan history that I know of religious
functionaries have become the ruling power. Perhaps at no other
period such a situation had prevailed in Afghanistan .
The event that led directly to the rise of the Taliban shows
this in part. Mulla Mohammad Omar of the village of Sangisar in
the district of Panjwayee in Kandahar accompanied by a number of
his talibs (students of Islamic learning) asked Commander Salih
Mohammad to release the women he had seized from a passenger bus
coming from Herat. Salih Mohammad had set up a tax post (patak)
on the Kandahar-Herat highway. The mulla pleaded with him to
free the women because, said he, "...seizing the women of
other people was against Islam and against Pashtunwali [the
Pashtun codes of behavior] and that it would provoke the Heratis
to seize in revenge the women of Kandahar who might be our
sisters or wives or mothers." Salih Mohammad declined the
request and further threatened him with gouging his second eye.
The mullah had lost one eye during the resistance. Mullah
Mohammad Omar retreated, but determined to do some thing about
it. The mulla collected his companions and followers and
attacked Salih Mohammad in his post who was killed. The weapons
of Salih Mohammad fell into his hands. Afterward he got rid of
many other such local commanders either by persuasion or force
or both until in November 1994 he wrested Kandahar itself from
autonomous masters such as Gul Agha (Barakzay), Naqib Allah (Alkozay),
Lalay (Popalzay), and Haji Ahmad (Achakzay). ( 9)
The fall of Kandahar proved a turning point. It was followed
by the fall of Ghazni shortly afterward, of Herat on September
5, 1995, of Jalalabad on September 13, 1996 and of Kabul on
September 27, 1996. All this meant a sweep of the Taliban over
the Kabul government, over the Tanzimat and the ethnic militias
south of the Hindu Kush as well as the disappearance of
criminals, kidnappers, robbers, rapists, pataks and the like. It
also meant general disarmament and the maintenance of security,
an accomplishment of immense significance. It likewise meant
momentum for the forces of reunification at the expense of
centrifugal forces which the interventionistic policies of the
ill-intentioned neighbors were reinforcing all this time mainly
through their Afghan surrogates.
The country was still far from united. All the regions north
of the Hindu Kush and a few provinces close to Kabul were still
held by others. It was argued that since these regions were not
populated as much by the ethnic Pashtuns as the other regions
had been the Taliban, most of whom are Pashtuns would be unable
to pacify them especially when the heads of the opposing groups
enjoyed the active support of Iran and Russia, and that under
the supervision of the Russian consul in Mazar they had made a
new anti-Taliban Alliance in Khinjan on October 10,1996. It was
even argued that the sweep of the religious-minded, Pashtun-dominated,
and hard-line rustic Taliban would perpetuate the division of
the country. Hence the increase in weapons and cash from Iran
and Russia to the groups composing the new Alliance. The
Alliance was, however negative in the sense that it was made
only in opposition to the Taliban. Other than that their members
had no common ground among them. That was why no unified
military command was set up. Also, even the strongest member of
it, that is, the National and Islamic Movement led by General
Dostum suffered from internal cracks. Further, the sweep of the
Taliban produced favorable responses among the people north of
the Hindu Kush also. Conversely, the presence of the Russian
consul in Khinjan made the Alliance unpopular. All Afghans were
bewildered by it and most cursed those who had made it.
In May 1997 General Abd al-Malik, the second in command of
the National and Islamic Movement staged a coup against General
Dostum, and invited the Taliban to Mazar. The joint forces of
the Taliban and Abd al-Malik forced Dostum to flee the country,
and occupy Mazar. But all of a sudden the table turned against
the Taliban. Instead of trying to consolidate their position in
an uncertain situation some commanders ordered the Taliban to
forcefully implement unpopular measures in the name of Islamic
Shari'at in complete disregard to the wishes of the people.
Their new ally along with their old foes joined hands against
the Taliban and routed them completely. Over 5,000 of the
Taliban were imprisoned along with a number of their commanders.
Probably over 3,000 of these imprisoned Taliban were
subsequently slaughtered. The Taliban lost Mazar as quickly as
they had possessed it quickly, but another column of them that
came to the north through the Salang tunnel
took the province of Kunduz in their hands. They thus got a
foothold in the north. The active presence of this column
frightened their foes, and they prepared the way for the return
of General Dostum, who once again took command. General Malik
fled to Iran. But Dostum was no longer the strong man that he
had been even in Mazar which was divided between various groups.
Mazar was declared the headquarters of the deposed regime of
Rabbani whom the government of Iran still recognized. Through
its consul in Mazar Iran provided military experts especially to
the pro-Iranian Islamic Unity Party led then by Karim Khalili.
This party became more active than ever because of the weapons,
money and encouragement it received from Iran on an increasingly
big scale. In fact, Iran's strategy at this stage was to deliver
weapons by air to any group that opposed the Taliban. Its
transport planes carrying weapons were landed twice or three
times a week in the airfields of Shiberghan, Bamian and Bagram.
'Alaw al-Deen Brojurdi, the man Iran had put in charge of Afghan
affairs made open trips regularly to Bamian and northern
Afghanistan. Iran was determined to build a strong block against
the Taliban as it worked to prevent another sweep of the Taliban
to the north.
Nevertheless the second sweep of the Taliban began from the
province of Badghis north-east of Herat in July 1998. This time
they were alone in their sweep, and respected the wishes of the
local population, even addressing their rallies , telling them
that they had come to deliver them from the clutches of the
mercenaries and atheists. They first occupied the province of
Faryab, with its capital of Maimana, the home town of General
Malik, and soon afterward the province of Jouzjan with its
capital of Shiberghan the home town of General Dostum. The
general repeatedly resisted the Taliban, but could not turn the
tide, and then he fled once again. The Taliban were in
Shiberghan when their supporters in the province of Balkh with
its capital at Mazar invited them to their province. The people
of Hazhdah Nahr around the ancient city of Balkh even urged them
to come. The Taliban even though were unprepared for the
undertaking accepted the call. Mazar came under fire by columns
of the Taliban from Kunduz, and Shiberghan in conjunction with
local supporters especially from the Balkh area. By this time
even though Mazar had received some reinforcement all groups of
the Northern Alliance had deserted the city, and only the
pro-Iranian Islamic Unity Party had taken positions to defend
it. But against the determined and united front of the Taliban
and the local population Mazar could not be defended. The
Taliban and their allies took the city by storm in a matter of
hours on Saturday August 8, 1998. The losses in men for the
Unity Party was immense, particularly of those fleeing the
scene. The occupation of Mazar followed by the rapid advance of
the Taliban in adjacent provinces until on 13 September 1998
they also occupied Bamian, the capital of Hazarajat, the
stronghold of the pro-Iranian Islamic Unity Party. Thus Mazar
after 6 years and the Hazarajat after 18 years of separation
were reincorporated in Afghanistan and the reunification of the
land was now almost complete.
Considering the amount of weapons they had accumulated and
the backing of Iran and Russia that they enjoyed the groups
composing the Northern Alliance were unlikely to accept a
central government in Kabul whether headed by the Taliban or
others. Together they had a total of more than 170 tanks, more
than 900 military vehicles, more than 50 motorized personnel
carriers, more than a few helicopters and war air planes, more
than 180 Scud and Luna rockets, and an unspecified quantity of
other light and heavy weapons. The actual amount of weapons may
be higher.
The most important accomplishment of the Taliban is the fact
that after twenty years of the Soviet invasion and the civil war
during which time the country had been in a state of
fragmentation they have brought it to the brink of
reunification. They have accomplished this at a time when the
difficulties confronting them were far more formidable than at
any time since the Second Anglo-Afghan War. In fact, the
internal difficulties were even sharper now than at any time
since Ahmad Shah Durranay had founded Afghanistan: in the
present civil war the internal powers had so much weapons in
their hands which no other groups or persons had in any other
period of civil war; in the present period there had sprung so
many rival political and military centers of power based on
ethnicity and region which did not exist in any other period of
civil war; to the extent that in the present period power
seekers had gone so much under the influence of foreign powers
others in no other period had gone; and finally to the extent
that the ill-intentioned neighbors had designed schemes on
Afghanistan and had prolonged the state of war through their
Afghan surrogates in no other period others have done so. What
the Taliban and their elders have accomplished no other groups
of Afghans could accomplish. They have accomplished all this at
a time when the Afghans as a nation had become powerless and
disappointed, and the ill-intentioned neighbors bent upon
hurting them and the integrity of their country. Afghanistan in
fact had faced a most severe crisis of its integrity. Therefore
the accomplishments of the Taliban and of their commanders are
equal to all those which the Afghans have accomplished after
Ahmad Shah Durranay had founded Afghanistan. In short with
dauntless spirit and huge sacrifices they have secured
Afghanistan for its own people in face of insurmountable odds.
A National Government for Afghanistan.
Afghan Make or Foreign Make?
Since the Soviet invasion Afghanistan had in fact no national
government. During the period of the Tanzimat the Afghans came
closer to have one, but whatever it was it was not a national
government. The state that was called the Islamic State of
Afghanistan became ineffective. It became ineffective because
that was the outcome of the Peshawar Accord which was devised
essentially by foreign powers. Hence the chaos and anarchy which
the Afghans face to this day. The lesson should be that if the
purpose is a viable political set up for Afghans it should be
devised by their own chosen or selected representatives. In the
present situation this seems more of an ideal than a realizable
goal for in the present war situation groups of Afghans prefer
to grab the state power. But even now if a group or groups of
people possess state power they can remain in power only if they
make it representative or fairly so by sharing power with
persons drawn from all levels until such a time when a loya
jirga or a grand council is convened or the ground for general
elections is prepared. In other words they must not only not
monopolize state power, but should also satisfy the people by
providing them security of life and security of property as well
as respecting their legitimate rights, their legitimate wishes
and attend to their legitimate needs even if there is still no
new constitution and no lawful national government.
Unfortunately this has not been the case so far.
Whatever form of government that has come to be set up by the
Afghans or a group or groups of them since the April coup of
1978 has been monopolistic. For whatever reason no Afghan active
on the national scene has come out with the vision, agenda and
actions commensurate of a national leader. At times efforts were
made toward the formation of a pluralistic form of government
but such efforts have all but failed. They have failed
principally because of the war situation, the monopolistic
designs of the committed and radical Afghans and the schemes of
the ill-intentioned neighbors as already described. After the
Soviet withdrawal the General-Secretary of the United Nations
showed interest in assisting the Afghans to set up a broad-based
government, but all his efforts through his special envoys have
failed. The formula is still on the table, and is pursued by his
present special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. But the formula
specially in the present situation suffers from limitations and
so it is unlikely that will come to fruition for the following
reasons:
1- The formula of the broad-based government is not relevant
in the present situation. Originally it was put forward by Diego
Cordovez after the Geneva Accords were signed in April 1988. At
the time it was expected that following the withdrawal of the
Soviet troops all the sides involved in Afghan politics would
agree to, and work for, the formation of a broad-based
government until the time for general election has arrived. It
was hoped that the political vacuum that would result the
withdrawal would thus be filled in, and anarchy avoided. This
did not happen, and the formula died. Nevertheless Cordovez's
successors pursued it; they also failed. The General-Secretary
did not address the issue of why his envoys failed in their
missions. Now he seems to take some drastic measures about it.
But now there is no longer a political void in Afghanistan.
There is now an Islamic Emirate which controls more than ninety
percent of the country, and by all accounts has maintained
security in its domain. It has thus got the right to represent
Afghanistan in international communities and speak for it. It
alone has the power and the ability to implement any program
that concerns Afghanistan in its domain. For the United Nations
to have any dealing with Afghanistan and its people it can not
do without it. Only in cooperation with it can it try to resolve
whatever issues it wants to pursue with regard to the country.
If for nothing else for practical reasons it needs to recognize
and deal with it. Recognition of the Islamic Emirate would also
mean changes toward its moderation. In its domain already
operates a free market system with least government regulations.
Its leaders have shown that they are not dogmatic
revolutionaries, but responsive to legitimate and sensible
demands for changes.
2- The broad-based government formula has now became a means
for others to pressure the Afghans to set up a political system
the way they think is fit. This limits the choice of Afghans in
the matter of self-determination, and thus it negates their
basic right, a right which is the foundation stone of their
polity, just as it is the foundation stone of all polities. Let
us not forget the fact that the Afghans gave huge sacrifices in
fighting the Soviet intruders principally to assert their right
to self-determination.
3- The broad-based formula has now become suspect especially
when some members of the six plus two, that is, Afghanistan's
six neighbors plus Russia and the United states have made it a
condition for the solution of the Afghan problem. The device of
six plus two which is objectionable on many grounds any way,
gives to each of Afghanistan's neighbors a role to play in the
solution of the Afghan problem. But each has an agenda of its
own about Afghanistan. In fact, the Afghan conflict and its
prolongation is due mainly to their machinations particularly
those of Iran's and Russia's. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
has time and again accused Russia, Iran and Uzbekistan of
interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan, while the rebel
groups have accused Pakistan. Hence the inability of
Afghanistan's neighbors to jointly and impartially work for the
solution of the Afghan problem.. Even Kofi Annan has now become
suspicious of the group when he recently complained that "
The unabated external involvement in the Afghan conflict leads
me to raise the question of the 'six plus two' group." That
was why the group was unable to adopt, as it was commissioned to
adopt "... a joint strategy towards reaching a peaceful
solution of the Afghan conflict." Now that Kofi Annan has
become convinced that the "external involvement" in
Afghan affairs has become a stumbling block, it is required of
him as General-Secretary of the world body to neutralize this
"external involvement." If he did so he would have
basically resolved the Afghan problem.
4-Lastly, the broad-based government in the form that is
demanded is impracticable. It is one thing to demand that the
broad-based government should include representatives of all
segments composing the Afghan society. It is quite another to
demand that it should be composed of the heads of the Tanzimat
and ethnic militias as the group of six plus two and others
demand. The fact is that these persons have fought among
themselves so much that they can not govern jointly. Actually,
some have disqualified themselves to govern, because they have
caused destruction on a grand scale, and the the killing of
innocent people by the thousands. Some have made themselves the
surrogates of the ill-intentioned neighbors. Most important,
with the exception of Commander Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, who is still
in Afghanistan others have been driven out of the country. Now
to insist that such persons should be included in a broad-based
government is asking for the impossible. In view is probably the
prolongation of the Afghan conflict, not its solution.
The demand which Afghans as well as non-Afghans are entitled
to make for a broad-based government should be in the sense that
it be representative in accord with the social conventions of
Afghans and the principles of human rights, as this should be so
in all polities. In this connection in the present specific
conditions of Afghanistan two suggestions are most talked about.
One suggestion is the emergency loya jirga which the former King
Mohammad Zahir has put forward in November 1990. According to it
an emergency loya jirga is to be convened after some
preparations have been made for it by all those groups and
persons who carry influence and weight in society. The jirga is
to set up an interim government, and the latter is to prepare in
suitable time the ground for the institution of a national
government on the basis of a new constitution.
The first comment to make about it is that the emergency loya
jirga was proposed at a time when Afghanistan had no government,
or had a Parcham-based government, but which, by all accounts,
was considered unviable. Now it is not so. No loya jirga can be
convened inside Afghanistan without the concurrence of the
Islamic Emirate. The Emirate stands for a loya jirga or a grand
council only after the whole of Afghanistan has been reunified.
To its leaders the reunification is the top priority. It is yet
to happen. The proponents of the emergency loya jirga may try to
convene it outside Afghanistan, but they may not be able to do
so. Perhaps they will be able to convene a forum of a kind, and
that too only with external assistance. In such a case it will
have no legitimacy, and no effectiveness. Besides, at no time in
Afghan history a new government has been instituted through a
loya jirga. At all times loya jirgas have been convened by
already established political authorities to meet national
emergencies in consultation with influential elders of society.
More important, the figure upon whom the proposed emergency loya
jirga hinges is the former king himself. But he is 86 years of
age, out of direct touch with concrete Afghan realities for over
quarter of a century, and unable to speak the language of the
majority. Besides, he exists only in the memory of the old
generation, and the young generation does not relate itself to
him. Now to expect the former king to dynamically engage in
Afghan politics as he will be required to do so, is asking too
much of him. Still others work under his umbrella, hoping to
replace the Islamic Emirate. Since they themselves are unable to
do so they rally around him in the hope that he can become an
alternative. Hence the support of the emergency loya jirga even
by such groups and persons who are essentially against it. Dr.
Zalmay Khalilzad is the most active among such persons who is
shuttling between Rome and Washington. They all look upon His
former Majesty as a golden means to terminate the Islamic
Emirate and to promote themselves who, like His former Majesty
had a comfortable life abroad during the national resistance
period, but now want power through international diplomacy.
Seemingly His former Majesty has let them do so. Thus he has now
become a liability to the people of Afghanistan in contrast to
the late King Aman Allah who under similar circumstances did not
choose to do so, and remained an Afghan patriot to the last
minute of his life. But for the reasons I have given it is
unrealistic to expect a government to be instituted through the
emergency loya jirga no matter how hard their proponents work
for it unless their foreign patrons push them to the seat of
power by a military force, an event which is unlikely to happen.
Their propaganda and activity, however, may create unrealistic
hope among some Afghans, polarize all Afghans still further, and
even disturb the stability which the Taliban have brought at a
huge cost. In such a case the centrifugal forces may find a new
lease of life and the pre-Taliban anarchy may reign once again
while the proponents of the emergency loya jirga especially
their activists with no social base would have become helpless,
hopeless and perhaps also indifferent spectators.
The other most talked about suggestion concerns the leaders
of the Islamic Emirate. They are required to introduce some kind
of reform even though here much depends on the situation inside
the country which is still one of war and destruction, and the
attitude of the international community toward Afghanistan which
is combative, and partisan, not in line with international laws
and norms and thus unfair, even biased, and regrettable, but
which is not the subject of discussion here. The Islamic Emirate
is, therefore, not expected at his stage to introduce
comprehensive reforms, but it is required to take some initial
feasible steps toward such a reform.
First it should open its fold in the non-military and
non-security fields to other Afghans. For this purpose it should
set up a supreme consultative council composed of competent,
qualified, principled, influential and non-committed Afghans to
suggest ways and means for improving the over all situation, in
particular the financial and employment situation. A purpose of
this council should be to devise ways and means to enlist the
cooperation of Afghan specialists in Europe, America and
elsewhere in reconstruction of the country. It should also set
up local consultative councils or jirgas to assist local
officials in running the country, a system which the Emirate had
originally put into operation. Meanwhile, it should assure the
Afghans that once the country was reunified it would convene, as
it had promised to convene a nation-wide grand council or loya
jirga to set up a representative broad-based government for the
transitional period. Second, the Islamic Emirate should lift the
unlawful restrictions it has imposed on women, beard, music and
the like, and observe the internationally-accepted rights of men
and women, a subject that I have described elsewhere in detail.
(10) For the Islamic Emirate to do so it needs to abolish the
office of the promotion of virtues and prevention of
prohibitions. If that is not feasible or advisable it can and
should effectively discipline its officials not to punish
violators of the laws themselves, but only to present them to
the courts.
With these measures the Islamic Emirate would have taken
steps toward easing the pressure under which it finds itself and
the people. It would also have saved itself from blame for
monopolizing state power as its predecessors had been rightly
blamed for it. It itself would have become a broad-based
government of a kind even in the present war situation. About
the human right situation it would still not satisfy its
international critics whatever it does in this respect. The
international community would probably go on stressing the issue
as before without appreciating the concern of the people about
the integrity of their fatherland as well as about their concern
for national sovereignty. Unfortunately, the Afghans are among
the least understood people in the world. In part this is
probably due to the assumption that the issue of human right
especially its moral aspect is cultural. At any rate, the
British suffered from the lack of understanding of the Afghans
in the nineteenth century, and the Soviets in the present.
Seemingly now the international community, especially the U.S.
Administration, intend to repeat a similar mistake by imposing
sanctions on Afghanistan, and isolating it essentially on the
issue of the latter's own creation, that is, the issue of Osama
bin Laden, which can not be discussed here.
The proposed sanctions in addition to the one already imposed
coupled with the isolation of Afghanistan by the non-recognition
of the Islamic Emirate are bound to hurt a brave people who
stood steadfast in defence of decent human values against
foreign aggression for which the non-Soviet international
community assisted them, but now wants to punish them in
collaboration strangely with the successor of the same
aggressors. But as Abd al-Hakeem Mujahid has put it the
sanctions probably"... would be only in the interests of
Iran and Russia, which want permanent instability in
Afghanistan, while the U.S. can get nothing out of it." In
short, such an action does not stand to reason, common sense
especially to justice if it still has a meaning. Perhaps it does
not at least in the minds of power players. At any rate to
impose sanctions on the poor but brave people of Afghanistan who
have already suffered immensely because of the Soviet aggression
and the subsequent civil war for over twenty years is nothing
but a tyranny (zulm) on a huge scale.
-------------------------------------
Notes
1 -M. H. Kakar, Afghanistan, a Study in Internal Political
Developments,1880-1896, Punjab Education Press, Lahore, Kabul,
1971, 35
2.- Kakar, A Political History and the External Relations of
Afghanistan, The Reign of Ameer Abd al-Rahman Khan, unpublished
manuscript, Chapter 10
3-Haroun, Da'ud Khan da KGB pa lomo ki (Da'ud Khan in the
Trap of the KGB), Khybar Publication, [Germany ], [1994].
4- Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan, An Insider's
Account, Brgamon-Brassey'sInternational Defense Publishers,
1988, Washington, New York, 179
5-Bruce G. Richardson, Afghanistan, Ending the Reign of
Soviet Terror, Maverick Publications, Bend, Oregon, Second
Edition, 1998, 52
6-Faqir Mohammad Wadan, Dashna haye surkh dar Afganistan,
siyasathaye moscow wa asarat -e-aan bar inkishaf-e-awza' dar
afganistan (The Red Daggers, Moscow's Policies and their Effects
on the Developments of Situations in Afghanistan) privately
published, Germany, 1999, 85-93
7-Kakar, Afghanistan, The Policy of Intrigue, Myopia, and
Hatred, Jirga, publication of the Afghan Movement for A
Representative Government in Afghanistan, Los Angeles, Vol.1,
Number 5, April 1993,10-19
8-Kakar, Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan
Response, 1979-1982, University of California Press, 1995,
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 276
9- Mohammad Ibrahim Kakar, personal communication,
California, September, 1999
10-Kakar, ed. Essays on the Population, History and Current
Affairs of Afghanistan, Sapi Center for Pashto Research and
Developments, Peshawar, in Pashto and Dari, 1999. See also,
Saida Gul Gharibyar, Report of an Interview with Ameer Khan
Muttaqi, in Pashto, Afghanistan Mirror ( journal), August 1999,
29-33